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PLACING FACES: RECOLLECTION AND FAMILIARITY IN THE OWN-RACE 
BIAS FOR FACE RECOGNITION 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The research presented in this thesis examined the roles of recollection and 
familiarity in the own-race bias (ORB) in recognition memory for faces. In Paper 1, 
Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure was used to estimate the relative 
contributions of recollection and familiarity in recognizing own- and other-race faces. 
Recollection estimates were higher for own-race faces than for other-race faces, 
although this effect disappeared when deep or shallow encoding strategies were 
encouraged. In Paper 2, participants were shown to be less accurate at ignoring 
previously seen other-race distractors than own-race distractors. Papers 3 and 4 
examined how accurately participants were able to remember contextual information 
about correctly recognized faces. In the encoding phase of an old/new recognition 
test, each target face was paired with one of several different backgrounds. At testing, 
old judgments were followed by context judgments, in which the participant 
attempted to identify with which background the face had been paired. The context 
judgments were consistently more accurate for correctly recognized own-race faces 
than for correctly recognized other-race faces. This effect was robust to experimental 
manipulations such as context reinstatement and divided attention. The overall 
conclusion from this thesis is that recollection is inferior for other-race faces 
compared to own-race faces. This recollection deficit means that it is more difficult to 
retrieve specific information about the circumstances in which other-race faces were 
encountered. The implications of this recollection deficit for real world behaviour are 
discussed, with particular reference to eyewitness memory.  
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General Introduction 
1. The Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition 
 Despite the remarkable capacity for the human memory to recognize limitless 
numbers of faces, not all types of faces are recognized equally well. People recognize 
members of their own race more accurately than members of other races. This was 
first empirically shown by Malpass and Kravitz (1969) with White and Black 
university students, although it was acknowledged long before. Feingold (1914) 
remarked that “to the uninitiated American, all Asiatics look alike, while to the 
Asiatic all white men look alike” (p.50). This effect has been termed the own-race 
bias (ORB), or cross-race effect.  
 The ORB has been shown with members of several different races. Most 
studies have tested White and Black participants (e.g. Ayuk, 1990; Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005), with significant effects found in 
both groups (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 
1982), although larger effect sizes are often found in White participants than in Black 
participants (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Superior recognition of own-race faces has 
also been found in Hispanic participants (Evans, Marcon, & Meissner, 2009; Gross, 
2009; MacLin, MacLin, & Malpass, 2001; Platz & Hosch, 1988), East Asian 
participants (Gross, 2009; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 
2006; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Ng & Lindsay, 1994), Turkish 
participants (Sporer, Trinkl, & Guberova, 2007), and Native Canadian participants 
(Jackiw, Arbuthnott, Pfeifer, Marcon, & Meissner, 2008).  
 The ORB has been tested with different paradigms. Most commonly, old/new 
recognition tests have been used (e.g. Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, & Sriram, 2001; Hills 
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& Lewis, 2006; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003). Participants study a large set of 
faces, and must then discriminate old faces from new faces in a testing phase. This 
procedure is statistically powerful, as multiple data points are collected from each 
participant. Using a large number of faces also reduces stimulus sampling concerns, 
as results will be less influenced by any peculiarities of the targets (Sporer, 2001a). 
Old/new recognition tests also allow for tight experimental control over factors such 
as presentation duration and retention interval.  However, this procedure is low in 
“mundane realism” (Wells & Olson, 2001), and one must therefore be cautious about 
applying the findings of these studies directly to memory in the real world. 
 Lineup studies, in which participants identify the target face from a small 
group of similar faces, provide a more externally valid method for testing face 
recognition. Most lineup studies of the ORB have used simultaneous lineups 
(Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Evans et al., 2009; Jackiw et al., 2008; 
Platz & Hosch, 1988; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001), although one study used a 
sequential lineup followed by a simultaneous lineup (Wright et al., 2001). Some of 
these studies are field studies, in which naïve participants are approached by one or 
more confederates, and are some time later asked to identify the confederate or 
confederates (Brigham et al., 1982; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Wright et al., 2001). Other 
studies have used videotaped staged crimes (Smith, Lindsay, Pryke, & Dysart, 2001; 
Smith, Stinson, & Prosser, 2004), or photographs (Evans et al., 2009; Jackiw et al., 
2008) during encoding.  The results of these lineup studies have supported those from 
old/new recognition tests, with most showing significant ORBs.  
 Despite their external validity, lineup studies do have some disadvantages. 
None of the field studies of the ORB have used target absent lineups, which are 
considered very important by eyewitness researchers (Sporer, 2001a).  Only a small 
   
3 
number of targets can be tested, which raises stimulus sampling concerns (Wells & 
Olson, 2001), as the particular targets used in a given study may not be representative 
of the group from which they are sampled, and the faces from one group may be more 
similar to each other than faces from the other group. Lineup studies are not 
statistically powerful, as only a small number of data points (sometimes just one) can 
be recorded for each participant. Large sample sizes are required, which can be 
difficult and expensive to recruit. However, despite these limitations, the general 
consistency of results across these studies suggests that the ORB does generalize to 
lineup identifications (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
 Several meta-analyses have been conducted on the ORB literature. Anthony et 
al. (1992) and Bothwell et al. (1982) showed that the ORB is reliable in both White 
and Black participants, with 79% of the eleven studies included in Bothwell et al.’s 
(1982) analysis showing significant crossover effects. The most extensive meta-
analysis to date involved thirty nine studies with almost five thousand participants 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Correct identifications, false identifications, and overall 
discrimination accuracy were shown to be reliably higher for own-race faces than 
other-race faces. The ORB was strongest in White participants, although it was also 
present in participants from other races.  
2. Why Does the Own-Race Bias Occur? 
 Theoretical accounts of the ORB have attempted to tackle both the why and 
the how which underpin this robust effect. Early theories of why the ORB occurs 
included differences in the amount of physiognomic or perceived variability between 
groups, and the interference of participants’ racial attitudes and stereotypes with their 
processing and retention of other-race faces. Both of these positions have received 
limited support, and have largely given way to the two main current theoretical 
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stances: The contact/perceptual expertise account, and the in-group/out-group model. 
The evidence for each of these explanations for why the ORB occurs will be 
discussed in turn below, beginning with the earlier accounts of physiognomic 
variability and stereotyping.    
2.1. Physiognomic differences in variability 
  An early hypothesis was that perhaps some races are simply less variable in 
their physiognomy than others. For example, whereas Whites show considerable 
variation in eye colour and hair colour, other groups such as Blacks and Asians tend 
to have uniformly dark hair and eyes (Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 1975). 
However, this hypothesis has not received much empirical support. White participants 
can make accurate same/different judgments as quickly for Japanese faces as for 
White faces (Goldstein & Chance, 1976) and can search for a White or Japanese 
target in an array of same-race faces with similar speed and accuracy (Goldstein & 
Chance, 1978). In one set of studies, White participants rated Japanese faces equally 
as similar to each other as White faces (Goldstein & Chance, 1978), while in another 
study, Japanese faces were rated as more similar than White faces (Goldstein & 
Chance, 1979). Zebrowitz, Montepare, and Lee (1993) showed that White, Black, and 
Korean participants could make individuated impression ratings and feature ratings 
for White, Black, and Korean faces, and that inter-racial agreement on the ratings was 
high. 
 More recently, Walker and colleagues (Walker & Hewstone, 2006a, 2006b, 
2008; Walker & Tanaka, 2003) have used morphing techniques to investigate whether 
other-race faces are more perceptually similar to each other than own-race faces. Two 
faces (referred to as “parent faces”) of different races are morphed together along a 
continuum, creating a range of faces with varying ratios of information from each 
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parent face. Participants then see a parent face and a morph, and make a rapid 
same/different judgment. White, East Asian, and South Asian participants make more 
errors discriminating faces closer to the other-race parent face than the own-race 
parent face, suggesting that other-race faces may appear more similar to each other 
than own-race faces after all. However, the crossover nature of this effect in samples 
from different races suggests that it is not a matter of physiognomic similarity, but of 
psychological similarity.  
2.2. Prejudice and stereotyping 
 Another early hypothesis was that the ORB is a product of biased attitudes 
(Chance et al., 1975), and that people with negative attitudes would have more 
difficulty recognizing other-race faces than people with positive attitudes. Several 
studies have searched for associations between self-reported attitudes and the ORB, 
with most showing no relationship between the two (e.g. Brigham & Barkowitz, 
1978; Carroo, 1987; Ferguson et al., 2001; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000). In a 
meta-analytic review, Meissner and Brigham (2001) found no direct effect of attitudes 
on the ORB, but suggested that there may be an indirect effect mediated by contact. 
Brigham, Bennett, Meissner, and Mitchell (2007) suggested that social attitudes may 
influence both the quantity and quality of contact with members of other races, and 
that this could lead to poorer recognition of other-race faces. 
 Other studies have examined the influence of implicit or unconscious attitudes 
on the ORB, using procedures such as the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the bona fide pipeline (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995). The results of these studies have been inconsistent, with some 
showing significant relationships between implicit attitudes and the ORB (Walker & 
Hewstone, 2008) and others finding no such relationship (Ferguson et al., 2001). 
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Lebrecht, Pierce, Tarr, and Tanaka (2009) showed that participants who were trained 
to distinguish between other-race faces showed smaller implicit biases than 
participants who were not trained. The authors suggested that difficulties in 
discriminating between members of other races could lead to stereotyping – if people 
look alike, they must therefore be alike. Brigham (2007) suggested that lacking 
confidence in one’s ability to accurately recognize people of other races may cause 
anxiety about, and therefore avoidance of, interactions with those same people.  
 Overall, the evidence does not seem to support the hypothesis that ORB is a 
product of prejudiced attitudes or automatic stereotypes. However, the methods used 
to measure explicit and implicit attitudes may be subject to measurement error. 
Participants may not be truthful when completing explicit attitude measures, as 
negative attitudes towards members of other races are not socially desirable. Recent 
evidence also suggests that tasks designed to measure implicit prejudice may be less 
reliable than was previously believed. For example, exposing participants to positive 
exemplars of members of another race reduces bias as measured by the IAT 
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). The presence of a Black experimenter is also 
sufficient to reduce bias in the IAT (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Some 
researchers have argued that apparent racial bias in the IAT may actually be a product 
of differential familiarity rather than implicit prejudice (Brendl, Markman, & 
Meissner, 2001; Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 2005).  
 Stereotyping and prejudice are very complex social phenomena. Garcia-
Marques, Santos, and Mackie (2006) argue that stereotypes are not static abstractions, 
but dynamic knowledge structures which fluctuate over time even within an 
individual. Stereotypes and implicit attitudes may be successfully controlled under 
some conditions (Blair, 2002; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; 
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Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999), but may be exaggerated in situations 
of high anxiety (Lambert et al., 2003) or perceived threat (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 
2003). Stereotype activation may also be moderated by how typical of their race a 
person is perceived to be. Blair, Judd, Sadler, and Jenkins (2002) showed that Black 
faces with more “Afrocentric” features (e.g. darker skin) are more likely to be 
associated with negative stereotypes than Black faces with fewer Afrocentric features. 
These kinds of subtle variations in the activation and expression of stereotypes stand 
in stark contrast to older theories of prejudice, which viewed attitudes as relatively 
stable over time. This “modern racism” is much more difficult to define and measure, 
and may be one reason why studies searching for associations between prejudice and 
the ORB have not produced significant results (Brigham, 2007). 
2.3. Contact and perceptual expertise 
 A longstanding and inherently plausible account of the ORB is that lifelong 
contact with members of one’s own racial group leads to a specialized sort of 
expertise for processing and remembering those faces. This expertise is not 
generalized to the processing of other-race faces, which are therefore processed less 
efficiently, or are confused in memory. This idea has been around for some time; 
Feingold (1914) stated that “it is well known that, other things being equal, 
individuals of a given race are distinguishable from each other in proportion to our 
familiarity, to our contact with the race as a whole” (p. 50). Sporer (2001b) argued 
that unless one assumes that people are genetically hardwired to recognize own-race 
faces but not other-race faces, the ORB must be attributable to differential contact.  
 Often in the ORB literature, little or no distinction is made between actual 
contact and opportunity for contact. Researchers have used a variety of techniques to 
investigate the contact hypothesis, some of which explore actual contact (by self-
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report, and by perceptual training), and some of which explore opportunity for contact 
(e.g. recruiting participants from areas/countries with different demographics, and by 
examining the development of the ORB throughout childhood). Many cognitive 
researchers have failed to acknowledge the importance of the distinction between 
actual contact and opportunity for contact, making the assumption that individuals 
within multi-racial societies will inevitably interact with members of other groups. 
While such contact may occur on a superficial level, social psychological research has 
shown that even within desegregated multicultural environments, there is a strong bias 
towards interacting with in-group members to the exclusion of out-group members 
(Dixon, Tredoux, & Clack, 2005; Tredoux & Dixon, 2009).   
  Furthermore, many researchers have ignored social psychological research on 
inter-group relations which demonstrates differences between majority and minority 
groups as a function of their power. The “golden standard” of ORB research is to find 
a cross-over interaction between the race of the participant and the race of the face, 
such that the participants from both groups recognize in-group faces more accurately 
than out-group faces. Researchers have argued that such interactions can rule out the 
possibility of a priori differences in the discriminability of the two face sets (e.g. 
Wells & Olson, 2001). However, there are reasons why one might expect members of 
minority groups – particularly those of low status – to recognize out-group faces as 
accurately, if not more accurately, than in-group faces. Minority group members may 
be reliant on majority group members for education, employment, housing, and so on. 
This might then necessitate a higher amount of meaningful contact with the out-group 
for minority groups than for majority groups (Islam & Hewstone, 1993a). Research on 
in-group/out-group attributional biases has also shown that members of high-status 
majority groups tend to favour the in-group and derogate the out-group; members of 
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low-status minorities, however, do not show the same patterns of out-group 
derogation, and may even favour the out-group (Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993b).   
 Below, the evidence for the role of contact in the ORB will be reviewed, 
distinguishing between actual contact and opportunity for contact. The former will be 
reviewed first, in studies which have taken measures of self-reported contact, and in 
studies which have experimentally manipulated experience with other-race faces 
using training procedures. Opportunity for contact will then be discussed, with 
evidence from developmental studies, and from experiments conducted with 
populations differing in their potential exposure to members of other groups.  
2.3.1. Actual contact 
In adult populations, some studies have investigated the association between 
self-reported inter-racial contact and the magnitude of the ORB. Some studies have 
shown significant positive correlations between contact and accuracy (e.g. Brigham et 
al., 1982; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008), with the most powerful associations with items 
which assess current friendships (Carroo, 1986; Michel, Caldara, et al., 2006; Slone et 
al., 2000) and other meaningful individuating contact (Walker & Hewstone, 2006b, 
2008). In some cases, contact is associated with accuracy for one race, but not for 
another (Michel, Caldara, et al., 2006; Platz et al., 1988; Wright et al., 2003), and in 
many cases, contact is not significantly associated with accuracy (Brigham & 
Barkowitz, 1978; Carroo, 1987; Corenblum & Meissner, 2006; Jackiw et al., 2008; 
Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Sporer et al., 2007; Walker & 
Hewstone, 2006a). Wright et al. (2003) argued that the variability of contact scores 
within many samples may be insufficient to detect a relationship between contact and 
accuracy, and this may particularly be true in areas which are racially homogeneous. 
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Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that across 29 studies, increased self-reported 
contact was associated with a decrease in the magnitude of the ORB, although the 
effect was modest, accounting for around 2% of the variance.  
Other studies have introduced experimental manipulations of exposure to 
own- and other-race faces. The logic is this: if the ORB is, at least to some degree, a 
product of learning experiences, then it should be possible to train participants to 
become more accurate at recognizing other-race faces. A small number of studies 
have tested this hypothesis. Elliott, Wills, and Goldstein (1973) and Goldstein and 
Chance (1985) trained White participants to individuate Asian faces using paired 
associate tasks, in which participants learnt associations between individual Asian 
faces and corresponding numeric labels. Trained participants showed a reduced ORB 
compared to control participants, who received no such training. Lebrecht et al. 
(2009) used a similar procedure with White and Black faces, and showed a reduced 
effect in White participants. Hills and Lewis (2006) found no ORB in White 
participants trained to focus attention on features which are useful for discriminating 
between Black faces, such as chin shape and mouth shape. However, verbal training, 
in which participants are trained to accurately describe other-race faces, does not 
appear to improve recognition (Malpass, Lavigueur, & Weldon, 1973). These studies 
strongly support the idea that people can learn to accurately distinguish between and 
recognize other-race faces. Passive exposure is insufficient to reduce the ORB 
(Goldstein & Chance, 1985; Hills & Lewis, 2006). Rather, participants must engage 
in a task which allows them to individuate the other-race faces. It is unclear, however, 
how long lasting these training effects may be as no studies have investigated the 
effects of training over an extended period of time.  
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2.3.2. Opportunity for contact 
 In recent years, a burgeoning literature has emerged on the developmental 
time course of the ORB, with participants ranging from newborn infants to children 
and adolescents. Researchers often make the assumption that the infants and children 
in these studies will have limited exposure to faces from other-race groups. Some 
developmental studies have included samples from groups with high potential for 
inter-group contact and groups with low potential for inter-group contact (Goodman 
et al., 2007).  
Infant studies show that the ORB begins to emerge very early in life. Infants’ 
face recognition can be tested with visual preferences paradigms, in which infants are 
habituated to a target face, and then shown the target along with a novel face. Infants 
will spend longer looking at novel stimuli than familiar stimuli, so recognition can be 
inferred when the looking time is longer for the novel face than for the target face. 
Kelly et al. (2005) found that White newborn infants were able to recognize White, 
Chinese, Black, and Middle Eastern faces equally well, but by three months old, the 
infants could only recognize White faces. The ORB at three months old has been 
confirmed elsewhere (Hayden, Bhatt, Joseph, & Tanaka, 2007; Kelly, Liu, et al., 
2007), although Sangrigoli and de Schonen (2004a) showed that this effect can be 
eliminated with exposure to a small number of other-race faces. Other studies have 
found that the ORB develops slightly later in infancy. Ferguson, Kulkofsky, Cashon, 
and Casasola (2009) also found that four month old infants could discriminate 
between other-race faces, but that this ability was lost by eight months of age. Kelly, 
Quinn, et al. (2007) and Kelly et al. (2009) have shown that recognition becomes 
progressively narrower throughout the first year of life, leading to a reliable ORB by 
nine months old. Thus, despite some inconsistencies in the exact timing of the ORB, it  
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Table 1: Age of onset in studies of the ORB in infants (top) and children and 
adolescents (bottom) 
Age ORB present ORB not present 
Infant studies 
Newborn  Kelly et al. (2005) 
3 months Hayden et al. (2007); Kelly et al. 
(2005); Kelly, Liu, et al. (2007); 
Sangrigoli & de Schonen (2004a) 
Kelly, Quinn, et al. (2007) 
Kelly et al. (2009) 
4-6 
months 
Kelly, Quinn, et al. (2007); Kelly 
et al. (2009) 
Ferguson et al. (2009) 
8-9 
months 
Ferguson et al. (2009); Kelly, 
Quinn, et al. (2007); Kelly et al. 
(2009). 
 
Child/adolescent studies 
2-4 years Sangrigoli & de Schonen 
(2004b); Shutts & Kinzler (2007)  
 
5-6 years Pezdek et al. (2003); Sangrigoli 
& de Schonen (2004b); Shutts & 
Kinzler (2007) 
Chance et al. (1982); 
Goodman et al. (2007)  
9-10 years Chance et al. (1982); Goodman 
et al. (2007); Pezdek et al. 
(2003); Sporer et al. (2007)  
 
13-16 
years 
Sporer et al. (2007); Walker & 
Hewstone (2006a) 
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appears that face recognition becomes narrowed within the first few months of life. 
However, these own-race effects remain fairly plastic during infancy and can be 
reduced by a relatively small amount of contact with members of other races 
(Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004a). 
 Studies with children have produced slightly less clear results. The ORB has 
been shown in children as young as two (Shutts & Kinzler, 2007) or three years old 
(Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004b). Studies with slightly older samples have found an 
ORB in five year olds (Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Moore, 2003) and seven year olds  
 (Corenblum & Meissner, 2006; Walker & Hewstone, 2006a). Other studies have 
failed to find an ORB until nine (Goodman et al., 2007) or ten years old (Chance, 
Lockwood-Turner, & Goldstein, 1982). By ten years and onwards, the ORB appears 
to be stable (Sporer et al., 2007; Walker & Hewstone, 2006b). Some of these 
inconsistencies in age of onset may be due to the different methodologies used, 
including perceptual discrimination tasks (Shutts & Kinzler, 2007; Walker & 
Hewstone, 2006a, 2006b), a delayed match to sample task (Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 
2004b), old/new recognition tests (Chance et al., 1982; Corenblum & Meissner, 
2006), a matching task (Sporer et al., 2007), and a lineup task (Pezdek et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the ORB develops during early childhood, 
and is firmly established by around ten years of age. The ages of onset of the ORB in 
studies with infants and with children are summarized in Table 1.  
Outside of the developmental domain, researchers have investigated 
opportunity for contact by comparing participants from populations which are 
expected to differ in their potential for interacting with members of other groups. 
Samples from different countries have been compared (Carroo, 1986; Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; Goodman et al., 2007; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Wright et al., 2001, 
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2003), as well as samples from more or less integrated areas within one country 
(Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Sporer et al., 2007). The results of these studies have 
been mixed, with some showing reduced ORBs in higher contact groups (Carroo, 
1986; Sporer et al., 2007), others showing differences only in one group of 
participants (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Cross et al., 1971), and yet others finding no 
difference in the magnitude of the ORB between high and low contact groups 
(Goodman et al., 2007; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Wright et al., 2001, 2003). Weimann, 
Fishman, and Rattner (1988) found that the ORB was more pronounced when 
comparing samples from different countries than when comparing different racial 
groups within one country. 
Corenblum and Meissner (2006) compared White Canadian participants’ 
recognition of Whites, who constitute the majority race in the local population, Native 
Canadians, who represent 40% of the local population, and Blacks, who make up 
approximately 1% of the local population. The participants showed the strongest 
deficit for the Black faces, which were the least numerous group in the local 
populous. Chance et al. (1975) similarly found that White and Black American 
participants were especially inaccurate at recognizing Japanese faces compared to 
their more familiar racial out-group. However, these results must be interpreted with 
some caution, as it is possible that the low contact stimuli (Black faces for Corenblum 
& Meissner; Japanese faces for Chance et al.) were less discriminable than the other 
face sets, due to stimulus sampling errors (Wells & Olson, 2001). Li, Dunning, and 
Malpass (1998) compared recognition for Black faces in White basketball fans and 
basketball novices. Basketball is a sport in the US with a large number of Black 
players; in order to follow a game, fans would need to discriminate between different 
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players accurately. In support of the contact hypothesis, fans showed a smaller ORB 
than novices.  
Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, and de Schonen (2005) studied the 
recognition of White and Korean faces in White and Korean adults living in France. 
Some of the Korean participants had been living in France for a few months, while 
others had been adopted by French families between three and nine years old. While 
the Korean participants who had been in France for only a few months were more 
accurate with Korean faces than with White faces, the adopted participants were more 
accurate with White faces than Korean faces, showing very similar performance to the 
White participants. Developmental studies suggest that the ORB remains fairly plastic 
before the age of ten, leading Sangrigoli et al. (2005) to argue that exposure to a large 
number of other-race faces during childhood can reverse the ORB. 
The contact hypothesis, though intuitive and parsimonious, has not been 
consistently supported. While it does appear that the ORB develops throughout the 
early months and years of life (e.g. Kelly et al., 2005; Shutts & Kinzler, 2007), effects 
of contact among adult populations are difficult to predict. To some extent, the 
success of the contact hypothesis seems to depend on whether researchers measure 
actual contact (e.g. by self-report), or whether they examine opportunity for contact. 
Results from studies comparing high and low contact groups across nations or within 
nations have been somewhat more supportive than studies measuring self-reported 
contact (Sporer, 2001b), but the results of even these studies have been equivocal. It 
seems, therefore, that the relationship between contact and the ORB is not 
straightforward; rather, there may be other mediating factors such as inter-group 
attitudes, anxiety, and categorization, through which contact exerts its effects on 
memory.  
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2.4. The in-group/out-group model  
 Malpass (1990) provided a utilitarian perspective of the ORB, based on the 
central idea that humans use their cognitive resources to maximize the rewards, and 
minimize the losses, of their social interactions. Being able to recognize faces enables 
humans to predict whether a particular social interaction will be beneficial or harmful, 
and to what degree. Within an individual’s in-group, the value of social interactions is 
likely to vary quite widely, and there may be no obvious visual cues to denote which 
members will be more or less valuable to interact with. Recognizing in-group faces is 
therefore important for maximizing the value of social interactions. Malpass (1990) 
hypothesized that interactions with out-group members may be less variable in their 
values than interactions with in-group members. This means that it should be 
sufficient to categorize an out-group member, and learning to individuate out-group 
members will be of no substantial benefit. Ackerman et al. (2006) argued that 
interactions with in-group members are likely to be on an individual level, while 
interactions with out-group members are likely to be on a group level. Allport (1954) 
suggested that the categorization of people and objects to oversimplified groups is 
necessary in order to handle the huge amount of information that we encounter in 
daily life, and Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, and Ruderman (1978) showed that categorization 
leads to errors discriminating between members within a group.  
 Leading on from this line of reasoning, Sporer (2001b) proposed the in-
group/out-group model (IOM) of the ORB. A schematic of this model is shown in 
Figure 1. According to the IOM, the perception of an out-group face automatically 
triggers a categorization process. Once a face has been categorized as belonging to an 
out-group, it will be processed less efficiently or less deeply than a face which has not 
been categorized as an out-group member. Whereas in-group faces are processed 
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configurally and stored in memory to allow optimal individuation, out-group faces are 
processed for features which denote their group membership at the expense of 
information appropriate for individuation.   
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the in-group/out-group model for face 
recognition.  
 
Note: Adapted from Sporer (2001b). 
 
 Several studies have shown that other-race faces are categorized very rapidly. 
Racial classification is faster for other-race faces than own-race faces (Caldara et al., 
2004; Levin, 1996; Zhao & Bentin, 2008). Levin (1996) argues that race is processed 
as a visual feature which is present in other-race faces but which is absent in own-race 
faces, and that this creates “pop out” effects when searching for other-race targets 
among an array of own-race faces (Levin, 2000; Levin & Angelone, 2001). These 
“pop out” effects for other-race faces have even been found in nine month old infants 
(Hayden, Bhatt, Zieber, & Kangas, 2009).  
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Neuroscientific research measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) shows that 
racial category information is processed very rapidly for other-race faces, even when 
race is task irrelevant (Ito & Urland, 2003), and when participants are required to 
make individuating judgments about other-race faces (Ito & Urland, 2005), suggesting 
that this rapid categorization process is outside of conscious control. Quanty, Keats, 
and Harkins (1975) suggested that racial categorization may be more accurate among 
higher prejudiced individuals, as they may become more sensitive to features which 
distinguish between in-group and out-group members. Skin color is a powerful cue 
for categorizing faces as in-group or out-group members (Blair et al., 2002). 
However, featural differences between groups are also very important in producing 
the ORB. Bar-Haim, Saidel, and Yovel (2009) manipulated the skin color of White 
and Black faces. Participants recognized own-race faces more accurately than other-
race faces, regardless of skin color. However, the largest recognition advantage was 
for own-race faces with their natural skin colors.  
 The IOM is not specific to the processing of race – it is a more general model 
which can be applied to any categorical groups. For example, participants recognize 
own-age faces (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; Chance, Goldstein, & Anderson, 1986; 
Wiese, Schweinberger, & Hansen, 2008; Wright & Stroud, 2002) and own-gender 
faces (Sporer, 1993; Wright & Sladden, 2003) more accurately than other-age or 
other-gender faces. Rule, Ambady, Adams, and Macrae (2007) found that in-group 
advantages even extend to groups that are visually ambiguous. Heterosexual and 
homosexual participants recognized own-orientation faces more accurately than other-
orientation faces, despite being ostensibly unaware of the group membership of the 
faces. Sexual orientation of faces may also be processed automatically, in a similar 
way to race (Rule, Macrae, & Ambady, 2009). Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg 
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(2007) showed that participants recognized faces more accurately if they believed 
them to be students at the same university as themselves, or even if they were 
members of the same group in a minimal groups paradigm.  
 Recent years have seen the emergence of a strong body of work in support of 
the IOM as applied to the ORB. MacLin and Malpass (2001) demonstrated the 
“ambiguous race face illusion”. Black parent faces and Hispanic parent faces were 
morphed together, creating faces of ambiguous race. When these morphs were given 
hairstyles typical of Black or Hispanic people, the perceived group membership of the 
faces changed, and an ORB for recognition emerged among Hispanic participants. 
Faces categorized as in-group members were recognized more accurately than the 
very same faces when categorized as out-group members. Categorical racial labels 
(Pauker & Ambady, 2009), and personal names typical of different groups (Hilliar & 
Kemp, 2008) have also been used to achieve ambiguous race recognition effects. 
Ambiguous race faces may become distorted in memory to become closer to the 
parent face of their perceived race (Corneille, Huart, Becquart, & Brédart, 2004; 
Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003). 
Racial categorization affects perception as well as recognition memory.  
Faces categorized as in-group members are encoded more holistically than those 
categorized as out-group members (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Michel et al., 
2007). White participants perceive Black faces as darker than White faces, even when 
they are matched for luminance (Levin & Banaji, 2006). MacLin and Malpass (2001) 
showed that ambiguous race faces categorized as Black are perceived as having more 
Afrocentric features (e.g. fuller lips, darker skin) than the same faces when 
categorized as Hispanic.   
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 According to the IOM, low motivation to individuate other-race faces is very 
important for maintaining the ORB. Encouraging participants to include other-race 
faces in their in-group reduces the magnitude of the bias (Pauker et al., 2009; Shriver, 
Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Lanter, 2008). Providing participants with 
instructions to individuate other-race faces also reduces the size of the ORB 
(Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Rhodes, Locke, Ewing, & Evangelista, 2009). 
 All of the above research strongly suggests that the ORB has a large social 
component. While some degree of expertise may be necessary for accurately 
discriminating between other-race faces, expertise is not sufficient. There must be a 
motivation to individuate, and when this condition is met, the ORB can be reduced 
(Hugenberg et al., 2007; Pauker et al., 2009; Shriver et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the 
categorization of faces to in-group and out-group status is a rapid and automatic 
process which may reduce the motivation to individuate other-race faces (Levin, 
1996). It seems that the ORB can only be fully understood when the complex socio-
cognitive nature of face processing is taken into account; faces are after all, 
predominantly social stimuli rather than just visual patterns (Sporer, 2001b). 
3. What are the Cognitive Mechanisms of the Own-Race Bias? 
As well as asking why the ORB develops, researchers have also looked for 
cognitive mechanisms which could explain how the ORB operates. The 
configural/featural hypothesis suggests that own-race faces are processed configurally 
or holistically, while other-race faces are processed featurally. The multidimensional 
face space hypothesis (Valentine, 1991) posits that other-race faces are stored in long-
term memory in such a way as to make later retrieval more difficult. Both of these 
hypotheses have received some support, but also some criticisms. The evidence for 
both hypotheses will be evaluated below. 
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3.1. The configural/featural hypothesis 
 Visual stimuli can be processed featurally, by decomposing an image into its 
constituent parts, or configurally, by encoding the position and spacing of the 
component features in relation to one another. While many visual objects may be 
processed featurally, faces are believed to be processed configurally. Yin (1969) 
showed that recognizing inverted faces is much more difficult than recognizing many 
other inverted objects. This inversion effect is believed to be caused by the configural 
processing of faces. In support of this hypothesis, Farah, Tanaka, and Drain (1995) 
found that inverting dot patterns which were encoded holistically was more 
detrimental to recognition than inverting dot patterns which were encoded featurally. 
Diamond and Carey (1986) suggested that inversion will disrupt any objects 
associated with high expertise. Several studies have found larger inversion effects for 
own-race faces than other-race faces (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes, Brake, 
Taylor, & Tan, 1989; Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004b), suggesting that own-race 
faces are processed configurally, while other-race faces are processed featurally.  
 Event related potential (ERP) studies of the own-race inversion effect have 
produced conflicting results. The N170 is a waveform which is associated with early 
encoding of the configural information present in faces, which peaks around 170ms 
after stimulus onset. Inverting faces causes a delay in the peak of the N170. Gajewski, 
Schlegel, and Stoerig (2008) found that the delay in the N170 was larger for own-race 
faces than other-race faces, but only for White participants. Wiese, Stahl, and 
Schweinberger (2009) found similar delays in the peak of the N170 for own- and 
other-race faces.  
The inversion effect has been criticized as an indirect test of configural 
processing (Diamond & Carey, 1986). Over recent years, researchers have found 
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other ways to examine configural processing. For example, the composite face effect 
is the illusion that the top half of a face, when combined with the bottom half of a 
different face, appears changed (see Figure 2 for example composite faces). This 
illusion is created by the brain’s tendency to process faces as a whole. When the two 
face halves are misaligned (as on the right of Figure 2), the composite effect 
disappears. This is because the misaligned composites are not processed holistically, 
and so the bottom half of the face does not interfere with the processing of the top 
half. Michel, Rossion, et al. (2006) found that White participants suffered a larger 
composite face effect for own-race than other-race faces, although this effect was not 
replicated in Asian participants. Michel, Corneille, and Rossion (2007) showed that 
this effect extended to morphed ambiguous-race faces when perceived as own-race 
group members, but not when perceived as other-race group members.  
 
Figure 2:  Example composite effect stimuli.  
 
Note: The face on the left is the original target, the centre face is the aligned 
composite, and the face on the right is the misaligned composite. 
 
Further evidence for the configural/featural hypothesis is that own-race faces 
show a whole/part advantage, whereas other-race faces do not (Michel, Caldara, et al., 
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2006; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). That is, features from own-race faces are 
recognized more accurately when presented as part of a whole face than when 
presented in isolation. Features from other-race faces are recognized as accurately 
whether presented as part of a whole face or in isolation. Participants are also more 
sensitive to configural changes made to own-race faces than other-race faces (Rhodes, 
Hayward, & Winkler, 2006). Configural processing of faces emerges in the early 
months of life. Ferguson et al. (2009) found that four month old infants process faces 
featurally. However, by eight months of age, faces are processed configurally. 
However, this configural processing only emerges for own-race faces, with other-race 
faces continuing to be processed featurally.  
 A reasonable amount of evidence has been provided for the configural/featural 
hypothesis of the ORB. However, there are still some inconsistencies and unanswered 
questions which need addressing. For example, the amount of configural processing 
that participants show for own- and other-race faces does not correlate with the 
magnitude of ORB participants show in a memory test (Michel, Caldara, et al., 2006; 
Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006). Some studies suggest that own-race faces benefit from 
improved featural processing as well as configural processing (Hayward, Rhodes, & 
Schwaniger, 2008; Rhodes et al., 2006). McKone, Brewer, MacPherson, Rhodes, and 
Hayward (2007) showed that highly familiar other-race faces can be processed 
configurally, although this is not likely to generalize to unfamiliar other-race faces. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that configural processing extends to chimpanzee 
faces, despite participants’ complete lack of expertise in discriminating chimpanzee 
faces. Taubert (2009) found significant inversion and composite effects for human 
and chimpanzee faces, but not for faces of other species with less similarity to 
humans, such as hens, lizards, and sheep. Taubert argued that holistic or configural 
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processing of human-like faces is innate, and that some elements of this broad 
processing system are retained into adulthood. Thus, it is unclear at this stage whether 
configural processing is either necessary or sufficient for the successful recognition of 
other-race faces.  
3.2. The multi-dimensional face space model 
 Valentine (1991) proposed that face exemplars are stored in memory in a 
multi-dimensional “face space”. The number of dimensions is not specified, but could 
consist of such variations as nose length, eye colour, and eye separation, or could 
correspond to dimensions that are not easily verbally described. Each face can be 
plotted as a specific point in this face space, according to its position along each 
dimension, such that similar faces which share many properties will be clustered 
closely together. The ease with which a face is recognized will depend on the density 
of exemplars in the surrounding area of the space. Distinctive faces are therefore 
remembered relatively easily, while typical faces are less easily remembered. Catz, 
Kampf, Nachson, and Babkoff (2009) created a six-dimensional face space, in which 
the locations of 200 face exemplars were plotted. The dimensions of this face space 
included size (of forehead, chin, whole face), face appearance (eye color, skin tone, 
distinguishing marks), and eye size and shape. Faces with fewer surrounding 
exemplars (i.e. those located in less dense areas of face space) were rated as more 
distinctive and were recognized more accurately than those with more surrounding 
exemplars (those located in more dense areas of face space).  
 The dimensions around which the face space is constructed are likely to be 
shaped by the perceptual experience of the perceiver (Valentine, 1991). Thus, a 
perceiver who has had extensive contact with White faces will structure their face 
space around dimensions which are useful for discriminating White faces. These same 
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dimensions may be less appropriate for distinguishing between faces from other racial 
groups. For example, Ellis, Deregowski, and Shepherd (1975) found that when 
describing faces, White participants frequently describe variations in eye colour, hair 
colour, and hair texture. Whereas these characteristics are useful for discriminating 
between White faces, they will be less appropriate for discriminating between Black 
or Asian faces. Because the dimensions within the face space are optimal for 
distinguishing between own-race faces, these faces will be distributed throughout face 
space, although there is likely to be a tighter grouping around the centre of the face 
space (Catz et al., 2009). However, other-race faces will be left densely clustered in 
outlying regions of face space. This dense clustering, coupled with the large distance 
from the centre of the space, could explain the perceptual homogeneity of other-race 
faces (Walker & Hewstone, 2008) and the deficit in recognizing other-race faces.  
 Figure 3 shows a hypothetical two dimensional face space for a White 
perceiver, with own- and other-race exemplars plotted. The two dimensions within 
this space are hair color and eye color. These features vary more widely in White 
faces than in Black or Asian faces, for example. Therefore, while the own-race faces 
(light circles) are distributed throughout the face space, the other-race faces (dark 
circles) are clustered within one small region of the space. As a result, there is higher 
density of exemplars within this region. The other-race exemplars also fall further 
from the centre of the space than the majority of the own-race exemplars.  
Caldara and Abdi (2006) simulated the ORB using a neural network trained on 
a majority of faces from one race and a minority of faces from another race, and 
showed that the minority exemplars became clustered in a three dimensional face 
space. Byatt and Rhodes (2004) asked White participants to rate the similarity of pairs 
of White and Chinese faces. Using multidimensional scaling analysis, own- and other-
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race faces were shown to form separate clusters in face space, with other-race faces 
being more densely clustered than own-race faces. Caldara, Rossion, Bovet, and 
Hauert (2004) also argue that the face space model can explain the reaction speed 
advantage for classifying other-race faces by race over own-race faces, as densely 
clustered faces would produce stronger activation than more evenly spaced faces. 
 
Figure 3: A hypothetical two dimensional face space, with own- and other-
race exemplars plotted.  
 
Note: Light circles represent own-race faces, and dark circles represent other-
race faces. 
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 However, Levin (1996) argued that the face space model, though intuitive, is 
an abstraction which relies upon classifications produced by the experimental context. 
Sporer (2001b) proposed several questions about the face space model, which remain 
unanswered. How many dimensions would be necessary to adequately represent own- 
and other-race faces? In order to discriminate between other-race faces more 
accurately, would one add new dimensions to an existing face space, or would an 
entirely separate face space be required?  
 The face space model is an elegant way of conceptualizing the storage of faces 
in memory, and neatly explains the ORB in face recognition. However, the model 
does not acknowledge the social nature of the ORB. Faces are stimuli of huge social 
importance, and the processing of these stimuli may be subject to top-down influences 
stemming from social interactions with and expectations toward members of other 
races. A comprehensive account of the ORB should be able to explain the role of 
social influences such as explicit and implicit attitudes in recognizing own- and other-
race faces.  
4. Dual-Process Theories of Recognition 
Dual-process theories posit that recognition memory can arise from two 
separable memory processes. Familiarity is the fluid feeling of having encountered a 
stimulus before, which varies along a continuum. Recollection, on the other hand, is 
the retrieval of specific information about a particular study event, which is thought to 
be an all-or-nothing process (Yonelinas, 2002; although see Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 
2009, for an alternative view). There are several different models of how these two 
processes interact. Atkinson and Juola (1974) argue that items which evoke a sense of 
very high or very low familiarity will be very quickly categorized as old or new, 
whereas items with moderate familiarity will activate a search for recollective 
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information. In this conditional search model, the recollection process is only 
activated when the information gained from familiarity is ambiguous. Other models 
(e.g. Mandler, 1980) argue that the two processes are activated in parallel, although 
familiarity is typically faster than recollection. Despite some disagreements among 
dual-process models, it is commonly assumed that familiarity is faster and less 
effortful than recollection, and that the two processes function independently at the 
time of retrieval (Yonelinas, 2002).  
4.1. Measuring recollection and familiarity 
 Several methods have been developed to test dual-process theories of 
recognition. These can broadly be divided into task dissociation methods, which 
attempt to isolate the two processes from each other using different tasks such as 
recall and recognition, and process estimation methods, which attempt to estimate the 
relative contribution of the two processes in a single task (Yonelinas, 2002). Because 
familiarity is widely assumed to be faster than recollection, many task dissociation 
methods have focussed on response time. Some of these studies have examined 
recollection and familiarity for fast and slow responses (Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & 
Dean, 2006), while others have imposed response deadlines of varying lengths on 
participants (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999; Konstantinou & 
Gardiner, 2005; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1995). The 
results of these studies have been inconsistent; some studies show that familiarity is 
the dominant process at short response times (McElree et al., 1999), while others 
suggest that recollection may also be a very fast process under certain circumstances 
(Dewhurst et al., 2006; Gardiner et al., 1999; Konstantinou & Gardiner, 2005).  
Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure (PDP) was developed in 
response to concerns about the assumptions of task dissociation methods. Prior to the 
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introduction of the PDP, researchers had compared accuracy on different memory 
tests, such as recall and recognition tests, in order to make inferences about the 
recollection and familiarity processes. However, this methodology relies on the 
assumption that the memory tasks are process pure – i.e. that recognition relies on 
familiarity and only familiarity, while recall relies on recollection and only 
recollection. Jacoby (1991) argued that this is almost certainly not the case, and so 
estimates of recollection and familiarity produced by task dissociation methods will 
be contaminated by the opposing process.  
 In the PDP, recollection and familiarity are estimated by comparing 
performance in a single task with two conditions: one in which both processes 
facilitate recognition, and one in which the two processes are placed in opposition. In 
the PDP, participants are presented with two stimulus lists, followed by a recognition 
task with two conditions – inclusion and exclusion trials. In inclusion trials, 
participants simply decide whether each stimulus is old or new, regardless of list 
membership. Recollection and familiarity should work in concert for this task, as they 
would in an ordinary recognition test. In exclusion trials, however, participants are 
asked only to identify stimuli from one particular presentation list, while treating 
stimuli from the other list as new. This places recollection and familiarity in 
opposition, as the participants must recollect information concerning the list 
membership of the stimulus; responses based solely on familiarity may be incorrect. 
The proportion of trials in which participants correctly identify stimuli as old in the 
inclusion trials (P[Inclusion]), and in which they incorrectly identify stimuli as old in 
the exclusion trials (P[Exclusion]) trials are then used to estimate recollection: 
P[Inclusion] – P[Exclusion], and familiarity: P[Exclusion]/(1-Recollection).  
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 The PDP makes certain assumptions about the underlying memory processes 
of recollection and familiarity, some of which have drawn criticism. For example, the 
PDP assumes that recollection and familiarity are independent, and that the response 
on any given trial will be produced by one of these processes, never both. Curran and 
Hintzman (1995) argue that violations of this assumption can lead to apparent 
dissociations between the two processes, which are actually artefacts of the 
experimental design. For example, dividing attention at encoding has been found to 
decrease recollection estimates in the PDP, while leaving familiarity estimates 
unaffected. Curran and Hintzman (1995) argued that if the two parameter estimates 
are positively correlated at the item level, then increases in the recollection parameter 
will necessarily lead to decreases in the familiarity parameter. Jacoby, Begg, and Toth 
(1997) rejected this argument, claiming that the familiarity parameter is robust even to 
very high item level correlations. However, if performance in the exclusion trials 
becomes very accurate under deep processing conditions, then ceiling effects can 
cause familiarity estimates to be reduced (Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & 
Ramponi, 2002). 
 One serious criticism of the PDP is that its definitions of recollection and 
familiarity are very narrow. Recollection is defined as the ability of the participant to 
accurately recall the list membership of a target item. Familiarity is then defined as 
the inability to correctly recall this list membership. Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Kelley 
(1997) argue that recollection as defined in the PDP does not reflect the retrieval of all 
aspects of the encoding episode, as there are many other details of the encoding event 
that a participant could recall without identifying the correct list membership. 
Similarly, familiarity as defined in the PDP is not simply an undifferentiated feeling 
of oldness, as a participant may be able to recall some other information about a target 
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which is not relevant to list membership. Mulligan and Hirshman (1997) distinguished 
between diagnostic recollection and nondiagnostic recollection. Diagnostic 
recollection allows a participant to accurately discriminate list membership, whereas 
nondiagnostic recollection does not. The PDP only includes diagnostic recollection in 
the R parameter, which means that the F parameter will include nondiagnostic 
recollection. This becomes more problematic as the similarity of the two study lists 
increases, and recollection becomes less diagnostic. If the two study lists are very 
similar, the R parameter will be underestimated and the F parameter will be 
overestimated (Gruppuso et al., 1997; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1997).  
 A major weakness of the PDP is its narrow definition of recollection as the 
ability to recall the list membership of a target stimulus. The Remember-Know (RK) 
procedure, developed by Tulving (1985), allows a much broader pool of responses to 
be included under the heading of recollection. In the RK procedure, participants make 
experiential judgments about their memories for recognized items, categorizing them 
as Remembered (R) or Known (K). Participants make R responses when they are able 
to recollect any specific information about the encoding event associated with a target 
stimulus. This information may include thoughts that the stimulus evoked, 
associations that the participant made between stimuli, or any other detail of the 
encoding event. Participants make K responses when they believe that they have seen 
an item before, but are unable to recall any information about the encoding event. 
Some studies also include Guess (G) responses (e.g. Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1996; Konstantinou & Gardiner, 2005), and this helps to ensure that K 
responses are uncontaminated by guessing.  
 Tulving (1985) argued that recollection arises from an episodic memory 
system, whereas familiarity is a product of a semantic memory system. While the RK 
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procedure does not directly test these two systems, R responses are presumed to 
accompany old/new judgments based on episodic memory, while K responses are 
presumed to accompany old/new judgments based on semantic memory. However, 
the nature of the RK procedure makes it very difficult to know how accurately R and 
K responses map onto recollection and familiarity, respectively. Some authors have 
questioned whether participants are able to understand RK instructions, and whether 
they are then able to introspect on their own memories to apply those labels in a 
meaningful way (Dunn, 2004). Instead, participants may use RKG responses to reflect 
differences in confidence, with R responses, K responses, and G responses being 
applied to decisions made with high, medium, and low confidence respectively 
(Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Rotello, MacMillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005).  
Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998) rejected this argument, 
however. They asked participants to provide explanations for their RKG judgments, 
and analyzed the content of these explanations. Only R responses were accompanied 
by reports of recollective experience; K responses were accompanied by reports of 
just knowing, and by feelings of familiarity. K responses were also sometimes 
associated with quite high confidence. These transcript data therefore suggest that 
participants are able to understand and apply instructions meaningfully in the RK 
paradigm. However, it is also possible that the participants in that particular study 
were more stringent in their RKG judgments, as they knew that they would have to 
explain these decisions. Participants in standard RKG experiments may be more likely 
to use confidence as a heuristic for making RKG judgments (Rotello et al., 2005).   
 There is some contention around the analysis of RKG responses. The 
recollection process is easily estimated from R responses, as participants will make an 
R response whenever they recollect an item. Estimating familiarity is more complex, 
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as participants will only make K responses for items which are familiar but not 
recollected. However, the familiarity process will almost certainly contribute to the 
recognition of recollected items, and K responses will therefore underestimate the 
contribution of familiarity to recognition (Gardiner et al., 1996). Yonelinas and 
Jacoby (1995) proposed transforming K responses using the Independence 
Remember-Know procedure (IRK). In this procedure, familiarity is estimated by 
dividing the number of K responses by the number of trials in which R responses are 
not given: Familiarity = K/(1-R). However, this procedure relies on the assumption 
that the two processes can be subjectively independent – that not only can one 
experience familiarity in the absence of recollection, but that one can also experience 
recollection in the absence of familiarity. While this state of awareness may be 
possible in some cases, it would seem to be an unusual state of awareness, and one 
that participants may be unable to understand (Gardiner et al., 1996). 
An alternative way of estimating familiarity, which would not make the 
assumption of independence, would be as a total of K and R responses: Familiarity = 
K + R. This would reflect the likelihood that most items which are recollected are also 
familiar. Many other studies have simply analyzed the proportions of R and K 
responses for items categorized as old (e.g. Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hockley & 
Consoli, 1999; Mäntylä, 1997). This allows the subjective feelings of remembering 
and knowing to be examined, but caution must be taken when equating these 
responses to the recollection and familiarity processes.    
4.2. Factors influencing recollection and familiarity 
 Dual-process theories predict that some variables will influence one process 
while leaving the other unaffected. Dividing attention during encoding, for example, 
should reduce recollection more than familiarity. Brandt, Macrae, Schloerscheidt, and 
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Milne (2003) asked participants to count backwards in threes during the encoding 
phase of an old/new face recognition test. During the recognition test, participants 
provided RK responses. Divided attention reduced the number of R responses given 
to distinctive faces. Parkin, Gardiner, and Rosser (1995) found a similar reduction in 
R responses when attention was divided by having participants detect auditory tones. 
Reinitz, Morrissey, and Demb (1994) found that participants made more familiarity-
based errors in line drawings of faces when attention was divided than when attention 
was undivided.  
 Craik and Lockhart (1972) introduced the levels-of-processing (LOP) 
framework. According to this framework, objects can be processed at various 
“depths”. Shallow processing may include surface characteristics of the stimulus – the 
color of ink that a word is printed in, or the size of the nose on a face. Deeper 
processing involves making inferences or semantic links – for example, thinking of 
synonyms for a word, or attributing personality characteristics to a face. The LOP 
approach has become a very popular framework for considering memory, with Craik 
and Lockhart’s (1972) original paper being cited more than 3,200 times to date (Web 
of Science, 2009). Many of these studies have shown that when task instructions 
encourage deeper processing, recognition is more accurate than when task instructions 
encourage shallow processing (e.g. Berman & Cutler, 1998; Bloom & Mudd, 1991; 
Bower & Karlin, 1974; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977). However, some authors have 
argued that it is the amount of information which is processed that improves 
recognition, rather than the depth of the processed information (Bloom & Mudd, 
1991; Winograd, 1981). Sporer (1991) argued that LOP effects are caused by the 
inferiority of shallow processing instructions over natural encoding strategies, rather 
than superiority of deep encoding instructions over natural encoding strategies. 
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 Dual-process theories predict that recollection should be enhanced by deeper 
processing, but that familiarity should be unaffected (Gardiner et al., 1996; Yonelinas, 
2002). Mulligan and Hirshman (1995) showed that deep processing was more 
beneficial to accuracy in unspeeded recognition tests, in which recollection can 
contribute to recognition, than in speeded recognition tests, which rely much more 
heavily on familiarity. However, other studies have shown that deep processing 
benefits familiarity as well as recollection (Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2006; Gardiner et 
al., 1999; Konstantinou & Gardiner, 2005). Overall, however, recollection does seem 
to benefit from deeper processing to a larger extent than familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). 
4.3. Dual-process theory and the own-race bias 
 Meissner et al. (2005) recently proposed that dual-process theory could be 
applied to the ORB. The ORB is often characterised by a marked increase in false 
alarm rates (Doyle, 2001; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Slone et al., 2000), which 
could be the result of impoverished recollection for other-race faces. Yonelinas (2002) 
argued that false alarms can be interpreted as an index of familiarity, as they 
presumably reflect recognition without recollection. Meissner et al. (2005) showed 
that participants gave more R responses to own-race faces than to other-race faces in 
an RK task. Marcon, Susa, and Meissner (2009) used a repetition lag paradigm, in 
which distractor faces are repeated during the recognition test. Participants mistakenly 
identified previously seen distractors more frequently for other-race faces than own-
race faces. This suggests that for other-race faces, the ability to recollect the details of 
the encoding event was impaired.  
  Many of the mechanisms believed to contribute to the ORB could explain 
why recollection is impaired for other-race faces. For example, faces which are 
processed configurally may be more likely to be recollected than faces processed 
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featurally (Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, & Soltani, 1999). Faces densely clustered in 
face space may be difficult to recollect, as other surrounding face exemplars may also 
be activated by the presentation of a target (Valentine, 1991); Brandt et al. (2003) and 
Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2006) found that distinctive faces are more likely to be 
recollected than typical faces. Categorizing faces by race could reduce effortful 
processing, leading to a weaker memory trace at retrieval (Sporer, 2001b). Mäntylä 
(1997) showed that faces which are processed for similarities are more likely to be 
familiar than recollected, while faces processed for differences are more likely to be 
recollected than familiar.   
4.4. Memory for context 
 In old/new recognition tests, the ability to identify a previously seen target is 
tested. This type of recognition is item recognition, and it can be distinguished from 
context memory, which is the ability to remember information concerning the 
encoding event in which a stimulus was presented. For example, participants may be 
asked to remember the paired associate of a target word (Hockley & Consoli, 1999; 
Westerman, 2001), the occupational label associated with a face (Yovel & Pallier, 
2004), the color of ink in which a target word was presented (Mickes et al., 2009), or 
the voice in which a target word was spoken (Bornstein & LeCompte, 1995). 
The distinction between item recognition and context memory can be 
intuitively understood when considering face recognition. For example, upon 
encountering a face, we may initially be struck with a sense of knowing that person, 
yet the source of that familiarity may be outside of our grasp. This will activate a 
search in memory for plausible contexts in which we may have encountered that 
person. If the recollective search is successful, we will attribute our familiarity to a 
particular encounter; if unsuccessful, we may decide that we were mistaken in our 
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feeling of familiarity. Brown, Deffenbacher, and Sturgill (1977) showed participants 
two groups of faces, in two different rooms, and later tested recognition for those 
faces in a third room. As well as old/new judgments for each face, participants were 
asked to identify the room in which faces judged as old had been seen. While 
recognition of the faces was very high, participants could often not recollect in which 
room the faces had been presented.   
 Dual-process theory predicts that recollection, but not familiarity, should 
support context memory (Yonelinas, 2002). For example, Mandler (1980, p. 253) 
argues that the “specific identification of an event is not possible on the basis of 
familiarity alone”, and memory for context is associated with a higher proportion of R 
responses than K responses using the RK procedure (Hockley & Consoli, 1999). 
However, familiarity may contribute to context memory when decisions are made 
very rapidly (Westerman, 2001) or when the target stimulus and the contextual 
information are perceived holistically as one item (Yonelinas et al., 1999).  
4.5. Context reinstatement 
 Reinstating the context in which a stimulus was originally seen improves the 
ability to recall that item. Godden and Baddeley (1975) famously demonstrated that 
words which were learned on land or underwater were remembered more accurately if 
recalled in the same environment. Other research has shown that words are recalled 
more accurately by participants in the same mood state (Balch, Myers, & Papotto, 
1999) or physical state (Schramke & Bauer, 1997) at encoding and testing. Marian 
and Neisser (2000) found that bilingual participants recalled autobiographical 
memories more easily if the language used at recall was the same as that being spoken 
during the remembered event.  
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 The effects of context reinstatement on recognition are less clear, however. 
Some studies have found that context reinstatement improves accuracy in old/new 
recognition tasks (Evans et al., 2009; Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Masson, 2007; Hockley, 
2008; Sporer, 1993), while others have found no improvement when context is 
reinstated (Baddeley & Woodhead, 1982; Macken, 2002). Smith (1988) argued that 
during free recall, relatively few cues are available to the participant, so context 
reinstatement provides cues that increase accuracy. However, in recognition, there are 
very strong cues available to the participant (the stimulus itself), so context 
reinstatement can provide only a very small benefit at best. In line with this argument, 
context reinstatement seems more beneficial when recognizing unfamiliar stimuli 
such as faces and non-words, than when recognizing familiar stimuli such as known 
words (Russo, Ward, Geurts, & Scheres, 1999).  
 The success of context reinstatement in improving recognition accuracy seems 
to depend on the way in which context is manipulated. For example, local context is 
associated with one or few stimulus items, whereas global context is associated with 
many stimulus items. Dalton (1993) found that reinstating local context improved 
recognition accuracy for both familiar and unfamiliar stimuli, whereas reinstating 
global context improved recognition accuracy for unfamiliar stimuli but not for 
familiar stimuli. Many of the studies which have shown context reinstatement effects 
on recognition have manipulated local context using unique visual or verbal 
information for each stimulus at encoding (Evans et al., 2009; Gruppuso et al., 2007; 
Hockley, 2008).However, not all studies have shown improved recognition accuracy 
following reinstatement of local context (Baddeley & Woodhead, 1982).  
 Contexts can also be interactive or independent (Baddeley & Woodhead, 
1982). Interactive contexts are always processed and interfere with the encoding of a 
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stimulus. Independent contexts, on the other hand, are not always processed and do 
not interfere with encoding. Sporer (1993) suggested that clothing cues function as 
interactive contexts when recognizing faces. Participants saw a series of faces with 
clothing cues present or hidden during encoding, and present or hidden during testing. 
Participants were more accurate when the clothing cues were congruent (either 
present or hidden) at both times. Interactive contexts may be more beneficial to 
recognition than independent contexts.  
  From a dual-process perspective, context reinstatement can enhance 
recollection (Gruppuso et al., 2001; Macken, 2002), and to a lesser degree, familiarity 
(Hockley, 2008). Context reinstatement also improves recognition more for stimuli 
which are less familiar (Russo et al., 2009). Applied to the ORB, one might predict 
that context reinstatement would reduce the magnitude of the ORB by boosting 
recollection for other-race faces. However, Evans et al. (2009) found that context 
reinstatement only benefited own-race faces, and did not improve recognition of 
other-race faces. The contextual information used by Evans et al. (2009) was verbal 
information, which may not have acted as an interactive context. Further research into 
context reinstatement at the ORB therefore seems warranted.  
5. Eyewitness Memory 
 As well as informing theories about how faces are processed and stored in 
memory, the ORB has direct implications for real world behavior, including 
eyewitness identification. Over the last few decades, a wealth of research has shown 
that eyewitnesses make errors when identifying suspects, which can and do lead to 
false convictions (Brigham, 2007; Doyle, 2001). Eyewitness memory was one of the 
first applied topics to be studied by psychologists (Loftus, 1993) and has continued to 
receive a great deal of attention due to the grave consequences of mistaken 
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identifications within the legal system. Inaccurate identifications create two distinct 
problems: on the one hand, an innocent person is imprisoned, and on the other hand, 
the guilty party eludes justice (Malpass & Devine, 1981).  
 To date (1st February, 2010), 249 falsely convicted people have been 
exonerated from US prisons by the Innocence Project, using DNA testing. The 
average sentence served by these individuals was 12 years; 17 of these people had 
been sentenced to death. These cases are thought to be just the “tip of the iceberg” 
(Naughton, 2003), as most crimes will not leave behind any DNA marker. Scheck, 
Neufeld, and Dwyer (2003) argued that inaccurate eyewitness identifications are the 
leading cause of wrongful imprisonment. Gross, Jacoby, Matheson, Montgomery, and 
Patil (2004) examined 340 exonerations in the US between 1989 and 2003, and found 
that in 64% of cases, at least one eyewitness erroneously identified the defendant; this 
increased to 88% in rape cases.  
 Eyewitness identifications often form key evidence in criminal trials. 
Although many eyewitnesses will provide accurate testimony, jurors may find it very 
difficult to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identifications (Penrod & 
Cutler, 1995; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). Earlier in the investigative process, 
investigating officers may also be “over-influenced” by eyewitness decisions in 
response to lineups (Dahl, Lindsay, & Brimacombe, 2006). This may stem from a 
tendency to equate confidence with accuracy, leading to the belief that confident 
witnesses will make correct identifications. However, research has consistently shown 
that the correlation between a witness’ confidence and the accuracy of their testimony 
is small (e.g. Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Perfect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993; Smith, 
Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989; although see Odinot & Wolters, 2006), although the 
correlation is stronger for witnesses who make identifications than for witnesses who 
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do not make identifications (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Further, jurors 
and judges may underestimate the influence of many factors on the reliability of a 
witnesses’ memories (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; Wise & 
Safer, 2004), despite high consensus on these factors among researchers (Kassin, 
Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001).  
 Laboratory research on eyewitness memory has been criticized by some as 
inapplicable to real world behavior (Bartolomey, 2001; Egeth, 1993). For example, 
ethical constraints limit the stress under which a participant can be placed, and 
practical constraints limit the number of factors that can be taken into account in any 
single study (Memon, Mastroberardino, & Fraser, 2008). However, eyewitness 
research has successfully informed policy on at least some issues (Wells et al., 2000). 
In 1999, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical Working 
Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999) was published in the USA. This guide 
contained information from the psychological literature on factors such as lineup 
instructions, simultaneous vs. sequential lineups, and selection of fillers for lineups. 
This collaboration between researchers and policy makers within the legal system can 
at least provide some optimism that eyewitness research can be applied to real world 
behavior, and can make a difference to the collection of eyewitness evidence.  
5.1. Eyewitness memory and the ORB 
 Wells (1978) distinguished between system variables and estimator variables 
in eyewitness memory research. System variables are controllable within the legal 
system, and include such factors as lineup format and selection of fillers. Estimator 
variables, however, refer to aspects of the witness or crime, and are not controllable 
within the system. These include such factors as stress, viewing conditions, and the 
ORB. Exoneration statistics reveal the potential impact of the ORB on the reliability 
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of eyewitness memory. Gross et al. (2004) found that 39 of 80 exonerations for rape 
involved a Black defendant and a White victim/witness, yet less than 10% of all rapes 
involve Black assailants and White victims. Of the first 180 exonerations brought 
about by the Innocence Project, 61% of the defendants were Black and 78% of the 
witnesses were White.  
Most studies of the ORB have used old/new recognition tests (Sporer, 2001a), 
and some authors have expressed concern about the applicability of these studies to 
eyewitness identifications, which will usually be made from lineups (Bartolomey, 
2001). The consistency of findings across field studies (Brigham et al., 1982; Platz & 
Hosch, 1988; Wright et al., 2001) and other lineup studies (Evans et al., 2009; Jackiw 
et al., 2008) suggests that the ORB does generalize to eyewitness identification. A few 
archival studies, in which patterns across large numbers of real cases are analyzed, 
have provided mix results. Wright and McDaid (1996) examined lineup 
identifications of 616 suspects by 1561 witnesses in the UK. Although the race of the 
witnesses was not recorded, White suspects were less likely to be identified than 
suspects from other races. Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) conversely found 
that Black witnesses in UK lineups were less likely to be identified than White 
suspects, and the race of the witness did not interact with the race of the suspect. 
Behrman and Davey (2001) analyzed 159 own-race and 72 other-race lineups in 
California, and found higher suspect identification rates in same-race than cross-race 
lineups. Suspect identification rates in field show-ups (which are similar to old/new 
recognition judgments) were similar in other-race and own-race cases. However, 
causal conclusions are difficult to draw from archival studies. Witnesses are not 
randomly allocated to groups (Wright & McDaid, 1996); there is no control over 
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factors such as retention interval, crime seriousness, or selection of fillers; and there is 
no guarantee that the suspect is the culprit (Behrman & Davey, 2001).  
Ninety percent of eyewitness researchers surveyed by Kassin et al. (2001) 
believed that the ORB is a reliable effect, and 72% would testify about the ORB in a 
criminal trial. While it is clear that more research is needed to establish the reliability 
of the ORB in the eyewitness world, it is also clear from exoneration statistics that the 
legal system is failing members of minority races. The extent of this failure extends 
well beyond eyewitness misidentification. For example, jurors may perceive members 
of minority races as more culpable (Lindholm & Christianson, 1998) and less credible 
(Abshire & Bornstein, 2003) than members of majority races. Black juvenile 
offenders are more likely to be prosecuted as adults than White juvenile offenders 
(Gross et al., 2004), and Black motorists are more likely to be stopped by traffic 
officers than White motorists (Buerger & Farrell, 2002).  
5.2. Memory for context in eyewitness identifications 
 For a witness attempting to identify a suspect, it is not enough that the witness 
finds a face familiar. The witness must be sure that they saw the suspect in a 
particular time and place, committing a particular act.  This involves discriminating 
between the sources of one’s own memories, and has been termed source monitoring 
(Johnson, 2006). Source monitoring failures in eyewitness identifications could have 
severe consequences, as innocent individuals with some familiarity to the witness 
could be identified (Lindsay, 2007). Loftus (1976) suggested that these kinds of errors 
are a “by-product of the integrative malleable nature of human memory” (p. 97). 
Errors may occur when an innocent bystander to a crime is misidentified (Loftus, 
1976), or when a witness is exposed to intervening mugshots or lineups between 
witnessing the crime and making the final identification. 
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 The effects of mugshot exposure on eyewitness memory have been studied 
extensively. Searching mugshots for the suspect decreases correct identifications 
(Davies, Shepherd, & Ellis, 1979; Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006) and 
increases mistaken identifications (Brown et al., 1977; Deffenbacher et al., 2006; 
Deffenbacher, Carr, & Leu, 1981) in later lineups. Suspects who are identified by the 
witness during a mugshot search are much more likely to be identified in a later 
lineup, even if innocent (Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001). Behrman and 
Davey’s (2001) archival study included 66 lineups in which the lineup identification 
was preceded by an earlier mugshot or photographic lineup identification. Suspect 
identification rates in these lineups were higher than for lineups where no previous 
identification had been made. Furthermore, 45% of the witnesses who had not 
identified the suspect at the first opportunity went on to identify the suspect in the 
later lineup. Although mugshot searches can be useful investigative tools (Lindsay, 
Nosworthy, Martin, & Martynuck, 1994), witnesses who view mugshots should not 
be later asked to make a lineup identification, as the risk of error is too high (Dysart et 
al., 2001).  
 The cognitive interview (CI) is a technique used to increase the reliability of 
eyewitnesses’ reported memories. A core element of the CI is to mentally reinstate 
contextual information about the crime scene. Malpass and Devine (1981) used a 
guided memory procedure to enhance participants’ memories of a culprit of a staged 
crime, five months after the event. The participants were asked to recall details about 
the room in which the incident took place, their thoughts and feelings at the time, and 
the immediate reactions to the incident. This guided memory technique increased the 
accuracy of lineup identifications. Krafka and Penrod (1985) showed that mentally 
reinstating an encounter with a confederate while viewing physical evidence from the 
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encounter increased hit rates in a lineup, without increasing error rates. Context 
reinstatement therefore appears to be a useful tool for increasing correct 
identifications from lineups, while leaving misidentifications unaffected.    
6. Introduction to Papers 
   Throughout this thesis, the own-race bias in face recognition will be 
examined from a dual-process perspective. The relative contributions of recollection 
and familiarity in recognizing own- and other-race faces will be explored, as well as 
the ability to retrieve contextual information about those faces. The aim of this thesis 
is to provide support for the hypothesis that recollection is impaired when identifying 
faces of other races, and to show that participants therefore have difficulty in 
remembering specific details of the previous occurrence of other-race faces.  
 In Paper 1, Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure is used to estimate 
the contributions of recollection and familiarity to White participants’ recognition of 
White and Black faces. Level of processing effects on recollection and familiarity are 
also tested. The main predictions of Paper 1 are that recollection estimates will be 
higher for the White faces than for the Black faces, while familiarity estimates may be 
similar for the two groups of faces. There is some evidence that participants process 
other-race faces more deeply than own-race faces in recognition tasks (Chance & 
Goldstein, 1981; Sporer, 2001b). Encouraging participants to adopt deep or shallow 
processing strategies for all faces may therefore reduce the difference in recollection 
for the White and the Black faces.  
 In Paper 2, a procedure similar to the exclusion trials of the PDP is used to 
investigate White participants’ abilities to discriminate between familiar White and 
Black faces from two intermingled study lists. Distinguishing between familiar 
stimuli from the two lists requires a recollective experience of the encoding 
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encounter. Therefore, the participants should be more accurate with the White faces 
than with the Black faces. Paper 2 also investigates whether accuracy can be 
improved if the participants are encouraged to consider their responses more 
carefully.  
 Papers 3 and 4 both explore memory for context in own- and other-race 
identifications. Faces are shown on one of several backgrounds at encoding. At 
testing, these faces are seen again on blank background, along with a series of new 
faces. Participants make old/new recognition decisions for each faces. Following an 
old judgment, the participant must attempt to identify upon which background the 
face had originally appeared. In Paper 3, White participants are recruited; in Paper 4, 
both White and Black participants are recruited. The main prediction for these papers 
is that participants will be more accurate at identifying the contexts in which correctly 
recognized own-race faces were seen than other-race faces.   
  In eight experiments across four papers, the importance of recollection in the 
own-race bias for face recognition is explored. Process estimation methods such as 
Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure and Tulving’s (1985) Remember-
Know procedure are used to estimate the contribution of recollection to recognizing 
own- and other-race faces. Factors which influence recollection, such as depth of 
processing and context reinstatement are manipulated. Memory for specific contextual 
information about correctly recognized own- and other-faces is tested. The overall 
aim of this thesis is to show that recollection is impaired for other-race faces, and that 
there is therefore a reduction in the ability to recall specific information about 
previously seen other-race faces.   
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Paper 1: Recollection and Familiarity in Recognizing Own- and Other-Race 
Faces 
Abstract 
 Recognition accuracy is higher for faces of one’s own race than for faces from 
other races. Recent evidence from a dual-process perspective suggests that people 
may have difficulty retrieving specific information about the previous occurrence of 
other-race faces. In two studies, White participants completed a process dissociation 
task with White and Black faces, in which recollection and familiarity were estimated 
based on performance in inclusion and exclusion trials. In Experiment 1, the 
recollection estimate was higher for White faces than for Black faces, and participants 
made more errors with Black faces than with White faces. In Experiment 2, depth of 
processing was manipulated. Deep processing was associated with higher recollection 
estimates than shallow processing for both White and Black faces. Recollection 
estimates for White and Black faces were very similar in the shallow and deep 
conditions.   
Introduction 
 For many years, a widespread belief has persisted that people have difficulty 
discriminating between and recognizing people from other races. Feingold, in 1914, 
stated that “to the uninitiated American, all Asiatics look alike, while to the Asiatic all 
White men look alike” (p. 50). This hypothesis was first tested empirically by 
Malpass and Kravitz (1969) with White and Black Americans. Since then, dozens of 
papers have been published on the topic, including several meta-analyses. The most 
recent meta-analysis, conducted by Meissner and Brigham (2001), concluded that the 
   
48 
own-race bias (ORB) is very robust, and generalizes to participants from many ethnic 
and racial groups.  
 Most studies of the ORB have used old/new recognition tests, in which 
participants study a set of faces, and later attempt to identify the studied faces from a 
larger set including some new distractor faces (e.g. Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Hills 
& Lewis, 2006; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003). Participants frequently make more 
false alarms for other-race faces than own-race faces (e.g. Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; 
Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000; Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). Often, these 
higher false alarm rates for other-race faces are accompanied by lower hit rates, 
creating a “mirror effect” (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 
2005; Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997).  
 Over several decades, theoretical models of recognition memory have been 
developing. The number of processes involved in recognition has been debated, with 
some models proposing that recognition is the product of a single process, and others 
proposing the existence of two separate processes, recollection and familiarity. 
Single-process models, such as traditional signal detection theory, posit that 
recognition is based upon the strength of activation produced by a stimulus, which is 
compared to some decision threshold (Swets, 1964). Dual-process theories, on the 
other hand, posit that in addition to this continuous activation strength process 
(familiarity), there is a second independent route to recognition (Yonelinas, 2002). 
This second route, recollection, involves the retrieval of episodic information related 
to the encoding of the stimulus. For example, an observer may recollect some thought 
or feeling that the stimulus evoked at encoding, or they may remember some details 
about the context in which a stimulus was presented.  
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 In support of dual-process models, neuropsychological and behavioral 
dissociations have been found between recollection and familiarity. Separate event 
related potentials (ERPs) have been identified for recollected stimuli and familiar 
stimuli (Curran, 2000; Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg, 1995). Amnesic patients who are 
unable to recognize items using recollection may still be able to recognize items based 
on familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). And some experimental manipulations affect one 
process while leaving the other relatively unaffected. For example, dividing attention 
at encoding reduces recollection but does not affect familiarity (Brandt, Macrae, 
Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 2003; Parkin, Gardiner, & Rosser, 1995), and reinstating 
elements of the encoding context benefits recollection to a much greater degree than 
familiarity (Macken, 2002).    
 Meissner et al. (2005) recently considered the ORB in a dual-process 
framework. People may have difficulty retrieving episodic information about the 
previous occurrence of other-race faces, which then reduces the ability to reject faces 
which appear somewhat familiar but which have never actually been seen. Meissner 
et al. (2005) provided some support for this hypothesis using a Remember-Know task 
(Tulving, 1985) in which participants describe the subjective experiences associated 
with their old judgments in an old/new task using Remember and Know labels. The 
participants made more Remember responses for own-race faces than for other-race 
faces, but made a similar proportion of Know responses for both groups of faces. 
Marcon, Susa, and Meissner (2009) used a repetition lag paradigm to examine 
recollection and familiarity, in which some of the distractors were repeated during the 
testing phase of an old/new recognition task. The participants made more repetition 
errors for other-race faces than for own-race faces. Marcon et al. (2009) concluded 
that participants were unable to retrieve information about the previous encounter 
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with the repeated distractors, and so misattributed their familiarity to them having 
appeared during the encoding phase. 
 Many methods have been developed for testing dual-process theories of 
recognition memory. One method is the process dissociation procedure (PDP), created 
by Jacoby (1991). The PDP was introduced as a way of estimating the relative 
contribution of recollection and familiarity to a given task. Previously, researchers 
had compared performance across two different tasks, such recall and recognition. 
The conclusions from these studies were based on the assumption that these tasks 
were process pure (i.e. each task involved either recollection or familiarity, not both), 
which Jacoby (1991) argued was an invalid assumption. The PDP uses a single task 
with two different trial types to derive estimated parameters for the contribution of 
recollection and familiarity to recognition performance.  
 During the encoding phase of the PDP, participants see two stimulus lists. At 
testing, the stimuli from these two lists are seen again, along with some distractors. 
Participants take part in inclusion trials and exclusion trials. In inclusion trials, 
participants are simply asked to decide whether each stimulus is old or new, 
regardless of list membership. The inclusion trials therefore simply consist of targets 
and distractors, as in a standard old/new recognition test. In exclusion trials, 
participants are asked only to identify the stimuli which appeared in one of the two 
encoding lists, treating stimuli from the other list as new. In addition to targets and 
distractors, the exclusion trials also contain lures, previously seen stimuli which are to 
be ignored (from the non-identified list).  
 In order to estimate recollection (R) and familiarity (F), the proportion of old 
responses to targets in the inclusion trials and lures in the exclusion trials must first be 
calculated: 
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 P(Inclusion) = hits / (hits + misses) 
 P(Exclusion) = lure IDs / (lure IDs + lure rejections) 
Old responses to targets in the inclusion trials (P(Inclusion)) will consist of some 
recollection-based responses, and also some familiarity based responses: R + F(1 – 
R). Old responses to lures (P(Exclusion)) will consist only of familiarity-based 
responses: F(1 – R). To estimate recollection (R), the proportion of lures incorrectly 
identified as old in the exclusion trials is then subtracted from the proportion of 
targets correctly identified as old in the inclusion trials:  
R = P(Inclusion) – P(Exclusion).  
Recollection and familiarity are assumed to be independent in the PDP; 
therefore, familiarity (F) is estimated with the following formula:  
F = P(Exclusion)/(1 – R).  
Despite the widespread use of the PDP in memory research, the procedure has 
received some criticism. Some of these criticisms have concerned the statistical 
assumptions made by the PDP, whereas others have concerned the way in which 
memory is conceptualized within the PDP framework. For example, a central 
assumption of the PDP is that recollection and familiarity are independent. That is, in 
any given trial, either recollection or familiarity will be used, but never both. This 
“independence assumption” has been widely criticized (McBride, 2007), with 
opponents of the PDP claiming that violations of this assumption can create artifactual 
dissociations between recollection and familiarity. Curran and Hintzman (1995) 
showed that if the estimated R and F parameters are highly correlated at the item 
level, then increases in R will lead to decreases in F. This causes an underestimation 
of the contribution of familiarity to recognition. Jacoby, Begg, and Toth (1997) 
refuted this claim, showing that F estimates are robust even to very high item-level 
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correlations. However, Jacoby et al. (1997) did concede that the independence 
assumption could be violated if performance is near ceiling, with very few errors in 
the exclusion trials. This is because an error rate of 0 in the exclusion trials will 
produce a parameter estimation of 0 for familiarity (because F = P(Exclusion)/(1 - 
R)).  
  Conceptually, the PDP has been criticized for its narrow definition of 
recollection. Within the PDP, recollection is defined as the ability to correctly identify 
the list membership of a previously seen stimulus.  However, there may be many 
other aspects of the encoding event that a participant is able to retrieve, whether or not 
they are able to determine the list membership of a given face (Buchner, Erdfelder, 
Steffens, & Martensen, 1997). Mulligan and Hirshman (1997) distinguished between 
diagnostic recollection and nondiagnostic recollection. Diagnostic recollection 
includes the retrieval of information pertinent to the task. In the PDP, this would be 
the list membership of a stimulus. Nondiagnostic recollection could include any other 
information about the encoding event, which is not relevant to the task. This could 
include such information as thoughts, feelings, or associations evoked by the stimulus 
at encoding. The PDP only includes diagnostic recollection in the R estimate, meaning 
that recollection will be underestimated, and the F estimate will be contaminated by 
nondiagnostic recollection. Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Kelley (1997) also argued that the 
PDP only includes a narrow range of responses in the R parameter, meaning that the F 
estimate represents more than just a “completely undifferentiated feeling of oldness” 
(p. 259). Gruppuso et al. (1997) showed that the R and F estimates in the PDP are 
heavily influenced by the similarity of the two encoding lists. As similarity increases, 
making list discrimination more difficult, R decreases and F increases. Yet it does not 
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seem logical to suggest that a participant’s ability to recollect information about a 
stimulus decreases as list similarity increases. 
Dodson and Johnson (1996) argued that the PDP views recollection as a 
controlled process which will always produce a correct response. Familiarity is 
viewed as an automatic process, which will produce either a correct response or an 
incorrect response, depending on task conditions. However, recollection may not 
always be the controlled all-or-nothing process it is represented as in the PDP 
(Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009), and familiarity may not always be automatic and 
uncontrollable. Dodson and Johnson (1996) suggested that the source monitoring 
framework provides a much more flexible and inclusive way of thinking about 
memory processes than the PDP, and that source monitoring tasks produce data which 
is easier to interpret and to apply to real world behavior.  
Despite these criticisms, the PDP can still provide a useful insight into the 
memory processes involved in recognition. The parameter estimates themselves 
should perhaps be treated with some caution, as they may not reflect the “true” 
contributions of recollection and familiarity to recognition, due to measurement error 
and biases in the data. However, the patterns of R and F estimates for different types 
of stimuli, and across different conditions, still provide valuable information on the 
ways in which memory processes are used in recognition.  
 Dual-process theorists have identified several factors with dissociable effects 
on recollection and familiarity. One such factor is depth of processing. The levels-of-
processing (LOP) framework was introduced by Craik and Lockhart (1972), who 
suggested that perception involves a series of complex stages which become 
progressively “deeper”. Upon perceiving a visual stimulus, for example, early visual 
areas of the brain detect properties of the object such as color, contrast, angles, and 
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lines. Further along the perceptual pathway, this input will be compared to real world 
knowledge in order to interpret the stimulus in a meaningful way. At deeper stages, 
associations may be formed between the stimulus and other items stored in memory. 
Experimentally, depth of processing is usually manipulated by giving participants 
instructions which encourage either shallow processing or deep processing. In face 
recognition studies, “shallow” instructions often ask participants to make judgments 
about facial features, and “deep” instructions ask participants to make personality 
judgments about the people depicted (e.g. Patterson & Baddeley, 1977; Winograd, 
1981).  
  Deep processing instructions often produce higher recognition accuracy than 
shallow processing instructions (e.g. Berman & Cutler, 1998; Bower & Karlin, 1974). 
Dual-process theory predicts that LOP instructions should greatly influence 
recollection but should influence familiarity to a much smaller degree. Deeper or 
more elaborate processing provides participants with more cues for recollection; for 
example, they may be able to retrieve particular thoughts and associations which were 
elicited by the stimulus at encoding. Familiarity, on the other hand, should not be 
affected by depth of processing, as this more automatic process stems from the 
perceptual fluency associated with a stimulus (Yonelinas, 2002). Some studies have 
supported this hypothesis (e.g. Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; 
Mulligan & Hirshman, 1995), while others have found that deep processing improves 
familiarity as well as recollection (Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2006; Konstantinou & 
Gardiner, 2005).  
Sporer (1991) compared the recognition accuracy of participants who were 
given deep or shallow encoding instructions with control participants who were given 
no instructions about encoding strategy. A typical LOP effect was found, with higher 
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accuracy in the deep condition than in the shallow condition. However, the deep 
instructions provided no extra benefit over the control condition. Sporer (1991) 
therefore argued that LOP effects are caused by the inferiority of shallow instructions 
rather than the superiority of deep instructions. Including a control condition in which 
no processing instructions are given can therefore provide some insight into how 
participants “naturally” process stimuli within the confines of a recognition task. This 
is something that few LOP studies have done, with most including only shallow and 
deep conditions (e.g. Bower & Karlin, 1974; Bloom & Mudd, 1991; Patterson & 
Baddeley, 1977). 
Socio-cognitive explanations of the ORB propose that when an out-group face 
is encountered, an automatic categorization process is triggered (Ito & Urland, 2005; 
Sporer, 2001b; Zhao & Bentin, 2008). Faces categorized as out-group members may 
then be processed using a shallow encoding strategy, as motivation to individuate may 
be low (Ackerman et al., 2006; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007). Chance and 
Goldstein (1981) asked White participants to write down the first thought they had 
upon seeing a series of White, Black, and Japanese faces. The content of the 
participants’ responses suggested that White faces were spontaneously processed 
more deeply than the Black or Japanese faces.  
   In this paper, two experiments are reported which use the PDP to investigate 
the roles of recollection and familiarity in the ORB. White participants’ memories of 
White and Black faces are tested in inclusion and exclusion trials, from which R and F 
parameters are estimated. The main predictions are that participants will falsely 
identify more Black lures than White lures in the exclusion trials, and that the 
estimated R parameter will be higher for White faces than for Black faces. In 
Experiment 2, depth of processing is manipulated. Participants are randomly allocated 
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to a shallow processing condition, a deep processing condition, or a control condition, 
with no encoding instructions. As depth of processing increases, the estimated R 
parameter should also increase; the estimated F parameter should not be influenced by 
depth of processing.  
When deep or shallow encoding strategies are encouraged, performance may 
be very similar for White and Black faces. In the control condition, participants are 
free to adopt any encoding strategy they wish. Previous research (e.g. Chance & 
Goldstein, 1981; Hugenberg et al., 2007) suggests that under such conditions, 
participants adopt more shallow processing strategies for other-race faces than for 
own-race faces. However, when participants are more constrained in their processing 
strategies as a result of the task instructions, these “natural” processing differences 
might be overridden. That is to say, in the shallow condition, participants’ natural 
tendencies to process own-race faces deeply will be inhibited; and in the deep 
condition, participants’ tendencies to categorize and process other-race faces in a 
shallow manner will also be prevented. Thus, whether LOP effects occur through 
deep-superiority processes or through shallow-inferiority processes, one would 
predict a smaller ORB in the shallow and deep conditions than in the control 
condition.   
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty two White undergraduates participated for credit on an introductory 
psychology course. The mean age of the participants was 20 years; forty (77%) were 
female.  
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 The experiment had a 2 x 2 repeated measures design. The first factor was 
race of face, with two levels, White and Black. The second factor, trial type, had two 
levels, inclusion and exclusion. The dependent measures were the proportions of 
“old” responses to targets, distractors, and lures; and the Recollection (R) and 
Familiarity (F) estimates. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Color photographs of one hundred and sixty male faces (80 White, 80 Black) 
were cropped in Adobe Photoshop to remove necks, shoulders, and backgrounds. 
These photographs were taken from two databases, which were of comparable high 
quality. All of the Black faces and approximately half of the White faces were taken 
from a South African database. However, the South African database did not contain 
a sufficient number of White males, so the remaining White faces were taken from an 
Australian database. Both of the databases had been set up specifically for research 
purposes, and all of the individuals had given permission for their images to be used 
in psychological research.1  
None of the faces had glasses, jewellery, or distinguishing marks, and all had a 
neutral facial expression. For each person depicted, two separate photographs were 
prepared – one in a frontal pose (shown in the learning phase), and the other in a three 
quarter profile pose (shown in the testing phase). The experiment was created and run 
using E-Prime software. 
                                               
1
 Due to copyright reasons, the face images cannot be reproduced here. 
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Procedure 
The participants were tested in groups of up to five by a White experimenter, 
with each participant working individually at their own PC. The experimenter 
remained in the room throughout. The participants were told that they would be taking 
part in a face recognition experiment, and that they should pay close attention to all of 
the faces so that they could answer questions about them later on. They were not 
given any information about inclusion or exclusion trials, nor were they told that they 
would see faces from different racial backgrounds. 
 The experiment was divided into four blocks, each of which had a learning 
phase followed by a testing phase. For each participant, two blocks consisted of 
inclusion trials, and two consisted of exclusion trials. The order of the blocks was 
randomized for each participant. In each learning phase, participants saw two groups 
of 10 target faces – Group A and Group B. Faces in Group A appeared first on a 
screen with a red border. After a thirty second delay, the Group B faces were shown 
on a screen with a blue border. The colored borders were added to decrease the list 
similarity, as high similarity can lead to an underestimation of recollection (Gruppuso 
et al., 1997). The faces were presented sequentially for 10 seconds each, with a 1 
second inter-stimulus interval. The order of the faces within each list was randomized 
for each participant. 
 The learning phase was followed by a thirty second delay, after which the 
testing phase began. In the inclusion trials, participants were told to say that any face 
that they recognized was old, regardless of whether the face had appeared in Group A 
or Group B, while unfamiliar faces should be classed as new. In the exclusion trials, 
participants were told only to identify faces from one particular group (e.g. Group A) 
as old, and to identify faces from the other group (e.g. Group B) as well as unfamiliar 
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faces as new. The participants responded by pressing 1 for old or 0 for new. In each 
block, 20 distractors appeared along with the 20 faces from the learning phase. The 
faces were shown sequentially in a random order and remained on the screen until the 
participant had made a response.  
 The experiment was blocked by race of face, so that participants couldn’t use 
race as a cue to list membership. Each participant took part in one inclusion and one 
exclusion block for both White and Black faces. In the exclusion blocks, the target 
group (Group A or B) and the lure group (Group A or B) were counterbalanced 
between participants. Which faces appeared as targets and which appeared as 
distractors was also counterbalanced between participants.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean proportions of trials in which participants said old are shown in 
Table 2, broken down by trial type (inclusion or exclusion), stimulus type (target, foil, 
or lure), and race of face. The table indicates that participants made correct old 
responses to White targets more frequently than Black targets. Conversely, they made 
more incorrect old responses to Black distractors and lures than to White distractors 
and lures. Repeated measures t tests were conducted to confirm these observations. 
The effect size Cohen’s d is reported for all comparisons (the formulae for calculating 
d in repeated measures and between groups designs are given in Appendix 1).  
The differences were significant in all cases, and the effect sizes were large. 
Participants said old more often to White targets than Black targets in both the 
inclusion trials, t(51) = 4.87, p < .001, d = .75, and the exclusion trials, t(51) = 4.19, p 
< .001, d = .62. Conversely, participants falsely accepted Black distractors as old 
more often than White distractors in both the inclusion trials, t(51) = 8.80, p < .001, d 
= 1.18, and in the exclusion trials, t(51) = 4.83, p < .001, d = .79. Participants also 
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identified Black lures as old more often than White lures, t(51) = 3.69, p = .001, d = 
.64.  
 
Table 2: Mean proportion of old responses to White and Black faces in 
inclusion trials (top) and exclusion trials (bottom) in Experiment 1. 
Mean  Standard Deviation  
Stimulus type 
White Black  White Black 
Inclusion 
Targets .68 .57  .15 .13 
Distractors .26 .41  .14 .13 
Exclusion 
Targets .58 .48  .15 .18 
Distractors .22 .33  .14 .13 
Lures .32 .42  .13 .18 
 
These results support previous findings in the ORB literature. The proportions 
of  old responses to targets are akin to hit rates in standard old/new recognition tasks, 
which are often higher for own-race faces than for other-race faces (e.g. Meissner et 
al., 2005; Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). Old responses to distractors are akin to 
false alarm rates in old/new recognition tests, which are often higher for other-race 
faces than for own-race faces (e.g. Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Meissner et al., 2005; 
Slone et al., 2000). The lures in the PDP form a category of stimuli which are not 
included in standard recognition tests, as they are previously seen faces which are to 
be ignored. The results of this study suggest that participants have greater difficulty in 
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recalling the list membership of Black faces than White faces, and so they mistakenly 
identify a larger number of Black lures than White lures.   
The proportion of targets correctly identified as old in the inclusion trials 
(P(Inclusion)) and the proportion of lures incorrectly identified as old in the exclusion 
trials (P(Exclusion)) were used to derive estimates for the Recollection (R) and 
Familiarity (F) parameters using the following formulae: R = P(Inclusion) – 
P(Exclusion); F = P(Exclusion)/(1 – R). The mean estimates are shown in Table 3, 
broken down by race of face. The table shows that the estimated R parameter for 
White faces was more than twice the estimated R parameter for Black faces. The F 
parameter, however, is very similar for White and Black faces. These observations 
were confirmed in repeated measures t tests. The R estimate was significantly higher 
for White faces than for Black faces, t(51) = 6.62, p < .001, d = 1.05, whereas the F 
estimate was not significantly different for White and Black faces, t(51) = 0.78, p = 
.44, d = .13. 
 
Table 3: Mean estimated recollection (R) and familiarity (F) parameters for 
White and Black faces in Experiment 1. 
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Parameter White Black  White Black 
R .36 .15  .19 .20 
F .50 .48  .18 .15 
 
 As predicted, participants showed a specific impairment in recollecting other-
race faces. Participants made more errors with Black lures than with White lures, and 
also correctly identified fewer Black targets than White targets, which lead to 
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substantially higher R estimates for White faces than for Black faces. However, 
participants were no more or less likely to use familiarity to recognize own-race faces 
compared to other-race faces. These results support those of Meissner et al. (2005), 
who found a significant difference in Remember responses but not Know responses in 
a Remember-Know task. Similarly, Marcon et al. (2009) found that Hispanic 
participants mistakenly identified repeated Black distractors more frequently than 
repeated Hispanic distractors. Using equations from the PDP, Marcon et al. (2009) 
estimated that participants were specifically impaired at recollecting other-race faces 
compared to own-race faces.   
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 showed that White participants are less likely to use recollection 
to recognize Black faces than White faces. Experiment 2 introduces an LOP 
manipulation to the process-dissociation procedure. Participants are allocated to one 
of three conditions, with instructions designed to encourage shallow processing, deep 
processing, or with no instructions about processing strategy. LOP instructions 
influence recollection more than familiarity (Gardiner et al., 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). 
Therefore, the largest effects of the LOP instructions should be on the lure response 
rates and the R estimates. Participants in the shallow condition should identify more 
lures than participants in the deep condition, leading to lower R estimates. The 
participants in the control condition are likely to be using a range of different 
encoding strategies, and so their performance may fall somewhere between the two 
experimental conditions. The effect size for the difference in recollection between 
White and Black faces should be smaller in the shallow and deep conditions than in 
the control condition, as participants’ natural tendencies to process own-race faces 
deeply but to categorize other-race faces will be constrained. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 A power analysis was conducted to determine the appropriate sample size for 
Experiment 2. In order to replicate the difference in the estimated R parameter for 
White and Black faces, the effect size (d = 1.05) of this difference in Experiment 1 
was used. The power analysis showed that, in order to achieve 95% power with an α 
level of .05, 17 participants were required per condition. Sixty White undergraduates 
took part for credit on an introductory psychology course or for £4. The mean age of 
the participants was 21 years; forty six (77%) were female. 
 The experiment had a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design. The first factor, race of face, 
had two levels, White and Black. The second factor, trial type, had two levels, 
inclusion and exclusion. The final factor, LOP condition, had three levels, shallow, 
deep, and control (n = 20 in each condition). The first two factors were manipulated 
within participants, and the third factor was manipulated between groups. As in 
Experiment 1, the dependent measures were the proportions of “old” responses to 
targets, distractors, and lures; and the Recollection (R) and Familiarity (F) estimates. 
Materials and Apparatus 
 The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1, but with the addition of 
new instructions in the shallow and deep conditions. Participants in these conditions 
answered one question about each face as it appeared during the encoding phase. A 
total of three different questions were used in each condition, and they were randomly 
assigned to the target faces. The participant could make their response at any time 
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while the face was on screen. The face remained on screen for the full 10 seconds, 
regardless of when the participant responded to the question. All of the questions were 
answered on a 1-5 scale, which appeared on the screen below each face. Participants 
in the control condition were just told to pay attention to all of the faces, as they 
would be asked questions about them later. These instructions were identical to those 
given in Experiment 1.   
The questions in the shallow condition were selected to avoid drawing 
attention to physiognomic differences between White and Black faces, such as nose 
width and lip fullness. Some characteristics, such as eye and hair color, vary more 
widely in White faces than in Black faces. To avoid tuning participants’ attention to 
racial differences, the shallow questions only ask about features which do not 
systematically vary between White and Black faces, and which are equally likely to 
vary within both racial groups. The three questions used were: “How round is the 
chin?”, “How far apart are the eyes?”, and “How thick are the eyebrows?”.  
In the deep condition, care was taken to avoid questions which might make 
participants feel uncomfortable. Personality characteristics with very obvious polar 
positive and negative opposites (such as intelligent vs. unintelligent) were avoided, as 
participants may have objected to making such judgments about minority race faces. 
Instead, personality traits with less obvious positive and negative associations were 
selected. The three questions used were: “How outgoing is this person?”, “How 
spontaneous is this person?”, and “How competitive is this person?”.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean proportions of old responses for targets, distractors, and lures were 
analyzed in separate 2 (race of face) x 3 (LOP instructions) mixed ANOVAs. Table 4 
shows the group means, collapsed across LOP instructions, but broken down by race 
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of face. The pattern of means for targets and distractors appear similar to those found 
in Experiment 1, with more old responses to White targets than to Black targets, but 
more old responses to Black distractors than to White distractors.  
 
Table 4: Mean proportion of “old” responses to White and Black faces in 
inclusion trials (top) and exclusion trials (bottom) in Experiment 2. 
Mean  Standard Deviation  
Trial type 
White Black  White Black 
Inclusion 
Targets .61 .57  .16 .14 
Distractors .28 .40  .16 .11 
Exclusion 
Targets .54 .51  .16 .18 
Distractors .24 .29  .12 .13 
Lures .44 .41  .18 .17 
 
The ANOVAs confirmed these observations. Participants made slightly more 
old responses to White targets than Black targets in the inclusion trials, F(1, 57) = 
3.79, p = .06, d = .27, but not in the exclusion trials, F(1, 57) = 1.24, p = .27, d = .18. 
Black distractors were incorrectly identified as old more often than White distractors 
in both the inclusion trials, F(1, 57) = 29.88, p < .001, d = .87, and the exclusion 
trials, F(1, 57) = 7.28, p = .01, d = .40.  
 Table 5 shows the mean proportions of old responses to lures, broken down by 
race of participant and LOP condition. The ANOVA confirmed that the lure responses 
differed across the LOP conditions, F(2, 57) = 4.60, p = .01, ηp2 = .14. Participants in 
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the shallow condition identified a higher proportion of lures (M = .49, SD = .12) than 
participants in the control condition (M = .39, SD = .12), t(38) = 2.78, p = .008, d = 
.28, or participants in the deep condition (M = .40, SD = .12), t(38) = 2.50, p = .02, d 
= .25. For both White and Black faces, the mean number of errors was smaller in the 
deep condition than in the shallow condition; however, the magnitude of this 
difference appears to be greater for Black faces than for White faces.  Despite these 
apparent differences between White and Black faces, neither the main effect of race 
nor the interaction term were significant (main effect of race: F(1, 57) = 1.00, p = .32, 
d = .17; interaction: F(2, 57) = 0.48, p = .62, ηp2 = .02).  
 
Table5: Mean proportion of old responses to lures, broken down by race of 
face and LOP condition in Experiment 2. 
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Race  Shallow Control Deep  Shallow Control Deep 
White .49 .40 .43  .16 .16 .21 
Black .49 .38 .36  .14 .18 .16 
 
The LOP effects were confined to the identification of lures. More lures were 
identified in the shallow condition than in the control or deep conditions, suggesting 
that shallow encoding instructions impair participants’ abilities to recollect 
information concerning the list membership of familiar faces at testing. The LOP 
instructions did not influence responding for targets or for distractors (maximum F(2, 
57) = 2.28). 
 Using the same formulae as in Experiment 1, the R and F parameters were 
estimated for White and Black faces in the three LOP conditions. The mean estimates 
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are shown in Table 6, broken down by race of face and LOP instructions. The table 
shows that R appears to increase as the LOP instructions become deeper, whereas F 
remains relatively constant across the LOP conditions. Further, the pattern of means 
for the R estimate appears to be different for White and Black faces. For White faces, 
there is a sharp increase in R between the shallow and control conditions, with the 
mean R estimate in the control and deep conditions almost identical. For Black faces, 
the increase in R seems to be more gradual, with the parameter estimate in the control 
condition falling between the estimates in the shallow and control conditions. To test 
these patterns, R estimates across the three LOP conditions were compared separately 
for White and Black faces, in one way ANOVAs. 
 
Table 6: Mean estimated R (top) and F (bottom) parameters for White and 
Black faces, broken down by LOP condition in Experiment 2. 
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Race Shallow Control Deep  Shallow Control Deep 
Recollection (R) 
White .06 .22 .22  .19 .17 .19 
Black .08 .15 .25  .12 .22 .20 
Familiarity (F) 
White .53 .51 .52  .16 .15 .18 
Black .53 .43 .47  .12 .17 .13 
 
 For White faces, the ANOVA confirmed that the mean estimated R parameter 
varied across the LOP conditions, F(2, 57) = 4.98, p < .001. Post hoc t tests (with a 
Bonferroni corrected α of .02) showed that the mean R estimate in the shallow 
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condition (M = .06, SD = .19) was lower than the mean estimate in the control 
condition (M = .22, SD = .17), t(38) = -2.81, p = .008, d = .28, and the deep condition 
(M = .22, SD = .19), t(38) = -2.61, p = .01, d = .26. Participants in the control 
condition appear to be using deep encoding strategies. When participants were 
prevented from using a deep processing strategy in the shallow condition, their ability 
to recollect White faces was impaired.  
The R parameter also varied across the LOP conditions for Black faces, F(2, 
57) = 4.24, p = .02. The R estimate was lower in the shallow condition (M = .08, SD = 
.12) than in the deep condition (M = .25, SD = .20), t(38) = -3.26, p = .002, d = .33. 
The estimate in the control condition (M = .15, SD = .22) did not significantly differ 
from the estimate in the shallow condition, t(38) = 1.34, p = .19, d = .13, or in the 
deep condition, t(38) = -1.43, p = .16, d = .14. This makes it difficult to draw any 
inferences about encoding strategies for Black faces in the control condition. 
Participants may have been using a variety of different processing styles, or they may 
have been using some medium-depth processing strategy. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of R estimates for Black faces for participants in the control condition. If 
participants were using two or more distinct processing styles, then one might expect 
to see a bimodal or multimodal distribution. However, there is quite clearly a single 
peak in the distribution, which suggests that this is unlikely.  
The ANOVAs confirmed that the LOP instructions did not influence the 
estimated F parameter for either White faces, F(2, 57) = 0.13, p = .88, or Black faces, 
F(2, 57) = 2.43, p = .10. Previous research has shown that LOP instructions influence 
R estimates but not F estimates in dual-process investigations (Yonelinas, 2002). 
Familiarity stems from the fluency with which a stimulus is perceived, which should 
not be affected by encoding strategy. These results therefore support the existing 
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literature, that depth of processing is less important for familiarity than for 
recollection.  
 
Figure 4: Histogram showing the distribution of R estimates for Black faces for 
participants in the control condition in Experiment 2.  
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Repeated measures t tests were run to compare the estimated R parameters for 
White and Black faces in each LOP condition. The prediction was that R would be 
significantly higher for White faces than for Black faces in the control condition, but 
that the differences in the shallow and deep conditions would be smaller and non-
significant. The t tests confirmed that the R estimates were not significantly different 
for White and Black faces in either the shallow condition, t(19) = 0.27, p = .79, d = 
.13, or the deep condition, t(19) = 0.40, p = .70, d = .14. However, contrary to 
predictions, the difference in the R estimates in the control condition was also non-
significant, t(19) = 1.29, p = .21, d = .36. However, the means in the control condition 
were in the predicted direction (M White = .22, SD = .17; M Black = .15, SD = .22), 
and the effect size was larger than those found in the shallow or deep conditions. 
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There may therefore have been a problem with statistical power in this study, with too 
few participants in each condition to detect a significant effect. In support of 
Experiment 1, the estimated F parameters did not differ for White and Black faces in 
any of the LOP conditions (for all comparisons, t(38) ≤ 1.63, p ≥ .20, d ≤ .50).  
 The results of Experiment 2 support the hypothesis that depth of processing 
influences recollection to a greater degree than familiarity. Participants in the shallow 
condition identified more lures than participants in the deep condition, which led to a 
lower mean estimated R parameter. Participants in the control condition performed 
very similarly to participants in the deep condition with White faces. This suggests 
that the control participants were using deep encoding strategies for own-race faces. 
The mean performance of control participants for Black faces fell somewhere 
between the means for the shallow and deep conditions, making it difficult to make 
any solid claims about processing strategies. However, the unimodal distribution of R 
estimates suggests that there were not two or more distinct strategies being used.  
General Discussion 
Summary of race effects 
 In two experiments, the roles of recollection and familiarity in recognizing 
own- and other-race faces were explored using Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation 
procedure (PDP). White participants studied White and Black faces, presented in two 
separate study lists, and took part in inclusion trials and exclusion trials. The mean 
proportion of old responses to targets, distractors, and lures (exclusion trials only) 
were compared for White and Black faces. In both studies, participants correctly 
identified more White targets as old than Black targets. Black distractors were also 
identified as old more often than White distractors. This pattern of results replicates 
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the mirror effect often found in ORB studies, with lower hit rates and higher false 
alarm rates for other-race faces compared to own-race faces (Meissner et al., 2005; 
Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997).  
In Experiment 1, participants misidentified more Black lures as old than White 
lures. These errors are similar to the repetition errors seen in Marcon et al.’s (2009) 
study, and they suggest that participants have difficulty retrieving episodic 
information in order to discriminate the list membership of familiar other-race faces. 
This effect was not replicated in Experiment 2, however, with no overall difference in 
lure identification rates between White and Black faces.  As a result, the large 
difference in the estimated R paramaters found for White and Black faces in 
Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2.  
In both experiments, however, the estimated F parameters were similar for 
White and Black faces. This supports previous findings by Meissner and colleagues 
(Marcon et al., 2009; Meissner et al., 2005), who found a dissociation between 
recollection and familiarity for own- and other-race faces. These results indicate that 
people are able to recognize other-race faces on the basis of familiarity. Reduced 
recollection and preserved familiarity in recognizing other-race faces could well lead 
to the pattern of results often found in ORB studies, with lower hit rates and higher 
false alarm rates for other-race faces than for own-race faces (Teitelbaum & 
Geiselman, 1997). 
The inconsistencies between Experiments 1 and 2 may have been produced by 
the LOP manipulation in Experiment 2. Although there were no significant 
interactions between race of face and LOP condition for any outcome measure, the 
decreased accuracy rates in the shallow condition may have obscured any differences 
between White and Black faces. Table 6 shows that the mean R estimates in the 
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shallow and deep conditions were very close for both groups of faces. It is in the 
control condition that the difference is beginning to emerge. With a larger sample 
size, this difference may have reached significance. However, the power analysis 
conducted prior to the data collection showed that this difference should have been 
detected with greater than 95% power with the current sample size.   
Summary of LOP effects 
The LOP instructions in Experiment 2 influenced the mean proportions of lure 
misidentifications, with more errors in the shallow condition than in either the control 
or deep conditions. The means in the control and deep conditions were almost 
identical, suggesting that there was a shallow-inferiority effect present rather than a 
deep-superiority effect. This supports Sporer’s (1991) argument that within 
intentional learning paradigms, faces are processed deeply, and that shallow encoding 
instructions reduce accuracy. There were no LOP effects for targets or distractors, 
however. Depth of processing instructions did not influence participants’ abilities to 
correctly identify previously seen faces. Nor did they influence the rates at which 
participants falsely identified previously unseen faces. LOP effects therefore seem to 
be confined to responses which require the rejection of a familiar stimulus using 
specific information about the encoding event (list membership). 
 This was confirmed in the analysis of the estimated R and F parameters. In 
line with previous research (e.g. Gardiner et al., 1996; Mulligan & Hirshman, 1995), 
LOP instructions had dissociable effects on recollection and familiarity. Whereas R 
increased as the depth of processing increased, F remained constant across the LOP 
conditions. As predicted, R estimates for White and Black faces were very similar in 
the shallow and deep conditions, with a difference beginning to show in the neutral 
condition. With a larger sample size, this difference may have reached significance. 
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The pattern of mean R estimates was different for White faces and Black 
faces. For White faces, there was a clear shallow-inferiority effect, with a lower R in 
the shallow condition than in either the control or deep conditions. However, the R 
estimate for Black faces in the control condition fell somewhere between the 
estimates in the shallow and deep conditions. It seems, therefore, that although racial 
categorization does reduce accuracy for out-group compared to in-group faces, some 
degree of accuracy is maintained over and above that found when featural processing 
strategies are encouraged. Some authors (e.g. Levin, 2000; Sporer, 2001) have argued 
that certain features act as “racial markers” (e.g. skin tone), which automatically cause 
the face to be categorized as an out-group member, and to therefore be processed in a 
shallow manner. In line with this account, participants have been found to rely more 
on featural processing than on configural processing for other-race faces (e.g. Michel, 
Corneille, & Rossion, 2006; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). However, in 
Experiment 2, participants who were explicitly told to attend to specific facial features 
performed less accurately with other-race faces than the control participants, who 
were left to use more natural encoding strategies. The difference between these two 
groups (though statistically non-significant) does seem to suggest that featural 
processing per se may not be the cause of the ORB in the control participants. 
However, the features which were used in the shallow task here (chin shape, eye 
separation, eyebrow thickness) were chosen specifically to avoid artificially inducing 
categorization effects. Perhaps if features which are more indicative of group 
membership (e.g. skin tone, lip fullness, nose width) a different pattern of results 
would have emerged. 
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Limitations  
 The studies presented here contained samples of White participants only. 
Ideally, similarly sized samples of Black participants would also have been recruited. 
Testing participants from only one race can raise concerns about stimulus sampling 
(Wells & Olson, 2001). For example, if the sample of Black faces were less variable 
and discriminable than the sample of White faces, then apparent cross-race 
differences may have been artifacts of the stimulus selection. However, as the size of 
the stimulus set increases, stimulus sampling concerns should decrease, as any 
idiosyncrasies of individual faces will have less influence on the overall results 
(Sporer, 2001a). With eighty faces from each group, the likelihood of stimulus 
sampling errors posing major concerns for these data seems small.  
Furthermore, full crossover effects are not always found in ORB research (e.g. 
Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, & Sriram, 2001; Wright et al., 2003). When crossover 
interactions are found, they are often asymmetric, with White participants typically 
showing larger effects than participants of other races (e.g. Jackiw, Arbuthnott, 
Pfeifer, Marcon, & Meissner, 2008; Meissner et al., 2005; Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, 
Ventureyra, & de Schonen, 2005). There are several reasons why these asymmetries 
could occur, including a priori differences in the variability of the two stimulus sets. 
However, social psychological research on intergroup relations can also inform our 
understanding of these recognition effects. Minority groups are often lacking in social 
status and in power, and so are reliant upon the powerful majority group in their 
everyday life (Islam & Hewstone, 1993a). As a result, they may come to perceive the 
out-group as heterogeneous, avoiding many of the attributional biases and stereotypes 
subscribed to by members of majority groups (Hewstone & Ward, 1993; Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993b). Anthony, Copper, and Mullen (1992) argued that the numerical 
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infrequency of out-group members in the environment of a majority group member 
encourages prototypical representation, which leads to perceptions of homogeneity. 
For minority group members, the numerical frequency of out-group members in the 
environment is high, encouraging exemplar-based representations, and reducing 
perceptions of homogeneity. Therefore, while one might expect the finding of Paper 1 
to replicate with members of other groups, such effects may well be smaller and more 
elusive.  
The results of these experiments should be interpreted with the criticisms of 
the PDP in mind. The validity of the independence assumption made in the PDP has 
been called into question, and violations of this assumption can create artifactual 
distinctions between the R and F estimates. In particular, the F parameter can be 
decreased as the R parameter increases. However, this did not occur in Experiment 2. 
Depth of processing increased R estimates, but F estimates remained constant.  
The PDP includes only a narrow range of responses in the R estimate, as 
recollection is defined as the ability to remember the list membership of a previously 
seen stimulus. This leads to an underestimation of R and an overestimation of F. 
However, the interest in these studies lies in the pattern of mean estimates across 
different stimulus types and conditions, rather than in the absolute values of the 
estimates. If the degree of under- and overestimation is similar for both groups of 
faces, then the overall patterns of means will not be affected.  
Evidence from the PDP should be combined with convergent evidence using 
different paradigms, such as source monitoring tasks, and Tulving’s (1985) 
Remember-Know procedure. Using multiple methods will provide a much clearer 
picture of how memory is really operating when recognizing faces from other racial 
groups. Paper 2 will use a task designed to test participants’ memories of contextual 
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information associated with own- and other-race faces, in search of further support for 
the dissociation between recollection and familiarity in the ORB. 
Conclusions   
 In support of previous research, White participants make greater use of 
recollection when recognizing White faces than when recognizing Black faces. Own-
race faces produced higher hit rates and lower false alarm rates than other-race faces. 
The participants were more accurate at recalling the list membership of familiar White 
faces than familiar Black faces, at least in some situations. When deep encoding 
strategies were encouraged, the number of lure identifications for Black faces 
decreased, leading to an increase in the estimated R parameter. Conversely, 
encouraging shallow processing reduced the R estimate for both groups of faces. 
These results suggest that the encoding strategies adopted by participants in old/new 
recognition tasks might be different for own- and other-race faces. When the 
processing strategies are controlled, cross-race effects become much smaller.  
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  Paper 2: Recollection Impairment for Other-Race Faces: A Question of Mental 
Effort at Retrieval? 
Abstract 
 In two experiments, White participants studied White and Black faces, each of 
which was assigned one of two verbal labels. At testing, participants saw these faces 
again along with some novel faces. Participants were required to identify the faces 
which had appeared with one of the encoding labels (targets), and to reject the faces 
which had appeared with the other label (distractors). The results were consistent with 
a dual-process approach to the own-race bias in face recognition. In Experiment 3, the 
participants were unable to discriminate between Black targets and Black distractors, 
suggesting they did not retrieve recollective information about the Black faces. In 
Experiment 4, when the task was framed to encourage more careful consideration at 
testing, participants could successfully discriminate between Black targets and 
distractors. These results suggest that participants are generally less willing, rather 
than less able, to search for recollective evidence when identifying other-race faces.  
Introduction 
Dual-process theories posit that there are two independent routes to 
recognition – recollection and familiarity (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). 
Recollection involves the retrieval of specific information about the previous 
occurrence of an item. Familiarity, on the other hand, refers to the strength of memory 
activation created by an item. Although there are several variations of dual-process 
theory (e.g. Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Mandler, 1980; Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009), 
the dominant view is that recollection is an all-or-nothing process, whereas familiarity 
is a continuous process, to which some decision criteria must be applied. Recollection 
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is also believed to be a relatively slow and effortful process, which involves actively 
searching episodic memory, whereas familiarity is a fast and automatic process 
(Yonelinas, 2002). 
In standard old/new face recognition tests, participants can be correct in two 
ways: They can identify a target (a hit) and they can reject a novel face (a correct 
rejection). They can also be incorrect in two ways: They can identify a novel face (a 
false alarm) and they can reject a target (a miss). In these tasks, recollection and 
familiarity act in concert, providing two sources of evidence upon which decisions 
can be based. However, Jacoby (1991) created a task that places the two processes in 
opposition, the process-dissociation procedure (PDP). Participants study two separate 
study lists, and then take part in inclusion trials and exclusion trials. Inclusion trials 
are similar to old/new recognition tests – participants must simply discriminate old 
items from new items, regardless of list membership. In exclusion trials, however, 
participants are required only to identify stimuli from one of the two study lists. One 
study list becomes the target list, and the other becomes the distractor list. This creates  
an additional type of correct response (rejection of distractors) and an additional type 
of incorrect response (identification of distractors).  
 When completing an exclusion task, participants can choose to use an effortful 
recollective search strategy, or they can choose not to use this effortful strategy, and 
they can instead rely on the relatively effortless familiarity process. The successful 
discrimination of targets from distractors requires a recollective search strategy, as 
one must recall-to-reject (i.e. one must recall seeing the stimulus in the task-irrelevant 
study list). Identifications of distractors therefore reflect familiarity without 
recollection.  
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Let us make the assumption that upon seeing a face during the testing phase, 
the participant will always attempt to search for any episodic information about a 
previous encounter with that face. If the face is a target, then a successful search will 
lead the participant to identify the face. If the face is a distractor, then a successful 
search will lead the participant to reject the face. If searches are unsuccessful (as they 
will always be with novel faces, excepting false recollection), then the participant 
could either decide to reject the face or to use an alternative decision strategy, such as 
familiarity. 
 
Figure 5: The hypothetical familiarity distributions for targets, distractors, and 
novel faces.   
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Figure 5 shows the hypothetical distributions of familiarity for targets, 
distractors, and novel faces. As in a standard recognition test, targets should be more 
familiar than novel faces, with some overlap in the distributions. Targets and 
distractors, however, should be approximately equal in their familiarity distributions, 
as all of the faces have been seen before. The two distributions will therefore overlap 
almost completely. No matter where a participant places their response criterion (for 
example, in position x on Figure 5), they will be unable to accurately distinguish 
between targets and distractors. 
One can then predict that successful recollective searches will increase target 
identifications and decrease distractor identifications. As the success rate of these 
searches increases, the difference in identification rates of targets and distractors 
should also increase. If recollective searches are consistently unsuccessful, or are not 
attempted, then there should be no difference in target and distractor identifications. 
The size of the difference can therefore indicate how successfully participants are able 
to recollect studied items.  
A robust finding in the face recognition literature is that participants are more 
accurate at recognizing faces of their own race than faces of other races (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). This effect has been termed the own-race bias (ORB). Most studies 
of the ORB have used old/new recognition tests (e.g. Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 
2007; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969). In these tests, 
the ORB is often seen as a “mirror effect”, with lower hit rates and higher false alarm 
rates for other-race faces. However, the effect size is often larger for false alarms than 
for hits. Signal detection measures of response bias show that participants respond 
more leniently to other-race faces than to own-race faces (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001).  
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Recently, Meissner and colleagues (Evans, Marcon, & Meissner, 2009; 
Marcon, Susa, & Meissner, 2009; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005) have examined 
the ORB from a dual-process perspective. Using a Remember-Know task, Meissner et 
al. (2005) showed that participants make more Remember responses to own-race 
faces than to other-race faces. Participants are also more likely to misidentify repeated 
distractor faces of a different race than of their own race (Marcon et al., 2009). In 
Paper 1, recollection estimates from the PDP were higher for own-race faces than for 
other-race faces.  
Here, two studies are reported, in which White participants see White and 
Black faces associated with one of two verbal labels. Participants then see both groups 
of faces again, along with a number of novel faces. Using a paradigm similar to 
Jacoby’s (1991) exclusion trials, participants are asked to identify faces which were 
associated with one of the two verbal labels (targets), while rejecting faces which had 
been seen with the other verbal label (distractors), as well as novel faces.  
The main prediction is that participants will successfully retrieve recollective 
information more frequently for the White faces than for the Black faces. As a result, 
the difference between identification rates for targets and distractors will be larger for 
the White faces than for the Black faces.  
Experiment 3 
Early studies of the ORB investigated racial attitudes as potential moderators 
of recognition accuracy (e.g. Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Carroo, 1987). Overall, 
little evidence was found linking participants’ explicit attitudes to the magnitude of 
the ORB (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). More recent studies have used more sensitive 
techniques to measure attitudes and stereotypes. Findings have been inconsistent, with 
some but not others finding significant relationships between attitudes and recognition 
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accuracy (Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, & Sriram, 2001; Lebrecht, Pierce, Tarr, & Tanaka, 
2009; Walker & Hewstone, 2008). Here, we explore whether “criminal” and “non-
criminal” labels influence identification rates for White and Black faces. Participants 
assigned to one condition were asked to identify criminals and to reject non-criminals, 
while participants assigned to the other condition had the opposite task.  
Previous research has shown that the information presented with a face can 
influence the ways in which the face is perceived, and the subsequent memory for that 
face. For example, Shepherd, Eliis, McMurran, and Davies (1978) presented 
participants with the photograph of a target, who they were told was either a murderer 
or a lifeboat captain. The participants rated the target more favourably along a range 
of physical and personality dimensions, including attractiveness and intelligence. 
After a short delay, the participants reconstructed the target face using Photofit. The 
resulting composites were rated by an independent group of judges, who rated the 
“murderers” to be less attractive and intelligent than the “lifeboat captains”. Shepherd 
et al. argued that the information distorted the participants’ perceptions of the faces, 
moving them towards their stereotypic norms for the categories of “murderer” and 
“lifeboat captain”.  
Further evidence comes from Sporer (1989, Experiment 1), who presented 
participants with a group of faces, and asked them to decide which were murderers, 
and which were not criminals. In a later old/new recognition test, recognition 
accuracy was higher for the faces that participants had labelled as murderers than 
those they had labelled as innocent. Within a cross-race context, the work of Oliver, 
Jackson, Moses, and Dangerfield (2004) has shown that Black faces presented in the 
context of news reports concerning crime become distorted in memory to contain 
more Afrocentric features. Based on the aforementioned research, and the widely 
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acknowledged stereotype of young Black males as criminals (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, 
& Davies, 2004), it is expected that participants will identify more criminals than non-
criminals, and that this effect may be larger for the Black faces than for the White 
faces.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Fifty two White participants took part in this experiment, for either £3 or 30 
minutes course credit. Forty three (83%) of the participants were female; ages ranged 
from 18 to 41 years, with a mean age of 21 years.  
The experiment had a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design. The first factor, condition, was 
manipulated between groups (n = 26 in each condition). In the "criminal" condition, 
participants were asked only to recognize faces that had been labeled as criminals. In 
the "non-criminal" condition, participants were asked only to recognize faces that had 
been labeled as non-criminals. The second factor, race of face (White or Black), 
varied within subjects. The third factor, stimulus type (target, distracter, or novel 
face), also varied within subjects. 
 The dependent variable was the mean proportion of faces identified. 
Materials and Apparatus 
 Photographs of 36 White and 36 Black males were used in this experiment. 
All of the photographs were taken from the same high quality database (used also in 
Papers 1 and 4). The faces all had neutral expressions, and had no distinguishing 
marks, glasses, or jewellery. The photographs were cropped in Adobe Photoshop to 
remove necks and shoulders. All faces were then pasted onto a blank white 
background. For each face, two photographs in different poses were used: a frontal 
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shot, and a three quarter profile shot. This ensures that participants make their 
recognition decisions based on the faces, rather than on any low-level features of the 
photographs (Bruce, 1982).  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to three by a White experimenter. 
Each participant sat at an individual PC. The experimenter remained in the room 
throughout the experiment. 
 The experiment was split into two blocks, each with a learning phase followed 
by a testing phase. Pilot testing showed that two blocks were necessary for accuracy 
to be above chance (there were no significant block effects in any of the analyses). In 
each learning phase, participants saw twenty four faces presented in a random order. 
Half of these faces were White, and half Black. For each race of face, half were 
labeled as criminals and half as non-criminals. This was denoted by the word 
"criminal" or "non-criminal" underneath the face. The face and the associated label 
remained on screen for five seconds. Participants were informed that they would be 
performing a recognition test, but were not given any instructions about whether they 
would be required to remember criminals or non-criminals. All participants were in 
the same condition across both blocks, and so had to identify either criminals or non-
criminals both times. However, they were told that the second block may be different 
from the first block, and so they should pay attention to all faces in both encoding 
phases.  
 In order to encourage deeper processing of the faces (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972), participants were asked to make a judgment for each face. For criminal faces, 
participants were asked to decide what crime that individual may have committed. For 
non-criminal faces, participants were asked to decide what occupation that individual 
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may do. After the face disappeared, participants were given five seconds to write 
down their decision on a numbered piece of paper. Participants were asked to attempt 
a response for every face. However, on trials where they could not make a response, 
they were asked to leave a blank space on the paper. 
 Immediately following the learning phase, the testing phase began. Thirty six 
faces were shown sequentially in a random order. These included the twenty four 
faces from the learning phase plus twelve foils. The participants were not given any 
information on the ratio of old to new faces. Research by Sporer (1989, Experiment 1) 
suggests that faces labeled as criminals may be more memorable than faces labeled as 
non-criminals. To test for this effect, half of the participants were asked only to 
recognize criminals, and the other half were asked only to recognize non-criminals. 
So, for example, in the criminal condition, participants were asked "Was this person a 
criminal? Yes or no". They had to respond "yes" if they recognized a face as a 
criminal (target), and "no" if they either recognized a face as a non-criminal 
(distractor) or if they thought a face was new (novel face). In this way, three types of 
responses could be examined: identifications of targets (correct), identifications of 
distractors (incorrect), and identifications of novel faces (incorrect). There was no 
time limit on responding. Participants were told to take as long as they needed, and 
the face remained on screen until they had made their decision.  
  After completing the learning and testing phase of block 1, participants 
moved on to block 2. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced between 
participants. Which faces appeared as criminals, non-criminals, and novel faces were 
also counterbalanced. After completing the experiment, the participants were 
debriefed, and were informed that the labels had been randomly allocated to the faces. 
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It was stressed that the labels in no way indicated that the people depicted in the study 
were actually criminals.  
Results and Discussion 
For each participant, the mean proportion of old identifications for White and 
Black targets, distractors, and novel faces was calculated. These proportions were 
analyzed in a 2 (race of face – White or Black) x 3 (stimulus type – target, distractor, 
or novel face) x 2 (condition – identify criminals or identify non-criminals) mixed 
ANOVA. There were no significant effects of condition in the analysis (maximum 
F(2, 100) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .03). Therefore, the results will be discussed without 
reference to condition.  
Figure 6 shows that the pattern of responses is different for White and Black 
faces. This observation was confirmed by a significant interaction term between race 
of face and stimulus type, F(2, 100) = 14.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. The main prediction 
was that the difference in identification rates between targets and distractors would be 
larger for White faces than for Black faces. This hypothesis was confirmed. White 
targets (M = .43, SD = .18) were identified significantly more often than White 
distractors (M = .24, SD = .15), t(51) = 6.69, p < .001, d = .1.13, whereas Black 
targets (M = .41, SD = .18) and Black distractors (M = .36, SD = .19) were identified 
at similar rates, t(51) = 1.63, p = .11, d = .24. These results suggest that the 
participants made more successful recollective searches for White faces than for 
Black faces.  
Identifications of novel faces were then compared to identifications of targets 
and distractors. For the White faces, novel faces were identified less often (M = .20, 
SD = .18) than targets, t(51) = 7.14, p < .001, d = 1.26, and distractors, t(51) = 2.16, p 
= .04, d = .22. For the Black faces, however, novel faces were identified at a similar 
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rate (M = .37, SD = .19) to targets, t(51) = 1.30, p = .20, d = .20, and to distractors, 
t(51) = 0.26, p = .80, d = .04. These results suggest that the participants were 
successfully recollecting White faces on many occasions, increasing target 
identification rates and reducing distractor and novel face identification rates. Black 
faces were not successfully recollected, producing similar identification rates across 
response types.  
 
Figure 6: Mean proportion of old identifications of White and Black targets, 
distractors, and novel faces in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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There were also significant main effects of race of face and stimulus type in 
the analysis. Overall, more identifications were made for Black faces (M = .38, SD = 
.14) than for White faces (M = .29, SD = .13), F(1, 50) = 14.21, p < .001, d = .65. 
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Identification rates varied across the different stimulus types, F(2, 100) = 24.07, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .33. Targets were identified more often (M = .42, SD = .14) than distractors 
(M = .30, SD = .13), t(51) = 5.98, p < .001, d = .87, and novel faces (M = .29, SD = 
.14), t(51) = 5.51, p < .001, d = .92. Identification rates did not significantly differ for 
distractors and novel faces, t(51) = 0.79, p = .43, d = .11.  
 The results of Experiment 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that participants 
encode other-race faces in a manner which is less conducive for later recollection than 
own-race faces. White targets were identified significantly more often than White 
distractors, suggesting that the participants were using a recollective strategy to 
discriminate between the two stimulus types. Black targets, distractors, and novel 
faces were identified at similar rates, suggesting that the participants were not 
successfully recollecting the Black faces. The high identification rates of novel faces 
also suggest that participants adopted a lenient response criterion for non-recollected 
Black faces. There was no evidence of any stereotyping effects in Experiment 3, as 
there were no significant effects of condition.  
Experiment 4 
 Experiment 3 showed that participants were less likely to recollect other-race 
faces than own-race faces. A question which arises from these data is whether 
participants were less able to recollect other-race faces, or whether they were less 
willing to attempt a recollection. The dominant view of recollection is that it is an 
effortful and controlled process (Yonelinas, 2002). Participants may have conserved 
cognitive effect by only attempting recollective searches for White faces, and not for 
Black faces.  
 In Experiment 4, participants were allocated to one of two conditions, with 
strict and lenient response instructions. The strict instructions encouraged participants 
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to be concerned with the accuracy of their target identifications compared to distractor 
identifications; the lenient instructions encouraged participants to be concerned with 
the quantity of their target identifications. One can make different predictions for the 
influence of response instructions on identifications of Black faces, depending on 
whether participants are less able or less willing to use recollection. If the participants 
in Experiment 3 were attempting recollective searches for Black faces, but these 
searches were frequently unsuccessful, then the instructions should not influence the 
difference in Black target and distractor identification rates. If the participants in 
Experiment 3 were not attempting recollective searches for the Black faces, then the 
strict instructions should encourage the participants to make these attempts. Assuming 
that at least some of these searches will be successful, target identifications should 
increase, and distractor identifications should decrease.   
In order to manipulate response bias, Experiment 4 was framed as a stop and 
search exercise. Racial disparities in police stop and search statistics have attracted 
political attention over recent years. The Race Equality Duty in the UK states that 
stop and searches based solely upon race, ethnicity, or religion are unlawful (Home 
Office Stop and Search Manual, 2005, p. 17). Similarly in the USA, the Attorney 
General's Office from the US Department of Justice issued a set of guidelines in 2003 
which expressly prohibit the use of race in spontaneous law enforcement activities 
such as stop and search. Recent empirical research examining real world police 
practices has produced mixed results. For example, Petrocelli, Piquero, and Smith 
(2003) analysed traffic stop data in one US city, which showed that the number of 
traffic stops resulting in a search could be predicted by the percentage of Black people 
living in the neighborhood. Smith and Petrocelli (2001) analysed similar traffic stop 
data and found that Black and minority drivers were more likely to be stopped than 
   
90 
White drivers. However, once stopped, White drivers were more likely to be searched 
than Black drivers. Waddington, Stenson, and Don (2004) argue that stop and search 
statistics are in proportion with the population available to be searched, as young men 
of ethnic minorities are more likely to frequent public places in certain areas than 
Whites. Some of the inconsistencies in these studies may be due to methodological 
constraints, such as relying on self-reports of police officers, and missing data.  
Despite the ambiguities and controversies present in real-world stop and search data, 
the perception of unfairness towards minority groups persists in the public 
consciousness (Buerger & Farrell, 2002). Experiment 4 was couched in “stop and 
search” terms in order to manipulate response bias in a way which would hopefully be 
meaningful to participants. 
The encoding phase was identical to that in Experiment 3. However, in the 
testing phase, participants were told to imagine that they were police officers, and that 
they would need to stop any individuals that they recognized as criminals from the 
encoding phase. In the strict condition, it was stressed that they should try not to stop 
many non-criminals; in the lenient condition, participants were told that it was very 
important to catch the criminals, and that stopping a few non-criminals did not matter.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy two White participants took part in the experiment for course credit or 
£3. Sixty five (90%) of the participants were female; ages ranged from 18 to 30 years, 
with a mean age of 21 years.  
 The experiment had a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design. The first factor, condition (strict 
or lenient), was manipulated between groups (n = 36 in each group). The second 
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factor, race of face (White or Black), varied within subjects. The third factor, stimulus 
type (target, distractor, or novel face), also varied within subjects.  
 The dependent variable was the mean proportion of faces identified.  
Materials and Apparatus 
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in Experiment 3. 
Procedure 
The encoding phase was identical to that in Experiment 3. In the testing phase, 
participants had to imagine that they were police officers "on the beat" and that they 
would need to "stop and search" anybody that they remembered as a criminal. 
Participants responded to each face by pressing 1 if they decided to stop and search, 
or 0 if they decided not to stop and search.  
Across two conditions, response criterion was manipulated. In the lenient 
condition, participants were given the following instructions:  
"You should imagine that you are a police officer on the beat. There has been a 
spate of crimes in this particular area over the last few hours. You need to catch 
as many of the criminals from the learning phase as you can. For each face, you 
will be asked if you would like to stop and search the individual. Due to the 
recent crimes, catching the criminals is your top priority. Stopping a few non-
criminals by mistake is a small price to pay for ensuring the safety of the area."  
In the strict condition, participants received these instructions:  
"You should imagine that you are a police officer on the beat. It is a standard 
day, with crime levels no higher than usual. You need to catch as many of the 
criminals from the learning phase as you can. For each face, you will be asked if 
you would like to stop and search the individual. Although you want to catch 
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the criminals, you should also strive not to inconvenience any of the non-
criminals by mistakenly stopping and searching them." 
The experiment had two blocks, each with a learning phase and a testing 
phase.2 Before the experiment began, participants were told that the two blocks may 
be the same or they may be different, so they would not be able to predict what they 
would need to do in the second block from what they did in the first block. This was 
to reduce the possibility that participants would only pay attention to the criminal 
faces in the second block. In reality, both blocks followed the same procedure for all 
participants.  
Results and Discussion 
The proportion of identifications of White and Black targets, distractors, and 
novel faces were entered into a 2 (race of face) x 3 (stimulus type) x 2 (condition) 
mixed ANOVA. The mean proportions of identifications are shown in Table 7.  
Overall, more identifications were made in the lenient condition (M = .45, SD = .09) 
than in the strict condition (M = .39, SD = .12), F(1, 70) = 5.69, p = .02, d = .57. This 
indicates that the instructions were successful in encouraging participants to shift their 
response criteria, although the increase in identifications was relatively small, at 
approximately six per cent. None of the interaction terms including condition were 
statistically significant (maximum F(2, 140) = 1.96, p = .15, ηp2 = .03). The shifts in 
response criteria between the strict and lenient conditions therefore appear to be of a 
                                               
2
 There was a small main effect of block number, F(1, 70) = 4.46, p = .04, d = .23, with slightly 
fewer identifications in block 2 (M = .40, SD = .12) than in block 1 (M = .43, SD = .12). None of the 
interaction terms including block number were significant (maximum F(2, 140) = 2.26, p = .11, ηp2 = 
.03). 
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similar magnitude for White and Black faces, and for targets, distractors, and novel 
faces. 
 
Table 7: Mean proportions of identifications of White and Black targets, 
distractors, and novel faces in the strict (top) and lenient (bottom) conditions 
in Experiment 4.  
Percentage  Standard deviation  
Race 
Target Distractor Novel  Target Distractor Novel 
Strict 
White .51 .35 .28  .18 .17 .18 
Black .50 .32 .35  .22 .17 .22 
Lenient 
White .56 .37 .36  .17 .19 .20 
Black .53 .44 .42  .14 .15 .16 
 
 The interaction between race and stimulus type was marginally significant, 
F(2, 140) = 2.59, p = .08, ηp2 = .04. White targets (M = .53, SD = .18) were identified 
significantly more often than White distractors (M = .36, SD = .18), t(71) = 6.52, p < 
.001, d = .95. This difference is similar to that found in Experiment 3, and again 
suggests that participants can use recollection to successfully distinguish between two 
groups of familiar own-race faces. Contrary to Experiment 3, the difference in target 
and distractor identification rates was also significant for Black faces (targets: M = 
.52, SD = .19; distractors: M = .38, SD = .17), t(71) = 5.32, p < .001, d = .76. Thus in 
Experiment 4, participants do seem to be showing some recollective ability for the 
Black faces.  
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 For both White and Black faces, target identification rates were higher than 
novel face identification rates: White faces, t(71) = 8.09, p < .001, d = 1.14; Black 
faces, t(71) = 6.61, p < .001, d = .72. Distractor identification rates and novel face 
identification rates did not significantly differ for White faces, t(71) = 1.70, p = .09, d 
= .22, or for Black faces, t(71) = .00, p = 1.00, d = .00.   
The main effect of stimulus type was significant in the analysis. Targets were 
identified more frequently (M = .53, SD = .14) than distractors (M = .37, SD = .13), 
t(71) = 8.10, p < .001, d = 1.14, and novel faces (M = .35, SD = .15), t(71) = 10.28, p 
< .001, d = 1.19. Identification rates for distractors and novel faces were not 
significantly different, t(71) = 1.10, p = .28, d = .14. This pattern of results is very 
similar to that seen in Experiment 3. However, unlike in Experiment 3, the main 
effect of race of face was not significant, F(1, 70) = 1.50, p = .22, d = .18, although 
the mean proportion of identifications was numerically higher for Black faces (M = 
.43, SD = .14) than for White faces (M = .41, SD = .13). 
The results of Experiment 4 are generally consistent with the view that 
participants are able to use recollection when recognizing other-race faces, but that 
they tend to do so less often than for own-race faces. Although there were no 
significant interactions between condition and race of face, participants in Experiment 
4 were able to discriminate between Black targets and Black distractors. It is possible 
that the instructions in both the strict and lenient conditions drew participants’ 
attention to their decision making strategies, encouraging more effortful processing at 
testing. It is also possible that the “stop and search” framework influenced 
participants’ retrieval strategies. These instructions may have encouraged participants 
to consider the real world consequences that identification decisions can sometimes 
have, therefore encouraging more careful and effortful responding.  
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General Discussion 
 In two experiments, White participants’ abilities to discriminate between 
previously seen White and Black targets and distractors were examined. Participants 
studied a series of faces, each of which was seen with one of two verbal labels. These 
faces were later seen again, along with a group of novel faces. Using a procedure 
similar to the exclusion trials of Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure, the 
participants were asked only to identify the faces which had been studied with one of 
the two labels (targets). Faces which had been seen with the other label (distractors), 
and novel faces, were to be rejected. In order to accurately reject a distractor, 
participants must recollect seeing the face associated with the task-irrelevant label. 
Thus recollection and familiarity are placed in opposition.  
 Previous research has shown that recollection is impaired for recognizing 
other-race faces (Evans et al., 2009; Marcon et al., 2009; Meissner et al., 2005; Paper 
1). Based on this research, it was predicted that the participants would have greater 
difficulty in distinguishing Black targets from Black distractors than in distinguishing 
White targets from White distractors. This hypothesis was confirmed in Experiment 3. 
The participants identified more White targets than White distractors, but identified 
Black targets and Black distractors at a similar rate. It also seemed that participants 
were adopting more lenient response criteria for Black faces than for White faces, an 
effect that is commonly found in cross-race recognition studies (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001).  
 In Experiment 4, participants were allocated to one of two conditions designed 
to encourage strict or lenient responding. The experiment was framed as a “stop and 
search” exercise, in which the participants had to catch the criminals from the study 
phase. Participants in the strict condition were told to avoid stopping non-criminals, 
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while participants in the lenient condition were told that catching the criminals was of 
the utmost importance, and that a few identifications of non-criminals were 
unavoidable. The aim of Experiment 4 was to find out whether participants could, in 
some circumstances, recollect the Black faces, or whether they were simply unable to 
recollect the Black faces. 
 The results of Experiment 4 were consistent with the hypothesis that 
participants can, when encouraged to, use recollection in their identifications of other-
race faces. Participants in both the strict and lenient conditions were able to 
discriminate Black targets from Black distractors. Overall, identification rates were 
higher in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 3. The “stop and search” instructions may 
have given the participants in Experiment 4 a different view of the task compared to 
the participants in Experiment 3, who received more standard recognition test 
instructions. This “stop and search” framework might have made the participants 
more aware of the real world consequences that identification decisions can have, 
which then encouraged more careful and controlled responding. Further research 
using this method seems needed in order to establish why even participants in the 
strict condition made more identifications than participants in Experiment 3, and why 
the increase in identifications seemed to be largest for the target identifications.  
 In Experiment 3, half of the participants were asked only to identify criminals 
in the testing phase, while half were asked only to identify non-criminals. Previous 
research has shown that memory can be enhanced for face stimuli presented with 
crime-related information (Sporer, 1989), and that target faces can also become 
distorted in memory to become closer to stereotypical representations of “criminals” 
(Shepherd et al., 1978; Oliver et al., 2004). Based on this research, it was predicted 
that the participants who were asked to identify the criminals would perform more 
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accurately than those who were asked to identify the non-criminals. However, no 
significant differences were found between the two groups. 
 There are many differences between the method used here and the methods 
used in previous research which could account for this failure of replication. Here, a 
large number of targets were presented from each group, creating a high demand on 
memory resources. In contrast, previous studies used a very small number of target 
faces – between one (Shepherd et al., 1978) and eight in total (Sporer, 1989). 
Furthermore, Sporer (1989) and Oliver et al. (2004) used quite strong manipulations 
of criminality. The criminal and non-criminal labels in Sporer’s study were self-
generated, while the contextual information in Oliver’s study consisted of an entire 
news report. In comparison, brief verbal labels were used in Experiment 3, which also 
included a large lexical overlap, with both labels containing the label “criminal”. As a 
result, the two stimulus lists were quite similar. High list similarity can decrease the 
accuracy of list discrimination (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997).     
 In conclusion, the results reported here provide evidence consistent with a 
dual-process approach to the ORB in face recognition. White participants had 
difficulty discriminating between familiar Black targets and distractors, but had no 
such difficulty discriminating between familiar White targets and distractors. 
However, when participants were encouraged to consider their response strategies, 
they were able to successfully distinguish between Black distractors and targets. This 
suggests that participants are not less able to use recollection when recognizing other-
race faces, but that they are less willing to do so.  
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Paper 3: Memory for Context in Own- and Other-Race Identifications3 
Abstract 
 People recognize faces from their own race more accurately than faces from 
other races. In three experiments, memory for context in own- and other-race 
identifications was investigated. White participants saw White and Black faces 
presented with different visual contexts at encoding. In an old/new recognition test, 
participants saw these target faces again along with some distractor faces. Following 
“old” decisions, participants were also asked to identify on which context the face had 
appeared during the encoding phase. In all three experiments, face recognition and 
context memory were more accurate for White faces than for Black faces. 
Remembering context is important in real world identifications, and failures in 
context memory can have serious consequences in eyewitness identifications. The 
results are discussed in a dual-process framework.  
Introduction 
 People are more accurate at recognizing faces from their own race than faces 
from other races (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). This own-race bias (ORB) has been 
shown in participants from several races (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Evans, Marcon, 
& Meissner, 2009; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Jackiw, Arbuthnott, Pfeifer, Marcon, & 
Meissner, 2008; Sporer, Trinkl, & Guberova, 2007), and meta-analyses have shown 
the effect to be robust and reliable (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell 
                                               
3
  Experiment 5 published in: Horry, R. & Wright, D. B. (2008). I know your face but not where 
I saw you:  Context memory is impaired for other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 610-
614. 
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Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). The ORB has worrying 
implications when applied to eyewitness memory. Mistaken identifications by 
eyewitness can and do lead to miscarriages of justice (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 
2003), which may be more likely when the witness and the suspect are of different 
races (Doyle, 2001).  
 In day to day life, we encounter many individuals in different environmental 
contexts. Sometimes upon recognizing a person, we may be unable to recall any 
details of the situation in which we encountered that person (Mandler, 1980). The 
ability to recall such contextual information is known as source monitoring (Conway 
& Dewhurst, 1995); failures in source monitoring can lead to false memories being 
accepted as true memories (Johnson, 2006) and to familiar yet irrelevant items being 
incorrectly identified as targets (Jacoby, 1991). Source monitoring becomes 
particularly important in the eyewitness world, as a witness making an identification 
must be sure that the suspect was seen in a specific place (the crime scene) at a 
specific time (during the crime), carrying out a specific act (committing the crime). If 
the witness cannot recollect this contextual information about a familiar yet innocent 
suspect, they may mistakenly identify a bystander to the crime (Read, Tollestrup, 
Hammersley, McFazden, & Christensen, 1990; Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994), 
or an individual seen during a mugshot search (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 
2006).  
 Dual-process theories assume that recollection and familiarity arise from 
separate and functionally independent memory processes (Yonelinas, 2002). 
Recollection is the product of an episodic memory system, which allows an individual 
to remember contextual information about a recognized item. Familiarity is a more 
subjective sense of knowing that an item has been seen before based on the strength 
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of activation produced by a presented item. Recollection is therefore an all-or-nothing 
process in which episodic information will either be retrieved or not, whereas 
familiarity is a continuous index of memory strength. Familiarity is believed to be a 
very fast and automatic process, whereas recollection is slower and more effortful 
(McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999).  
  Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005) suggested that the ORB could be caused 
by a specific impairment in the recollection process for other-race faces. Participants 
took part in an old/new recognition test with own- and other-race faces, and were also 
asked to report on the experiential basis of their memories, using the Remember-
Know procedure (Tulving, 1985). Participants made more Remember responses to 
own-race faces than other-race faces, but Know responses were made at a similar rate 
to faces from both groups. Marcon, Susa, and Meissner (2009) also found that 
participants make more familiarity-based errors with other-race faces than with own-
race faces. Here, these results were supported in Paper 1, as White participants made 
more exclusion errors for Black faces than White faces in a process-dissociation task, 
and the estimated recollection parameter was higher for White faces than Black faces.  
 Dual-process theorists argue that recollection is necessary for contextual 
information to be accurately remembered (Mandler, 1980). The impairment in the 
recollection process seen in other-race faces should therefore lead to deficits in 
remembering context. Across three studies, this hypothesis is tested in samples of 
White participants. At encoding, a series of White and Black target faces are shown, 
and each face appears on one of several backgrounds. At testing, the targets are seen 
again, along with a series of distractor faces. Participants make old/new decisions for 
the faces, followed by confidence judgments. Following an old judgment, the 
participants are also asked to identify on which background the face had appeared at 
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encoding. In Experiments 5 and 6, the contexts used are complex visual scenes; 
Experiment 7 explores memory for simple contexts colored contexts. 
  In Experiment 6, the effects of context reinstatement on face recognition and 
context memory are explored. During the testing phase, the target faces are seen on 
the same background as at encoding, or on a different background. Some studies have 
found that reinstating encoding context improves recognition accuracy (Gruppuso, 
Lindsay, & Masson, 2007) while others have found no such improvement (Macken, 
2002). When these effects are found, they are generally stronger for classes of stimuli 
which are less familiar (Russo, Ward, Geurts, & Scheres, 1999). Other-race faces 
form a less familiar class of stimuli than own-race faces, and so reinstating the 
encoding context may particularly benefit these faces. Context reinstatement appears 
to enhance recollective memory to a greater degree than familiarity-based memory 
(Gruppuso et al., 2007; Macken, 2002). This may reduce the size of the ORB in both 
face recognition and context memory, by increasing participants’ abilities to recollect 
other-race faces. 
Experiment 5 
  The aim of Experiment 5 is to explore how accurately White participants can 
remember contextual information about correctly identified faces from their own race 
and from a different race. White participants were previously shown to have 
difficulties in using recollection to identify Black faces compared to White faces 
(Paper 1, Paper 2). As recollection is believed to play a central role in memory for 
context (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002), White participants may make more context 
errors for correctly recognized Black faces than for correctly recognized White faces.  
 Previous research has shown that stereotypic attitudes towards out-group faces 
can be modified by the context in which they are presented (e.g. Barden, Maddux, 
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Petty, & Brewer, 2004; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Wittenbrink et al. showed 
that automatic racial bias, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was reduced after watching a video showing 
Black actors in a positive context (a family barbecue). No such reduction occurred for 
participants who watched a video of Black actors in a negative context (a gang 
incident). Using static images as contexts, Barden et al. also showed that context can 
moderate racial bias. Faces were presented on backgrounds which were congruent 
either with positive aspects of racial stereotypes (e.g. Black faces on a basketball 
court, White and Asian faces in a classroom) or with negative aspects of racial 
stereotypes (Black faces in a prison context, White faces in a factory context). As 
predicted, when the contexts were positive-congruent, positive racial bias was found; 
when the contexts were negative-congruent, negative racial bias was found.  
 Experiment 5 uses four backgrounds similar to those used by Barden et al. 
(2004) – the basketball court, the factory, the classroom, and the prison. An additional 
gray screen background is used as a baseline control. The results of Barden et al. 
suggest that the basketball and prison contexts are congruent with positive and 
negative aspects of Black stereotypes, respectively, while the classroom and factory 
contexts are congruent with positive and negative aspects of White stereotypes. 
Congruency between a context and the stimulus in terms of stereotypical 
representations could then influence memory, such that memory is enhanced when the 
information is congruent.  
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Method 
Participants and Design. 
 Forty six White participants took part in this experiment for £4. The mean age 
of the participants was 27 years (range 18 to 56), and thirty five (76%) of the 
participants were female. Data from one participant were lost due to a computer error.  
A 2 x 5 repeated measures design was used. The two independent variables 
were race of face (White or Black) and context (basketball court, classroom, factory, 
jail cell, and gray screen). Several measures were used to analyze face recognition: hit 
rates, false alarm rates, and the signal detection measures d' and C. Hit rates, d', and C 
were analyzed in separate repeated measures ANOVAs; false alarm rates were 
analyzed in a repeated measures t test. Context memory was analyzed in a multilevel 
logistic regression. The outcome variable was whether, on any given hit trial, the 
context judgment was correct or incorrect. 
Materials and Apparatus 
 Eighty White faces and eighty Black faces were collected from the internet. 
The faces were looking straight ahead with neutral expressions, and had no 
distinguishing marks, glasses, or jewellery. The photographs were cropped in Adobe 
Photoshop, to remove necks, shoulders, and backgrounds. The four visual scenes used 
as contexts (basketball court, classroom, factory, and jail cell) were also collected 
from the internet; the gray screen context was created in Microsoft Paint. The faces 
were superimposed onto the different contexts in Adobe Photoshop, with the size and 
position of the faces relative to the contexts held constant. Examples of the stimuli are 
shown in Figure 7. 
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 The software E-Prime was used to create and run the study, and to collect the 
data. 
 
Figure 7. Example stimuli from Experiment 5. White faces (left) and Black 
faces (right) on all five encoding contexts plus the blank screen used at 
testing. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to three by a White experimenter. 
Each participant worked individually at their own PC. The experimenter remained in 
the room throughout the experiment to ensure that there was no talking among 
participants. Participants were told that they would be performing a face recognition 
task, and that they would need to pay close attention to both the faces and the 
backgrounds on which they were presented.  
The experiment was split into four blocks, each with an encoding phase and a 
testing phase. In each encoding phase, 25 targets were presented for 5s, with a 1s 
inter-stimulus interval (ISI). Within each encoding phase, all possible combinations of 
face race and context were shown at least once. Each encoding phase was 
immediately followed by a testing phase, in which the 25 targets were shown along 
with 15 foils. In total, participants saw 50 targets (10 in each context) and 30 foils 
from each race.  
During the testing phases, the stimuli were shown against a blank background. 
For each face, participants made an old/new judgment by pressing 1 on the keyboard 
for yes, or 0 for no, followed by a confidence rating on a 9-point scale (1 being not 
confident at all, and 9 being very confident). For faces judged as old, a context 
judgment was required. Participants made this judgment by pressing the numbered 
key which corresponded to the context that they believed was correct (1 for 
basketball, 2 for classroom, 3 for factory, 4 for jail cell, and 5 for gray screen). This 
was a forced choice task, in which participants had to make a response. The face 
remained on screen throughout these questions. Participants were asked to be as 
accurate as possible, and to take as much time as they needed over their answers.  
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  Targets and distractors were counterbalanced across participants, as were the 
contexts associated with each target. The order of the blocks was randomized for each 
participant, as was the presentation order of the stimuli within each encoding phase 
and testing phase.  
Results and Discussion 
Face recognition 
Previous research has shown that the ORB is often characterized by a marked 
increase in false alarm rates for other-race faces compared to own-race faces 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000). Hit rates and false 
alarm rates (FA rates) were therefore analyzed separately, in addition to the signal 
detection measures d' and C. The formulae used to calculate these measures are given 
in Appendix 2. The hit rates, d', and C scores were analyzed in 2 (race of face) x 5 
(context) repeated measures ANOVAs. The FA rates for White and Black faces were 
compared in a repeated measures t test. For all comparisons with two levels, the effect 
size Cohen’s d is reported. For interaction terms and comparisons with more than two 
levels, the effect size ηp2 is reported.   
Table 8 shows the mean hit rates, FA rates, d', and C for White and Black 
faces, collapsed across context. Whereas hit rates were similar for White and Black 
faces, F(1,44) = 0.77, p = .39, d = .13, false alarm rates were higher for Black faces 
than White faces, t(44) = 5.60, p < .001, d = .88. When hit rates and false alarm rates 
were combined in the d' measure, accuracy was found to be higher for White faces 
than Black faces, F(1, 44) = 8.53, p = .005, d = .52. Participants were also more 
conservative when responding to White faces than Black faces, F(1, 44) = 9.00, p = 
.004, d = .60. Thus, in line with previous research, participants were more accurate at 
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recognizing own-race faces than other-race faces (e.g. Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; 
Meissner & Brigham, 2001). However, this effect was found only in false alarm rates, 
with similar hit rates for both groups of faces. This is a pattern of results which has 
been found elsewhere (e.g. Slone et al., 2000). In this study, the ORB was 
characterized by a criterion shift for other-race faces, with less conservative 
responding than for own-race faces.  
 
Table 8: Mean hit rates, false alarm (FA) rates, d', and C for White and Black 
faces in Experiment 5.  
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Measure White Black  White Black 
Hit rate .75 .77  .11 .11 
FA rate .14 .23  .08 .12 
d' 1.94 1.64  .55 .62 
C -.19 -.01  .28 .33 
 
There were no observed differences between the encoding contexts for any 
measure: for hit rates, F(4,176) = 0.22, p = .93, ηp2 = .01; for d', F(4, 176) = 0.43, p = 
.78, ηp2 = .01; and for C, F(4, 176) = 0.43, p = .79, ηp2 = .01. The interaction term 
between race and context was not significant in any of the analyses: for hit rates, 
F(4,176) = 0.54, p = .70, ηp2 = .01; for d', F(4, 176) = 1.18, p = .32, ηp2 = .03; and for 
C, F(4, 176) = 1.18, p = .32, ηp2 = .03. 
It was predicted, on the basis of previous research (Barden et al., 2004; 
Wittenbrink et al., 2001), that stereotypic congruency between the faces and the 
context might enhance memory. However, there were no significant differences in 
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accuracy across any of the contexts. The contexts which were used were similar to 
those used by Barden et al. One possible reason for the lack of significant effects was 
that the content of racial stereotypes differs between the United States (where the 
work of Barden et al. was conducted) and the United Kingdom. For example, 
basketball is not a particularly popular sport in the UK, and so basketball might not 
form part of the stereotype of Black males here. No ratings were taken from 
participants to confirm or disconfirm the applicability of these contexts to UK 
stereotypes, so it is possible that the manipulation was unsuccessful in activating 
stereotypic attitudes in this study.  
Furthermore, although Barden et al. make the claim that the basketball court 
and classroom contexts form positively valenced contexts, while the prison and 
factory contexts form negative contexts, these assumptions seem somewhat objective. 
An individual’s attitudes towards classrooms might vary with their enjoyment of 
studying; attitudes towards factories might vary with employment history and socio-
economic status; and attitudes towards the basketball court might vary with 
enjoyment of sport in general, and with basketball in particular. Overall, the different 
contexts used here may have provided only weak manipulations of valence, therefore 
leading to small and unreliable effects. It is possible that backgrounds which are more 
strongly negative and positive (e.g. the scene of a violent crime, or a pristine beach) 
would have elicited larger effects. 
Memory for context 
 Context memory was analyzed in a regression model. Participants only made 
context judgments after “old” decisions for faces, so data was only available on hit 
and false alarm trials. As all context judgments for false alarm trials are in error, only 
hit trials are included in the analysis. Because the number of hits varies by person, a 
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multilevel model was used, so that inappropriate weight was not given to people with 
different numbers of hits (Wright & London, 2009). The outcome measure, whether 
the context judgment was accurate or inaccurate, was binary, and so a logistic 
regression was used (Wright, 1997).  
Multilevel statistics provide a powerful method of analysis at the level of 
individual trials rather than averages calculated across trials for each participant 
(Wright, Horry, & Skagerberg, 2009). Memory data can be thought of as clustered or 
nested within participants, giving the data a hierarchical structure (Wright, 1998). In a 
multilevel regression, participant variation can be treated as a random effect in which 
the regression slopes are allowed to vary for each participant. In a similar way, 
variation around individual stimuli can be treated as a random effect (Clark, 1973). 
This may be particularly important for naturalistic stimuli such as faces, which will 
vary along many dimensions.  
The regression model was built in two steps, shown in Table 9. In the first 
step, confidence was entered as a predictor of context accuracy.  Participants may be 
more accurate at identifying the contexts for faces recognized confidently than for 
faces recognized less confidently. Accuracy ranged from 37.25% for faces identified 
with very low confidence (confidence ratings of 1) to 68.26% for faces identified with 
the highest confidence (confidence ratings of 9). The regression model confirmed that 
confidence significantly predicted accuracy, with an estimated regression parameter 
of .35, p < .001. The second model included race of face as a predictor. Context 
judgments were accurate for 58.72% of White face trials, compared to 52.05% of 
Black face trials. This difference was statistically significant, with an estimated 
regression parameter of .22, p = .02. Including race of face improved the fit of the 
model to the data, χ2(1) = 4.96, p = .03.  
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According to dual-process theory, recollection is necessary to support memory 
for context. Recent evidence suggests that people use recollection less frequently 
when recognizing other-race faces than when recognizing own-race faces (Marcon et 
al., 2009; Meissner et al., 2005). Experiment 5 showed that White participants were 
more accurate at identifying the contexts in which they saw White faces than the 
contexts in which they saw Black faces.   
 
Table 9: Estimated regression parameters and error terms for confidence and 
race of face in Experiment 5. 
  Model 1: Context and 
confidence 
 Model 2: Race of 
face included 
Parameter  Estimate SE Sig.  Estimate SE Sig. 
Fixed effects:         
Intercept β0 -2.41 .21 <.001  -2.50 .21 <.001 
Confidence β1 .35 .02 <.001  .35 .02 <.001 
Race of face β2 ------ ---- ------  .22 .10 .02 
Random effects:         
Participant level σ2u .18    .17   
Stimulus level σ2e .44    .44   
         
Difference in model fit: χ2(1) = 4.96, p = .03     
  
Experiment 6 
 Experiment 6 investigates the effects of context reinstatement on face 
recognition and memory for context. During the testing phase, the target faces are 
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either shown in a congruent context or an incongruent context. Faces should be 
recognized more accurately when presented on a congruent context than on an 
incongruent context (Gruppuso et al., 2007). This improvement may be larger for 
Black faces than White faces, as they form a relatively less familiar class of stimuli 
(Russo et al., 1999). If context reinstatement specifically benefits recollection, then 
memory for context should be more accurate when the contexts are congruent than 
when they are incongruent. This may reduce the difference in context accuracy for 
White and Black faces.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Fifty four White participants took part in the experiment for credit on an 
introductory psychology course or for £5. The mean age of the participants was 21 
years (range 18 to 36), and forty three (80%) of the participants were female.  
 A 2 x 2 repeated measures design was used. The two independent variables 
were race of face (White or Black) and congruency (congruent or incongruent). The 
face recognition measures were hit rates, false alarm rates, d', and C. For context 
memory, the outcome measure was whether, on any given trial, the context judgment 
was accurate or inaccurate; these data were analyzed in a multilevel logistic 
regression. 
Materials and Apparatus 
 The faces used in this experiment were the same as those used in Experiment 
5. Only three of the encoding contexts from Experiment 5 were used: the classroom, 
the jail cell, and the gray screen. This was to reduce the number of possible encoding 
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and testing context combinations. Once again, the experiment was created and run 
using E-Prime software.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 5, with the following exceptions. 
A total of 54 targets from each race were seen; 18 of these targets appeared on 
congruent contexts, and the remaining 36 appeared on incongruent contexts. One third 
of the distractor faces appeared on each context. The presentation order was 
randomized for each participant. Which faces were targets and which were foils was 
counterbalanced between participants, as was the pairings of faces to the different 
contexts.  
Results and Discussion 
Face recognition 
 Table 10 shows the mean hit rates, d', and C scores broken down by 
congruency and race of face. These data were analyzed in separate 2 (race of face) x 2 
(congruency) repeated measures ANOVAs. The false alarm rates for White and Black 
faces were compared in a repeated measures t test. Overall accuracy, shown in the d' 
scores, was higher for White faces (M d' = 1.55, SD = .59) than for Black faces (M d' 
= 1.35, SD = .55), F(1, 53) = 8.56, p = .005, d = .35. Participants made more false 
alarms for Black faces (M = .29, SD = .16) than for White faces (M = .20, SD = .12), 
t(53) = 5.33, p < .001, d = .63. This replicates the ORB found in Experiment 5, and 
elsewhere in the face recognition literature (e.g. Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001). However, hit rates were somewhat higher for Black faces (M = 
.75, SD = .12) than for White faces (M = .72, SD = .11), F(1, 53) = 4.22, p = .05, d = 
.25. 
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Table 10: Mean hit rates, d', and C for White and Black faces shown on 
congruent (top) and incongruent (bottom) contexts in Experiment 6. 
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Measure White Black  White Black 
Congruent 
Hit rate .72 .77  .14 .15 
d' 1.57 1.44  .69 .68 
C -.14 .11  .34 .41 
Incongruent 
Hit rate .72 .73  .12 .12 
d' 1.53 1.26  .57 .52 
C -.15 .02  .30 .40 
 
Overall accuracy was higher for faces presented on congruent contexts at 
testing (M d' = 1.50, SD = .59) than for faces presented on incongruent contexts at 
testing (M d' = 1.40, SD = .49), F(1, 53) = 5.12, p = .03, d = .20. Congruency 
increased hit rates slightly (M congruent = .74, SD = .12; M incongruent = .72, SD = 
.10), but the difference was not significant, F(1, 53) = 2.31, p = .14, d = .18. The 
interaction term between race of face and congruency did not reach significance for 
hit rates, F(1, 53) = 2.58, p = .11, ηp2 = .05, or for d', F(1, 53) = 2.46, p = .12, ηp2 = 
.04. The hypothesis that context reinstatement would increase face recognition 
accuracy was therefore supported, although the effect size was quite small. The 
prediction that Black faces might benefit most from context reinstatement, however, 
was not supported, as the interaction was not significant. However, the mean 
differences in hit rates and d' were numerically larger for the Black faces than for the 
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White faces. With a larger sample size, these differences may have become 
statistically significant.  
 Participants were more conservative with White faces (M C = -.14, SD = .30) 
than with Black faces (M C = .07, SD = .38), F(1, 53) = 25.07, p < .001, d = .61. This 
shift in response criterion could explain the higher hit rates found for Black faces, as 
participants were making more “old” decisions overall for Black faces than for White 
faces. Participants were also somewhat more conservative with faces presented on 
incongruent contexts than with faces presented on congruent contexts, F(1, 53) = 
5.12, p = .03, d = .16, although this effect was quite small. The interaction term was 
non-significant, F(1, 53) = 2.46, p = .12, ηp2 = .04. 
Memory for context 
 Context memory was again analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression. The 
predictor variables were confidence, congruency, and race of face. Confidence and 
congruency were entered in model 1, and race of face was added in model 2. Table 11 
shows the estimated regression parameters for each of the main effects in the two 
models.  
 Participants were more likely to be accurate for faces which had been 
identified with high confidence than for faces identified with low confidence. 
Accuracy ranged from 40.43% for faces identified with the lowest confidence (ratings 
of 1) to 66.12% for faces identified with the highest confidence (ratings of 9). The 
estimated regression parameter for confidence was .20, p < .001. Participants were no 
more accurate when the contexts were congruent (54.97%) than when they were 
incongruent (54.55%). The estimated regression parameter for congruency was .01, p 
= .88. The hypothesis that context memory would be more accurate when context was 
reinstated was therefore not supported. This is somewhat surprising, as context 
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reinstatement has been shown to enhance recollective memory (Gruppuso et al., 2007; 
Macken, 2002).  
 
Table 11: Estimated regression parameters and error terms for confidence, 
congruency, and race of face in Experiment 6.  
  Model 1: Congruency 
and confidence 
 Model 2: Race of 
face included 
Parameter  Estimate SE Sig.  Estimate SE Sig. 
Fixed effects:         
Intercept β0 -1.25 .14 <.001  -1.37 .15 <.001 
Congruency β1 .01 .07 .88   .01 .07 .86 
Confidence β2 .20 .02 <.001  .20 .02 <.001 
Race of face β3 ------ ---- ------  .27 .08 .001 
Random effects:         
Participant level σ2u .14    .14   
Stimulus level σ2e .12    .10   
         
Difference in model fit: χ2(1) = 10.12, p = .001   
 
Accuracy was higher for White faces (58.24%) than for Black faces (51.24%). 
The estimated regression parameter for race was .27, p = .001. This supports the 
findings of Experiment 5, that memory for context is impaired for correctly identified 
other-race faces. The interaction term between race of face and congruency was non-
significant, with an estimated regression parameter of .03, p = .80. There was 
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therefore no evidence that the ORB for context memory was reduced when context 
was reinstated. 
Experiment 7 
 Experiments 5 and 6 showed that White participants were less accurate at 
identifying the contexts in which Black faces were seen than the contexts in which 
White faces were seen. In both of these studies, complex visual scenes were used as 
the contexts. These contexts may have carried different associations for different 
participants, some positive and some negative. Although no differences in recognition 
accuracy between the different contexts were found, it nevertheless seems important 
to show that this cross-race effect is not an artefact of the particular contexts used in 
Experiments 5 and 6. In Experiment 7, simple backgrounds of different colors are 
used as encoding contexts.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Fifty four White participants took part in the experiment for credit on an 
introductory psychology course or for £4. The mean age of the participants was 21 
years (range 18 to 32), and forty seven (87%) were female.  
The experiment had a 2 x 3 repeated measures design. The two independent 
variables were race of face (White and Black) and encoding context (red, green, or 
blue screen). The face recognition measures were hit rates, false alarm rates, d', and 
C. Context memory was analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
 The faces were the same as those used in Experiments 5 and 6. The encoding 
contexts were a red screen, a green screen, and a blue screen. At testing, all faces were 
presented on a blank screen. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 5, with the following 
changes. As there were only three encoding contexts, the number of White and Black 
targets shown on each background was increased to 18. This gave a total of 54 targets 
and 26 distractors of each race. Pilot studies showed that the context judgment task 
was more difficult with colored backgrounds than with visual scenes. In order to help 
participants build associations between each face and its corresponding background, 
participants were asked to press a key on the keyboard which had been labelled with a 
red, green or blue sticker during the encoding phase. This did not affect the 
presentation time of the stimulus. Participants also used the colored keys to make their 
context memory judgements. 
Results 
Face recognition 
 Table 12 shows the mean hit rates, false alarm rates, d', and C for White and 
Black faces. Overall face recognition accuracy, shown by d', was higher for White 
faces (M = 1.59, SD = .53) than for Black faces, (M = 1.26, SD = .58), F(1, 52) = 
24.89, p < .001, d  = .59. Participants made more false alarms with Black faces (M = 
.28, SD = .17) than with White faces (M = .17, SD = .12), t(52) = 7.26, p < .001, d = 
.77. However, hit rates were higher for Black faces (M = .71, SD = .11) than for White 
faces (M = .68, SD = .11), F(1, 52) = 6.68, p = .01, d = .25. This pattern of results is 
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very similar to that found in Experiment 6. A significant ORB was found, but in false 
alarm rates and not in hit rates.  
 
Table 12: Mean hit rates, false alarm (FA) rates, d', and C for White and Black 
faces in Experiment 7.  
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Measure White Black  White Black 
Hit rate .68 .71  .11 .11 
FA rate .17 .28  .12 .17 
d' 1.59 1.26  .53 .58 
C -.27 -.01  .34 .37 
 
Hit rates varied across the different encoding contexts, F(2, 104) = 3.18, p = 
.05, ηp2 = .06, ranging from .69 (SD = .13) for the red context to .72 (SD = .11) for the 
green context. The interaction terms between context and race of face were not 
significant in either the hit rate or the d' analyses: hits, F(2, 104) = 1.72, p = .18, ηp2 = 
.03; d', F(2, 104) = 2.05, p = .13, ηp2 = .04. 
 Participants were more conservative with White faces (M = -.27, SD = .34) 
than with Black faces (M = -.01, SD = .37), F(1, 52) = 54.34, p < .001, d = 1.07. This 
means that participants were making more “old” decisions in response to Black faces 
than White faces, which could explain the increase in hit rates as well as the increase 
in false alarm rates. Response criteria did not vary across encoding contexts, F(2, 104) 
= 2.30, p = .11, ηp2 = .04. The interaction term between race of face and context in the 
C analysis was not statistically significant, F(2, 104) = 2.05, p = .13, ηp2 = .04. 
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Memory for context 
 Context memory was analyzed in a multilevel logistic regression. The 
outcome variable was whether, on a given trial, the context judgment was accurate or 
inaccurate. The predictor variables were confidence (entered in model 1) and race of 
face (entered in model 2). The estimated regression parameters are shown in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Estimated regression parameters and error terms for confidence 
and race of face in Experiment 7.  
  Model 1: Context and 
confidence 
 Model 2: Race of 
face included 
Parameter  Estimate SE Sig.  Estimate SE Sig. 
Fixed effects:         
Intercept β0 -1.02 .14 <.001  -1.15 .14 <.001 
Confidence β1 .13 .02 <.001  .13 .02 <.001 
Race of face β2 ------ ---- ------  .27 .07 <.001 
Random effects:         
Participant level σ2u .07    .07   
Stimulus level σ2e .03    .02   
         
Difference in model fit: χ2(1) = 15.02, p < .001   
 
Confidence ratings significantly predicted accuracy; the estimated regression 
parameter for confidence was .13, p < .001. Accuracy ranged from 50.00% for faces 
identified with very low confidence (ratings of 1) to 56.68% for faces identified with 
very high accuracy (ratings of 9). This relationship is somewhat weaker than those 
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found in Experiments 5 and 6. This may have been because remembering associations 
between faces and simple, colored contexts was more difficult than remembering 
associations between faces and complex visual scenes. 
Participants were more accurate at identifying the contexts on which White 
faces appeared (51.29%) than the contexts on which Black faces appeared (44.55%). 
The estimated regression parameter for race of face was .27, p < .001. This supports 
the findings from Experiments 5 and 6, and shows that impaired memory for context 
in other-race identifications extends beyond the specific visual scenes used 
previously.  
General Discussion 
 A large body of work over the last forty years has shown that people are more 
accurate at recognizing faces from their own race than faces from other races 
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Here, across three studies, 
White participants recognized White faces more accurately than Black faces. 
Participants’ response criteria were consistently more lenient for Black faces than for 
White faces, leading to a marked increase in false alarm rates, as well as a smaller 
increase in hit rates. However, even when a face is correctly identified, an observer 
may be unable to remember information about the context in which that face was 
originally encountered. These studies show, for the first time, that such failures in 
context memory are more likely when identifying faces from a different race. In all 
three experiments, context judgments were more often accurate for White faces than 
for Black faces.  
 Recently, dual-process theories of memory have been applied to the ORB. 
Meissner et al. (2005) found that subjective reports of remembering in a Remember-
Know task were more frequent in own-race than other-race identifications, and 
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Marcon et al. (2009) showed that participants made more familiarity-based errors for 
other-race faces than for own-race faces. Recollection is the product of an episodic 
memory system, which allows individuals to retrieve contextual information about the 
encoding of a stimulus (Yonelinas, 2002). Deficits in recollection should therefore 
lead to failures in context memory. The three experiments presented here support the 
dual-process account of the ORB by showing this predicted impairment in context 
memory for other-race faces.  
  Research from the source monitoring literature has shown the importance of 
being able to retrieve information about the source of an item’s familiarity. This type 
of contextual memory is particularly important for eyewitnesses (Loftus, 1976), who 
need to be sure that the suspect that they identify is the culprit, and is not simply 
familiar from some other source. For example, the risk of a misidentification by a 
witness is increased if the witness is exposed to mugshots between witnessing the 
crime and viewing a lineup. In such a case, the witness may identify a previously seen 
innocent suspect on the basis of familiarity, as he or she is unable to recall the source 
of that familiarity (Deffenbacher et al., 2006). The results presented here raise the 
worrying possibility that these types of errors may be more likely if the suspect and 
the witness are of different races.  
 Experiment 6 explored the potential of context reinstatement in improving 
both face recognition and context memory. While a modest improvement was found 
in face recognition accuracy, no improvement was found in context memory. 
Previously, context reinstatement has been shown to benefit recognition of unfamiliar 
classes of stimuli more than familiar classes of stimuli (Russo et al., 1999). It was 
therefore predicted that context reinstatement may be more beneficial for Black faces 
than for White faces. The difference in face recognition accuracy between stimuli 
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shown on congruent and incongruent backgrounds was numerically larger for Black 
faces than for White faces, although the interaction term was not statistically 
significant. 
  Many studies which have found significant increases in recognition accuracy 
following context reinstatement have manipulated local context. Local context is 
associated with just one or very few stimulus items (e.g. Evans et al., 2009; Gruppuso 
et al., 2007; Hockley, 2008). In contrast, global context is associated with a larger 
subset of items. For example, if each stimulus was paired with a unique piece of 
contextual information, such as a unique image, that would be local context. If all 
items on one study list were associated with one context (e.g. a particular testing 
room), and all items on another study list were associated with another context (a 
different study room), then the room would constitute the global context. In 
Experiment 6, all of the stimuli were associated with one of three background images. 
The backgrounds would therefore have acted as a global context rather than a local 
context, perhaps reducing the likelihood that context reinstatement would provide 
benefits to recognition. Future studies could examine the impact of local context 
reinstatement on the ORB, by pairing each face with a unique background image.  
 There are two major limitations to these studies. First, the same photograph of 
each face was used during the encoding and testing phases. Bruce (1982) argued that 
participants could use low-level features of the photographs to make their recognition 
judgments. Rather than recognizing the faces, they may simply be recognizing the 
pictures. Using different images of the same individual during encoding and testing 
ensures that face recognition is really being tested. This is a limitation which will be 
addressed in Paper 4, by using a different stimulus set with two images of each face. 
Second, only White participants took part in this experiment. This is known as a half-
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design within the cross-race recognition literature, and raises the possibility of 
stimulus sampling errors (Wells & Olson, 2001). If the stimuli from the two groups 
differ in their homogeneity, then apparent cross-race effects may actually be artefacts 
of the stimulus selection. Testing participants from both racial groups reduces the 
likelihood of this possibility if a cross-over interaction can be found in recognition 
accuracy. In Paper 4, samples of White and Black participants will be tested to 
address this limitation. 
 Across three experiments, White participants showed advantages in 
recognizing own-race faces, and in retrieving contextual information about those 
faces from memory. These results support the dual-process theory of the ORB 
(Meissner et al., 2005), which posits that own-race faces are more likely to be 
recollected than other-race faces. Although low in external validity, one can speculate 
on the implications of these results outside of the laboratory. In order to successfully 
interact with those around us, we need not only recognize whether we have seen an 
individual before, but we need to recall in what context we have seen somebody 
before. Remembering such information will inform our decision to approach or to 
avoid, and how to behave in a given encounter (Mandler, 1980). 
 Perhaps the most extreme situation in which this sort of contextual memory 
may prove crucial is when an eyewitness is making an identification. In a lineup, an 
eyewitness is presented with a series of individuals, which will evoke varying feelings 
on familiarity in the witness. One way to make the identification decision would be 
for the witness to pick the individual in the lineup who seems most familiar. In many 
cases, the most familiar individual may well be the culprit. However, the familiarity 
associated with a given individual could arise from many different sources – perhaps 
the witness has seen the individual at some other time and place, or perhaps the 
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individual was present at the crime scene, but was not the culprit. Eyewitness 
identification therefore requires person recognition, rather than the simple target 
recognition often tested in old/new recognition studies (Sporer, 2001b). 
Source monitoring errors have been demonstrated in lab experiments using 
eyewitness paradigms. For example, innocent bystanders might be misidentified as 
the culprit (Loftus, 1976), or innocent suspects seen in mugshot searches might be 
identified in subsequent lineups (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006). The 
studies in this paper provide the first empirical evidence that source monitoring errors 
are more prevalent in cross-race identifications than in own-race identifications. 
Further research could explore such an effect using more externally valid paradigms 
with mock crimes and lineups. If the source monitoring errors observed here 
generalise to real world identifications, then mugshot exposure effects and bystander 
effects might be larger when the suspect and the witness are from different ethnic 
groups than when they are from the same ethnic group.  
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Paper 4: The Role of Recollection in the Own-Race Bias in Item Recognition and 
Context Memory4 
Abstract 
People recognize own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces. This 
own-race bias (ORB) in recognition may be the result of a deficit in recollective 
memory for other-race faces. In a single experiment, White and Black participants 
saw White and Black faces presented with different visual contexts. Recognition 
memory was tested using an old/new recognition paradigm. For faces categorized as 
old, participants also produced context judgments. Participants were more accurate at 
identifying own-race faces than other-race faces. They were also more accurate at 
remembering the contexts in which correctly recognized own-race faces were seen. 
Using a Remember-Know task, participants gave more Remember responses to own-
race faces than to other-race faces.  
Introduction 
Humans have a remarkable capacity for recognizing faces. As a class of visual 
stimuli, faces are highly similar to one another, each consisting of the same basic 
features in the same general configuration. Yet people are able to detect even very 
small changes in a familiar face (Brooks & Kemp, 2007), and are able to recognize 
familiar faces despite drastic changes (Hole, George, Eaves, & Rasek, 2002). 
However, people are not able to remember all types of faces equally well. Out-group 
                                               
4
  Experiment 8 in press: Horry, R., Wright, D. B., & Tredoux, C. G. (In press). Recognition 
and context memory for faces from own and other ethnic groups: A Remember-Know investigation. 
Memory & Cognition. 
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recognition deficits are well documented in the literature (Sporer, 2001b). For 
example, people are impaired at recognizing faces from other age groups (Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2005; Wright & Stroud, 2002) or faces of the opposite gender (Wright & 
Sladden, 2003). Perhaps the most robust of these out-group recognition effects is the 
own-race bias (ORB), the tendency for people to recognize faces of their own race 
more accurately than faces of other races (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). 
Several theories have been put forward to explain the ORB including 
cognitive disregard following categorization (Rodin, 1987), attention to inappropriate 
features during encoding (Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975), reliance on featural 
processing for other-race faces (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008), and storage in memory 
along inappropriate dimensions in “face space” (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995). Many of 
these theories flow from the premise that people generally have more contact, and 
therefore acquire more perceptual expertise, with members of their own race than 
with members of other races. Sporer (2001b) argued that unless the brain is hardwired 
from birth to selectively recognize own-race faces, contact must play an important 
role in the ORB. Sangrigoli and de Schonen (2004) showed that three-month old 
infants could recognize own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces, 
although this effect could be eliminated by exposure to a few exemplars of other-race 
faces. 
Dual-process theorists argue that that there are two separable routes to 
recognition – recollection and familiarity. Recollection is the explicit episodic 
memory of having encountered a stimulus before, which includes some information 
about the encoding event. Familiarity is a more fluid sense of knowing that a stimulus 
has been encountered before, in the absence of recalling any specific details about that 
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encounter (for a review of dual-process theory, see Yonelinas, 2002). Recently, 
Meissner and colleagues (Evans, Marcon, & Meissner, 2009; Marcon, Susa, & 
Meissner, 2009; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005) suggested that the ORB could be 
produced by a specific impairment in recollection for other-race faces. This could 
account for the reduced hit rates and increased false alarm rates for other-race faces 
which are commonly found in old/new recognition tests (Meissner & Brigham, 2001).   
Tulving’s (1985) Remember-Know (RK) procedure is a widely used paradigm 
for investigating participants’ subjective experiences of their recognition decisions. 
When an item is recognized as old, the participant makes a second judgment, 
concerning his or her reasons for making a positive identification. If the participant is 
able to recall any aspects about the encoding event in which a stimulus was 
encountered, then he or she makes a Remember (R) response. If a participant feels 
that an item is familiar, but is unable to recall any information about the encoding 
event, then he or she makes a Know (K) response. Many studies also include a Guess 
(G) option, for when recognition decisions are made with no memorial basis (e.g. 
Konstantinou & Gardiner, 2005). The advantages and disadvantages of the RK 
procedure are discussed by Yonelinas (2002) and Gardiner, Ramponi, and 
Richardson-Klavehn (2002). While some authors have equated Remember and Know 
responses to recollection and familiarity respectively, other authors have cautioned 
against these interpretations of the RK procedure (e.g. Dunn, 2004; Donaldson, 1996). 
This issue remains contentious, and will be returned to in the General Discussion. 
Recollection and familiarity can both produce accurate item recognition. Dual-
process theorists argue that memory for context, however, relies much more heavily 
on recollection than familiarity. Remember responses are often associated with higher 
context memory accuracy than Know responses, although context memory accuracy 
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may still be above chance for Know responses (Meiser & Sattler, 2007). Meiser, 
Sattler, and Weisser (2008) showed that the binding of multiple elements of an 
encoding event into a coherent memory representation is evident in Remember, but 
not in Know, responses. Therefore, while familiarity may allow the retrieval of some 
residual context information, recollection is required for retrieving more complex and 
specific context information.  
In Paper 3, White participants were found to be less accurate at remembering 
contextual information about other-race faces than about own-race faces. At encoding, 
faces of White and Black males were presented on one of five different backgrounds. 
At testing, the faces were all presented on a blank screen. Participants made old/new 
recognition decisions, and also made context judgments for faces that they 
categorized as old. As well as the expected impairment in item recognition for Black 
faces compared to White faces, context memory was impaired for Black faces.  
Paper 3 included samples of White participants only, limiting the 
generalizabilty of the results. Wells and Olson (2001) argued that a priori differences 
in the discriminability of the two stimulus groups can create apparent cross-race 
effects, which are actually artifacts of the stimulus selection. Recruiting participants 
from both groups greatly reduces the likelihood of this if a crossover interaction can 
be shown. These studies present data from participants living and studying in South 
Africa. A small number of ORB investigations have been conducted in Africa 
(Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, 2008; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; Wright, 
Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001, 2003), with some finding full crossover effects and others 
finding asymmetric effects. South Africa provides a unique societal context for 
exploring the ORB, due to its recent history of enforced segregation, and its ethnic 
multiplicity. The data were collected at a large university with a diverse student 
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population. In this particular setting, there is considerable opportunity for students to 
interact with people from different ethnic and racial backgrounds, so one might expect 
smaller cross-race effects. However, even within multicultural societies or 
organisations, people are much more likely to have meaningful and intimate 
relationships with people from their own race than with people from other races 
(Dixon, Tredoux, & Clack, 2005; Tredoux & Dixon, 2009). Participants from such 
areas could provide some new insights into the subtleties and complexities of cross-
race effects, which would strengthen the generalizabilty of the results from the United 
States and Europe.  
This paper presents a single experiment which will investigate the role of 
recollection in recognizing own- and other-race faces, and in remembering contextual 
information about those faces. This study uses a similar procedure to that used in 
Paper 3. Faces are shown at encoding on one of several backgrounds. Participants 
then take part in an old/new recognition test for those faces, and make context 
judgments for faces categorized as old. Remember-Know judgments are also provided 
when old decisions are made.  
This paper has three main aims. First, to add to the emerging evidence that the 
ORB is characterized by a marked decrease in recollection for other-race faces 
compared to own-race faces, using Tulving’s (1985) RK procedure. Second, to show 
that memory for context is impaired in other-race identifications, and that this 
generalizes beyond White participants. And finally, to collect cross-race recognition 
data from a population outside of North America or Europe.  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty one White and forty four Black undergraduates at the University of Cape 
Town took part in the study for credit on an introductory psychology course or for 
payment (approximately £3). Nine of the participants were male (2 White, 7 Black). 
The mean age was 21 years; ages ranged from 17 to 43.  
 The experiment had a 2 (race of participant – White or Black) by 2 (race of 
face – White or Black) by 4 (context – basketball court, classroom, factory, jail cell) 
mixed design. The first factor was between groups, and the latter two factors were 
repeated measures. The dependent variables were face recognition measures (hits, 
false alarms, d' and C), decision strategy (Remember, Know, Guess judgments), and 
context memory accuracy.  
Materials and Apparatus 
Eighty White faces and eighty Black faces of young males were used as 
stimuli. All of the Black males and approximately half of the White males were taken 
from a South African database. However, this database did not contain a sufficient 
number of White faces, and so the remaining White faces were taken from an 
Australian database of comparable quality. Chiroro et al. (2008) suggested that local 
stimuli should be used wherever possible when testing the ORB. However, this can be 
practically difficult to do, especially when large numbers of faces are required. Even 
when local stimuli are used, the people depicted may nonetheless come from a range 
of different backgrounds due to the multicultural nature of many societies, including 
South Africa. Therefore, both groups of faces would have had some variation in the 
ethnic backgrounds of the people shown.   
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Two photographs of each face were used in the experiment – one with a full 
frontal pose, and one with a three quarter profile pose. A different view of each face 
was presented at encoding and testing to ensure that participants were recognizing the 
faces rather than any low level features of the particular photograph (Bruce, 1982). 
Each photograph was cropped so that the necks and shoulders were removed. The 
cropped photographs were then pasted onto the four backgrounds using Adobe 
Photoshop. Which faces appeared on which backgrounds was counterbalanced 
between participants. Which faces were targets and which were foils was also 
counterbalanced. The experiment was designed and run with the E-Prime software 
system.   
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to five. Each participant sat at an 
individual PC and worked independently. Participants were told that they would see a 
series of faces presented on different backgrounds, and that they would later be asked 
to remember the faces and their associated backgrounds. 
The experiment was broken down into ten short blocks, each with a learning 
phase followed by a testing phase. During each learning phase, eight targets appeared 
(one target for each combination of race and context). Each target and its associated 
background was shown for 8s, with a 1s inter-stimulus interval. In each testing phase, 
the eight targets were seen again, along with eight new faces (four White and four 
Black). The recognition test was self-paced, and each face remained on screen until 
the participant had responded to all of the questions. In total, throughout the 
experiment, ten targets of each race appeared on each background, giving a total of 
forty White and forty Black targets. Forty distractors from each group were also seen. 
Participants were not told the proportion of old to new faces. The order of the blocks 
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was randomized for each participant, and the order in which the faces were presented 
within each block was also randomized. 
 Participants made an old/new recognition decision for each face. Following an 
old judgment, participants made an RKG judgment followed by a context memory 
decision. Instructions for the RKG judgments were provided on the screen, and were 
also printed on a sheet of paper so that the participants could refer to them at any time. 
The instructions were adapted from Conway and Dewhurst (1995), to make them 
suitable for use in a face recognition experiment: 
Sometimes when we recognize a face we have seen before, we can 
consciously REMEMBER specific details about the previous occurrence of 
the face. At other times, we simply KNOW that we have seen a face before, 
even though we cannot recall specific details about the event. 
For each face, you will have 3 options: 
1. REMEMBER: When you see a face in this test that you recognize, you may 
be able to remember specific details about seeing that face before. You may 
for example recollect the thoughts or feelings that the face evoked when you 
saw it, or an association that you formed with another face, or some aspect of 
the face's physical appearance. In short, any additional detail which supports 
your belief that the face appeared before. 
2. KNOW: For other faces, you may know that they appeared before, even 
though you cannot remember any specific details of their occurrence. 
3. GUESS: For some faces, you may have simply guessed, without any reason 
to believe that the face appeared before. 
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For the context memory judgments, participants were required to press 1 for the 
basketball court, 2 for the classroom, 3 for the factory, or 4 for the jail. This was a 
forced choice with task, with no option to respond “don’t know”.   
Results 
Face recognition accuracy and response bias 
Table 14 shows the mean hit rates and false alarm rates, and the mean d' and C 
for White and Black participants with White and Black stimuli. Separate 2 (race of 
participant) x 2 (race of face) mixed ANOVAs were conducted for each outcome 
measure5. Across all four measures, the interaction term between race of participant 
and race of face was significant and large: for hit rates, F(1, 83) = 60.83, p < .001, ηp2 
= .42; for false alarm rates, F(1, 83) = 45.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .36; for d', F(1, 83) = 
55.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .40; for C, F(1, 83) = 55.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. White 
participants had higher hit rates for in-group (White) faces than for out-group (Black) 
faces, t(40) = 8.00, p <.001, d = .98, and higher false alarm rates for out-group (Black) 
faces than for in-group (White) faces, t(40) = 6.43, p < .001, d = .63. Black 
participants showed the same pattern of results, with higher hit rates for in-group 
(Black) faces than for out-group (White) faces, t(43) = 3.24, p = .002, d = .50, and 
higher false alarm rates for out-group (White) faces than for in-group (Black) faces, 
t(43) = 3.04, p = .004, d = .33.  
 
                                               
5
 Analyses including encoding context revealed no significant main effects or interactions on 
any outcome measure (minimum p = .16). Therefore, context will not be discussed further. 
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Table 14: Mean hit rates and false alarm (FA) rates, and mean d' and C 
for White participants (top) and Black participants (bottom) with White 
and Black faces in Experiment 8. 
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Measure White faces Black faces  White faces Black faces 
White participants 
Hit rates .76 .65  .11 .12 
FA rates .12 .20  .11 .14 
d' 1.77 1.36  .59 .52 
C -.07 -.27  .37 .37 
Black participants 
Hit rates .63 .70  .15 .13 
FA rates .15 .12  .12 .10 
d' 1.71 1.87  .59 .59 
C -.46 -.38  .36 .33 
 
The signal detection measure d' confirmed that White participants were more 
accurate with White faces than with Black faces, t(40) = 7.25, p < .001, d = .74, 
whereas Black participants were more accurate with Black faces than with White 
faces, t(43) = 3.12, p = .003, d = .27. The criterion measure C showed that White 
participants were more conservative with White faces than with Black faces, t(40) = 
7.25, p < .001, d = .53, whereas Black participants were more conservative with Black 
faces than with White faces, t(43) = 3.12, p = .003, d = .24. 
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RKG responses 
The way in which RKG responses are analyzed is a contentious issue, and 
one’s position will depend upon the assumptions made about how recollection and 
familiarity operate at the trial level. For example, one can assume that the two 
processes are exclusive, i.e. that on any given trial, either recollection or familiarity 
can influence the recognition judgment. Alternatively, one can assume that the two 
processes are inclusive, i.e. that items which are recollected will also be familiar.  
Authors who favour the exclusivity assumption argue that the Independence 
Remember-Know (IRK) procedure, developed by Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) 
should be applied to K responses. In the IRK procedure, familiarity is estimated as 
follows: F = K/(1-R). Authors who favour the inclusivity assumption (e.g. Gardiner, 
Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996) argue that the proportions of R and K responses 
should be analyzed as they are, as they reflect the participant’s actual state of 
awareness. Here, we present data for both the proportion of K responses, and for 
familiarity estimates from the IRK procedure. Table 15 shows the mean proportions 
of hit trials producing R, K, and G responses, and the IRK familiarity estimates, 
broken down by race of participant and race of face. As G responses are dependent 
upon R and K responses, G responses were not analyzed. All of the other measures 
were analyzed in separate 2 (race of participant) x 2 (race of face) mixed ANOVAs.6 
Table 15 shows that both groups of participants made more R responses for 
own-race faces than for other-race faces, although the mean difference appears larger 
for White participants than for Black participants. This observation was confirmed in 
                                               
6
  The same analyses were conducted on R and K responses for false alarm trials. No significant 
effects were found. For main effects: Maximum F(1, 83) = 2.40, p = .13, d = .34. For interaction terms: 
Maximum F(1, 83) = 1.78, p = .18, ηp2 = .02. 
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the ANOVA, as the interaction term was significant, F(1, 83) = 34.40, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.29. White participants made significantly more R responses to White faces than 
Black faces t(40) = 6.25, p < .001, d = .74. In contrast, Black participants made 
slightly more R responses to Black faces than White faces, although this difference 
was not statistically significant, t(43) = 1.72, p = .09, d = .15.  
 
Table15: Mean proportions of Remember, Know, and Guess responses in 
hit trials, along with transformed Independence Remember-Know (IRK) 
responses, broken down by race of participant and race of face in 
Experiment 8.  
 Mean  Standard deviation 
Measure White faces Black faces  White faces Black faces 
White Participants 
Remember .70 .54  .20 .23 
Know  .21 .27  .17 .16 
IRK .71 .63  .39 .29 
Guess .09 .18  .10 .19 
Black participants 
Remember .57 .61  .25 .24 
Know .28 .28  .23 .24 
IRK .58 .66  .29 .25 
Guess .14 .11  .11 .09 
 
Table 15 shows that White participants made more K responses for Black 
faces than for White faces, whereas Black participants were equally likely to make K 
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responses for White and Black faces. The ANOVA confirmed these observations. The 
interaction term was significant, F(1, 83) = 4.43, p = .04, ηp2 = .05, but the difference 
was significant for White participants t(40) = 3.00, p = .005, d = .40, and not Black 
participants, t(43) = 0.34, p = .74, d = .01. 
A different pattern seems to have emerged when the IRK transformation was 
applied to the RKG data, with higher means for own-race faces than other-race faces 
within both groups of participants. Again, the interaction between race of participant 
and race of face was significant, F(1, 83) = 4.73, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. However, the 
differences between White and Black faces were not statistically significant for either 
the White participants, t(40) = 1.36, p = .18, d = .22, or the Black participants, t(43) = 
1.74, p = .09, d = .29. 
Context memory 
As in Paper 3, context memory was first analyzed in a multilevel logistic 
regression. Participant-level variance and stimulus-level variance were included as 
random effects, and the predictor variables were race of face, race of participant, and 
RKG response. The regression model was built in two steps, shown in Table 16. The 
first step (shown in the left hand columns), included the main effects of race of 
participant and race of face. White participants were more likely to be accurate 
(67.84%) than Black participants (60.80%), β1 = .38, p = .01. Overall, context 
judgments for White faces (66.79%) were more accurate than context judgments for 
Black faces (61.72%), β2 = .22, p = .02. 
In the second step of the model, the interaction between race of participant and 
race of face was entered. The interaction term was significant, β3 = .86, p < .001. This 
interaction is shown in Figure 8. The figure shows that White participants were more 
accurate with White faces than with Black faces. For Black participants, there seems 
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to be a smaller difference in the opposite direction, with higher accuracy for Black 
faces than for White faces. To confirm these observations, separate regressions were 
run on the data from White and Black participants. In both cases, race of face was a 
significant predictor of accuracy: for White participants, β = .80, p < .001, and for 
Black participants, β = -.29, p = .01.  
 
Table 16: Comparison of regression models predicting context accuracy 
from race of participant, race of face, and Remember-Know-Guess 
response in Experiment 8. 
  Model 1: Without ORB  Model 2: With ORB 
Parameter  Estimate SE Sig.  Estimate SE Sig. 
Fixed effects:         
Intercept β0 .32 .12 .007  .99 .12 <.001 
Race of participant β1 .38 .15 .01  .05 .17 .75 
Race of face β2 .22 .10 .02  .25 .11 .02 
ORB interaction β3 ------ ---- ------  .86 .13 <.001 
Remember-Know β4(a) ------ ---- ------  .86 .08 <.001 
Remember-Guess β4(b) ------ ---- ------  1.45 .11 <.001 
Guess-Know β4(c) ------ ---- ------  .59 .11 <.001 
Random effects:         
Participant level σ2u .39    .39   
Stimulus level σ2e .20    .13   
         
Difference in model fit:   χ2(4) = 298.66, p < .001 
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Figure 8: The percentage of correct context recognition judgments on hit 
trials, broken down by race of face and race of participant in Experiment 8. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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RKG responses were also added to the second step of the regression model. 
Context judgments were more likely to be accurate in Remember trials (73.67%) than 
in Know trials (54.11%), β4(a) = .86, p < .001, or Guess trials (39.83%), β4(b) = 1.45, p 
< .001. Know trials were also more accurate than Guess trials, β4(c) = .59, p < .001. 
Context responses always followed old decisions and RKG judgments. A 
possible confound could have occurred if the RKG responses influenced participants’ 
later abilities to remember contextual information. For example, providing a 
Remember judgment may have generated additional retrieval cues, allowing easier 
access to the representation of the encoding context. A further regression was run, 
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using only data from Remember trials (N = 2909 trials). Again, the interaction 
between race of participant and race of face was a significant, β3 = .88, p < .001. 
White participants were more accurate with White faces (82.13%) than with Black 
faces (70.02%), β = .71, p < .001. Although Black participants were slightly more 
accurate with Black faces (70.92%) than with White faces (67.68%), this difference 
was non-significant, β = .18, p =.19.  
To confirm the validity of these analyses, the context data were used to 
calculate a measure of source identification which is independent of item recognition, 
the average conditional source identification measure (ACSIM; see Murnane & 
Bayen, 1996). The calculation of this measure is based upon the ratio of correct to 
incorrect context judgments for faces correctly judged as old. ACSIM values can vary 
between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating more accurate memory for context. 
The procedure for calculating these values is described in Appendix 3. A 2 (race of 
face) x 2 (race of participant) mixed ANOVA was run on the ACSIM data. The mean 
ACSIMs are shown in Table 17, broken down by race of face and race of participant.  
The main effects of Race of participant and Race of face were significant. 
Overall, accuracy was higher for White faces (M = .66, SD = .17) than Black faces (M 
= .61, SD = .18), F(1, 82) = 8.71, p = .004, d = .28. White participants were more 
accurate (M = .66, SD = .15) than Black participants (M = .60, SD = .14), F(1, 82) = 
3.79, p = .06, d = .43. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(1, 82) = 36.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. White participants were significantly 
more accurate with White faces than with Black faces, t(40) = 6.13, p < .001, d = .92, 
while Black participants were more accurate with Black faces than with White faces, 
t(43) = 2.27, p = .03, d = .34. The ACSIM analysis confirms the findings from the 
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regression analysis, that memory for context is impaired in other-race identifications 
compared to own-race identifications. 
 
Table 17: Mean ACSIM values for White and Black faces, broken down by 
race of participant in Experiment 8. 
Mean  Standard deviation Race of 
participant 
White faces Black faces  White faces Black faces 
White .74 .59  .15 .19 
Black .57 .63  .14 .18 
 
Discussion 
This paper presented a single experiment, in which White and Black 
participants living in South Africa viewed White and Black faces presented on 
different contexts. In a recognition test, participants attempted to discriminate old 
faces from new faces, and also made RKG judgments and context judgments for faces 
identified as old. The three main aims of this paper were as follows. First, to show 
that recognition of other-race faces is characterized by a marked decrease in 
Remember responses when Tulving’s (1985) Remember-Know procedure is used. 
Second, to replicate the context impairment found for other-race faces in Paper 4 with 
a crossover sample. And third, to investigate the ORB in a population outside of 
North America or Europe.  
The analyses of the RK judgments clearly showed that the ORB has 
dissociable effects on remembering and knowing. White participants made 
significantly more R judgments for White faces than for Black faces, while Black 
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participants showed a non-significant trend in the opposite direction. Consistent with 
the findings of Meissner et al. (2005), differences in knowing were smaller than 
differences in remembering. However, K responses are difficult to interpret within the 
RK paradigm. The analysis of RK responses is a contentious issue, as there are still 
debates concerning the relationship between recollection and familiarity. The decision 
to use the IRK procedure (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995) or to analyze the proportion of 
K responses (e.g. Gardiner et al., 1996) can influence the pattern of results. This was 
the case in Experiment 8. When the proportion of K responses was analyzed, White 
participants made significantly more K responses to Black faces than White faces. 
When familiarity was estimated using the IRK procedure, both groups of participants 
had slightly higher familiarity estimates for own-race faces than for other-race faces. 
These two analyses could lead to quite different conclusions. Therefore, one should 
always be very careful when discussing RK responses as if they map directly on to 
underlying memory processes. Gardiner et al. (1996) argue that RK responses are best 
treated as what they are – a participant’s subjective reports of their state of awareness 
associated with a recognition decision.  
Participants from both groups were less accurate at identifying the contexts 
associated with other-race faces than with own-race faces. Analyzing memory for 
context can be difficult, as context recognition can be confounded with item 
recognition. To confirm the validity of the ORB for context memory, the analysis was 
conducted in two ways. First, a multilevel regression was run on hit trial data only; 
second, ACSIM values were analyzed in a traditional ANOVA (Murnane & Bayen, 
1996). Using both of these methods, the results confirmed those of Paper 3, while 
expanding this finding to Black participants as well as White participants.  
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Context memory was much more accurate on R trials than on K trials. This is 
not surprising, as reports of Remembering are often associated with increased 
memory for source information than reports of Knowing (Meiser & Sattler, 2007). 
Yet K and G responses also produced correct context judgments at a higher rate than 
chance. It may be that the K and G responses were not “process pure”, and that they 
included some identifications in which there was some degree of recollection present. 
It is also possible that some context memory can be supported by familiarity. This 
position is supported in the implicit learning literature (Scott & Dienes, 2008). 
Most ORB studies have been carried out in North America or Europe. A 
handful of studies carried out in Africa have produced inconsistent results, with some 
but not others finding crossover effects (Chiroro et al., 2008; Chiroro & Valentine, 
1995; Wright et al., 2001, 2003). Here, participants from two racial groups living and 
studying in the same city in South Africa were recruited. The face recognition data 
showed the typical ORB, with higher accuracy for own-race faces than for other-race 
faces. The ORB is often particularly strong for false alarm rates (e.g. Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000), with 
accompanying hit rate differences also sometimes found (Meissner et al., 2005; 
Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). Here, crossover interactions were found for both hit 
rates and false alarm rates, although the effects were larger the false alarm rates than 
for the hit rates.  
For every measure reported, the effect size was substantially larger for the 
White participants than for the Black participants. Asymmetric effects are quite 
common in the ORB literature (e.g. Ferguson, Rhodes, Lee, & Sriram, 2001; Wright 
et al., 2003), with larger effects often being found in participants from the majority 
group than for participants in the minority group. Members of minority groups are 
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likely to have more opportunity for contact with members of majority groups than 
vice versa, due to the numerical frequency of out-group members in their environment 
(Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992). Minority groups are also usually associated with 
low status, and are reliant on members of the high-status majority group for 
employment and education (Islam & Hewstone, 1993a). 
South Africa provides a particularly interesting location in which to study 
cross-race effects, due to its relatively recent history of segregation. Uncommonly, the 
numerical minority group (Whites) in South Africa had high status and power, while 
the numerical majority group (Blacks) had low status and power. Cape Town is a 
particularly diverse city, and the University of Cape Town, from which the 
participants were all recruited, enrols approximately 50% Black students and 50% 
White students. Members of both groups should therefore have had ample opportunity 
for contact with individuals from the out-group. However, opportunity for contact 
does not necessarily translate into actual meaningful contact. A recent study 
conducted on desegregated beaches in Cape Town showed that people still almost 
exclusively associate with members of their own race (Dixon et al., 2005). Self-
reported contact was not recorded in this study, so one can only speculate on why the 
effect sizes were larger for the White participants than for the Black participants. 
However, as members of a group with a history of low status, the Black participants 
may have found interacting with White authority figures necessary throughout their 
lives. Being able to accurately discriminate between out-group members may have 
therefore been more important for the Black participants than for the White 
participants.     
 The results of this paper have been interpreted within a dual-process 
framework. Supporters of dual-process models argue that Remember and Know 
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responses affect recollection and familiarity, respectively (e.g. Gardiner et al., 1996, 
2002), and that memory for contextual information relies heavily on recollection 
(Meiser & Sattler, 2007; Meiser et al., 2008).  The current study, when related to dual-
process theory, suggests that recollection is specifically impaired for other-race faces. 
However, these results of could also be consistent with single-process theories of 
memory. Dunn (2004) and Donaldson (1996) argued that Remember responses are 
made to items recognized with high confidence, and that apparent dissociations 
between R and K responses can be explained by a simple memory strength model. 
DeCarlo (2003) also argued that source memory can be explained by an extended 
multivariate signal detection model, which does not assume the existence of two 
separate memory processes. Glanzer, Hilford, and Kim (2004) showed that Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROCs) for item recognition and source recognition share 
similar properties (e.g. the ROCs are convex, the z-ROCs are linear), and that items 
which influence item recognition have very similar effects on source recognition. A 
memory strength interpretation of the current results would suggest that own-race 
faces produce stronger activation that other-race faces. This leads to decreased item 
recognition, fewer reports of Remembering, and impaired memory for contextual 
details of other-race faces.  
 In conclusion, across two experiments, an own-race bias in face recognition 
and in memory for context was shown. The effects were larger for White participants 
than for Black participants. Own-race faces were more likely to be given Remember 
responses than other-race faces. Dividing attention at encoding reduced overall 
accuracy for both face recognition and context memory, but did so at a similar rate for 
own- and other-race faces. These results are generally consistent with the dual-process 
approach to the ORB proposed by Meissner et al. (2005).  
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Thesis Discussion 
 The own-race bias (ORB) is the well-established finding that people recognize 
faces of their own race more accurately than faces of other races (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). Several theories have been proposed as to why and how this bias 
develops. For example, lifelong contact with members of one’s own group creates 
perceptual expertise which is lacking for other-race faces (Chiroro & Valentine, 1995; 
Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Sporer 2001b). Other-race faces are then processed less 
holistically than own-race faces (Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 2006; Michel, Rossion, 
Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008), or inappropriate features 
are encoded (Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975; Lindsay, Jack, & Christian, 
1991). These faces will be represented in long-term memory in a way that is 
detrimental for later recognition (Valentine, 1991).  
 Meissner and colleagues (Evans, Marcon, & Meissner, 2009; Marcon, Susa, & 
Meissner, 2009; Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005) recently approached the ORB 
from a dual-process perspective. Dual-process theories of memory posit that there are 
two separate routes to recognition: through an episodic process of recollection, and 
through an automatic process of familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). Although both 
processes can lead to correct recognition judgments, recollection more often produces 
correct decisions than familiarity, and is necessary for the retrieval of contextual 
information about the encoding event in which a stimulus was seen (Mandler, 1980). 
Meissner and colleagues have shown that recollection is impaired for other-race faces, 
but familiarity is preserved.  
 The main aims of this thesis were to expand upon the work of Meissner et al. 
(2005) by providing further evidence for the dual-process account of the ORB, and to 
show that this recollection impairment for other-race faces leads to inferior contextual 
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memory. Eight experiments were reported across four papers, using methods such as 
Jacoby’s (1991) process-dissociation procedure (PDP) and Tulving’s (1985) 
Remember-Know (RK) task to estimate the relative contributions of recollection and 
familiarity to recognizing own- and other-race faces. Factors believed to influence 
recollection, such as depth of processing and context reinstatement were also 
manipulated. The results of these studies will be summarized below. This summary 
will be followed by more in-depth discussions of the theoretical and applied 
implications of the data, as well as a discussion of the limitations of these studies, and 
future directions for research.    
1. Summary of Results 
 In Paper 1, Jacoby’s (1991) PDP was used to estimate the contributions of 
recollection (R) and familiarity (F) to White participants’ recognition of White and 
Black faces. Based on previous findings of Meissner et al. (2005) and Marcon et al. 
(2009), it was predicted that the estimated R parameter would be higher for the White 
faces than for the Black faces. The estimated F parameter was predicted to be similar 
for White and Black faces. In Experiment 1, these hypotheses were supported. The 
participants made more identifications of Black lures than White lures in the 
exclusion trials, which produced a significantly higher R estimate for the White faces 
than for the Black faces. The effect size for this difference was large (d = 1.05). The 
estimated F parameter, on the other hand, was not significantly different for the White 
and Black faces (d = .13).  
 Level of processing (LOP) was manipulated in Experiment 2. The depth of 
encoding strategy influences recollection to a much larger extent than familiarity 
(Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002). Some authors have 
argued that people process other-race faces less deeply than own-race faces (e.g. 
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Chance & Goldstein, 1981). The predictions for Experiment 2 were that as the depth 
of processing increased, the estimated R parameter would increase, while the 
estimated F parameter would remain relatively constant. Control participants who 
were given no LOP instructions would perform similarly to those in Experiment 1, 
with a higher R estimate for the White faces than for the Black faces. Participants in 
the shallow and neutral conditions, on the other hand, would not show such a 
difference.   
 The results were generally supportive of these hypotheses. For both White and 
Black faces, the R estimate was higher in the deep condition than in the shallow 
condition. The F estimate did not vary across the LOP conditions. Participants in the 
shallow and deep conditions showed little difference in recollection for the White and 
Black faces (d = .13 and d = .14 respectively). The control participants had somewhat 
higher R estimates for the White faces than for the Black faces (d = .36), although this 
difference was not statistically significant. The lack of significance could have been 
due to low power, with 20 participants in each LOP condition. Nevertheless, the 
results were in the predicted direction. Paper 1 therefore supported the hypothesis that 
other-race faces are less likely to be recollected than own-race faces, and suggested 
that this could be due to less elaborate processing at encoding.  
 Paper 2 used a procedure similar to the exclusion trials of the PDP. White 
participants studied White and Black faces, presented with one of two verbal labels – 
“criminal” or “non-criminal”. At testing, the participants were asked only to identify 
faces that had appeared with one of the two labels (target faces), while rejecting faces 
associated with the other label (distractor faces). As both groups of faces are equally 
familiar, recollection is required in order to discriminate between targets and 
distractors. The main prediction was that participants would be less able to make this 
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discrimination for the Black faces than for the White faces, and that they would 
therefore identify similar numbers of Black targets and Black distractors.  This 
hypothesis was supported in Experiment 3. Participants identified significantly more 
White targets than White distractors (d = 1.13), but identified Black targets and Black 
distractors at a similar rate (d = .24). There were at least two explanations for these 
results. First, that the participants were unable to successfully retrieve recollective 
information about the Black faces. And second, that the participants were not 
attempting to retrieve recollective information about the Black faces. 
 Experiment 4 attempted to tease these two explanations apart, by manipulating 
the instructions given to participants at testing. The task was framed as a “stop and 
search” exercise, and participants were allocated to conditions with strict or lenient 
response instructions at testing. If participants are unable to recollect other-race faces, 
then these instructions should not have influenced the difference between target and 
distractor identification rates. If participants are simply unwilling to attempt to 
recollect other-race faces, then the instructions should have influenced the difference 
between target and distractor identification rates. The results showed that the 
participants in both the strict and the lenient conditions were able to discriminate 
between Black targets and Black distractors.  It is possible that the stop and search 
framework encouraged participants to respond more carefully, and that the strict and 
lenient instructions therefore had only a small effect. Overall, these results were 
consistent with the hypothesis that, under some conditions, participants are able to 
recollect other-race faces as accurately as own-race faces. The recollection 
impairment seen in Papers 1 and 2 may therefore be a result of reduced cognitive 
effort when responding to Black faces than when responding to White faces.  
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 Paper 3 investigated White participants’ memories for contextual information 
associated with correctly recognized White and Black faces. At encoding, each target 
face appeared on one of several backgrounds. At testing, the target faces were seen 
again, along with a number of new faces. Participants made an old/new decision and a 
confidence judgment for each face. For faces identified as old, context judgments 
were also required. A successful context judgment requires a recollective memory of 
the target stimulus as it appeared during the original encoding event. Based on the 
findings of Papers 1 and 2, the main prediction for Paper 3 was that context judgments 
would be less accurate for Black faces than for White faces.  
 Across three experiments, this hypothesis was confirmed. The participants 
consistently recalled the contexts in which White faces had appeared more accurately 
than Black faces. This effect remained significant even after participants’ confidence 
ratings had been accounted for. Context accuracy was above chance in all studies, but 
also relatively modest. This confirms previous research, which has shown that 
recalling contextual information about familiar stimuli is reasonably difficult (Brown, 
Deffenbacher, & Sturgill, 1977). Experiments 5 and 6 used meaningful and complex 
visual scenes as contexts, while Experiment 7 extended this effect to simple coloured 
backgrounds. The replication of this effect across different backgrounds suggests that 
the effect was not a product of the particular scenes which were chosen.  
  Experiment 6 investigated the influence of context reinstatement on face and 
context recognition accuracy. Reinstating elements of the encoding context at testing 
has larger benefits for recollection than for familiarity (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & 
Masson, 2007; Macken, 2002). Recognition improvements following context 
reinstatement are also larger for relatively unfamiliar classes of stimuli (Russo, Ward, 
Geurts, & Scheres, 1999). Therefore, it was predicted that congruency between 
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encoding and testing contexts would increase both face and context recognition 
accuracy, and that the effect would be larger for the Black faces than for the White 
faces. There was a small yet significant improvement in face recognition accuracy 
when the contexts were congruent compared to when they were incongruent (d = .20). 
However, this improvement was of a similar size for the White and the Black faces. 
Context reinstatement did not influence the accuracy of the context judgments. The 
small effects found are perhaps not surprising. Context reinstatement effects are often 
larger in recall studies than in recognition studies, with some recognition studies 
finding no benefit of reinstating contextual information (Macken, 2002). The presence 
of a target item itself is such a powerful cue for recognition that the context may have 
no further real value. This may have been the case here, with only small differences in 
accuracy between congruent and incongruent trials. 
 Paper 4 extended the findings of Paper 3 to samples of Black participants as 
well as White participants. Both groups of participants lived in a cosmopolitan and 
racially diverse city, Cape Town. Both groups of participants showed own-race biases 
in their item recognition and in their context memory accuracy. The effect sizes were 
larger for the White participants than for the Black participants. Although contact was 
not measured in any of the samples, it is possible that the Black participants had had 
extended meaningful contact with White authority figures throughout their lifetimes, 
thus reducing the magnitude of their ORB compared to the White participants. 
Asymmetric effects are common when groups differ in social status (e.g. Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993a, 1993b), and when one group is reliant on another for many aspects 
of their daily lives (education, employment, etc.). 
 In Experiment 8, Tulving’s (1985) RK procedure was used to investigate 
participants’ subjective reports of remembering and knowing. Participants were 
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expected to make more Remember (R) responses to own-race faces than to other-race 
faces, while proportions of Know (K) responses were expected to be more similar for 
own- and other-race faces. RK responses were also expected to be strong predictors of 
context memory accuracy. The results confirmed these hypotheses. Both groups of 
participants made more R responses to own-race faces than to other-race faces, 
although the difference was not significant for the Black participants. White 
participants made more K responses for Black faces than for White faces, while Black 
participants made approximately the same number of K responses for White and 
Black faces. RK responses strongly predicted accuracy. However, even after 
controlling for RK responses, the ORB for context memory was still present. These 
results suggest that remembering and knowing play some role in producing other-race 
context impairment, but that there is some variance left unexplained. RK responses 
are unlikely to be “process pure” (Jacoby, 1991), such that they will not map directly 
onto the processes of recollection and familiarity. Some of the unexplained variance 
may be a result of measurement error within the RK procedure. 
 Across eight studies, recollection was shown to be impaired for other-race 
faces compared to own-race faces. As a result of this, participants had difficulty in 
retrieving contextual information associated with correctly recognized other-race 
faces. The implications of these results for the theoretical accounts of the own-race 
bias will be discussed below, followed by a discussion of the practical implications of 
these data.    
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2. Theoretical Implications 
2.1. Theories of the own-race bias 
 Explanations of the ORB can be broadly split into two main camps. Perceptual 
expertise accounts suggest that extensive lifelong contact with people from our own 
group finely tunes our cognitive systems to be optimal for processing and recognizing 
own-race faces (e.g. Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & de Schonen, 2005; 
Valentine, 1991). Socio-cognitive accounts suggest that processes such as 
stereotyping and out-group categorization interfere with the efficient processing of 
other-race faces, which impairs later attempts at recognition (e.g. MacLin & Malpass, 
2001; Shriver, Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Lanter, 2008; Sporer, 2001b). Both 
of these positions predict that sub-optimal encoding strategies are used when 
processing other-race faces. This may involve the use of featural processing rather 
than holistic processing (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004), 
the processing of inappropriate facial features (Ellis et al., 1975; Hills & Lewis, 
2006), or the use of less elaborate encoding for other-race faces than for own-race 
faces (Chance & Goldstein, 1981). 
 Any of these social and cognitive mechanisms would lead to other-race faces 
being represented in long-term memory more poorly than own-race faces. The 
memorial representations of other-race faces could be generally weaker than the 
memorial representations of own-race faces, with less associative information and 
semantic links attached. Or other-race exemplars could be stored in densely clustered 
regions of a multi-dimensional face-space (Valentine, 1991), rendering later attempts 
at recognition more difficult.  
 Whichever theoretical stance one takes concerning the underlying mechanisms 
of the ORB, one would ultimately predict that other-race faces are encoded less 
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effectively than own-race faces, and are therefore poorly represented in memory. The 
dual-process perspective of the ORB (Meissner et al., 2005) therefore fits reasonably 
well with the varying accounts of the effect. Insufficient processing at encoding and 
weak memory representations of other-race faces should create difficulties in 
retrieving recollective information about those faces. For example, if less elaborative 
encoding strategies are used for other-race faces than for own-race faces, then there 
will be fewer semantic links associated with those faces, producing fewer cues for 
recollection. Or if other-race faces are densely clustered in face-space, then the 
increased subjective similarity of a target face to its surrounding exemplars will 
reduce the likelihood of a successful recollective search. 
 The dual-process account of the ORB has several advantages. First, it gives 
some insight into the subjective experiences of participants when trying to recognize 
other-race faces, which can lead to new ways of attempting to reduce the magnitude 
of the ORB. Second, by separating the recollection component of recognition memory 
from the familiarity component, one can make more subtle predictions about the 
effects of some variables upon the ORB, such as divided attention and levels of 
processing. And third, it allows new questions to be asked about the ORB, such as 
whether participants will be able to accurately recall contextual information 
associated with other-race faces.  
 Throughout this thesis, several factors were manipulated which were expected 
to influence the magnitude of the ORB, either by reducing accuracy for own-race 
faces or by increasing accuracy for other-race faces. The ORB remained robust to 
manipulations of response criterion and context reinstatement, despite significant 
main effects of these factors upon accuracy. In order to detect significant interactions, 
higher statistical power may have been required. However, the magnitude of the ORB 
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was influenced by a levels-of-processing (LOP) manipulation. When participants 
were given no encoding instructions, they were significantly more accurate with own-
race faces than with other-race faces. However, when the participants were 
encouraged to use deep or shallow encoding strategies, this difference disappeared. 
These results suggest that participants who are given no encoding instructions tend to 
process own-race faces more deeply than other-race faces, and that this contributes to 
the ORB in recognition.  
  Overall, the results presented in this thesis are consistent with the dual-
process account of the ORB proposed by Meissner et al. (2005). Recollection does 
appear to be impaired for other-race faces, while familiarity is preserved. As a result 
of this recollection deficit, participants make more errors when trying to distinguish 
between familiar other-race faces from different sources. Participants are also less 
accurate at recalling specific contextual information associated with other-race faces. 
The implications of these results for dual-process theories of memory will be 
discussed below, followed by a discussion of the applied importance of these data.  
2.2. Dual-process theories of recognition memory 
 There is considerable debate among memory theorists concerning the number 
of processes involved in recognition memory. Dual-process theories compete with 
single-process models of memory, which argue against the existence of a separate 
recollection process, and for a single signal detection-type process (Swets, 1964). 
Supporters of these models argue that many of the apparent dissociations which have 
been found between recollection and familiarity can also be explained by the more 
parsimonious single-process models.  
Consider the RK procedure (Tulving, 1985). Dual-process theorists argue that 
the consistency of RK responses across studies, coupled with the dissociable effects 
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of many factors on R and K responses, confirm the validity of the RK procedure 
(Yonelinas, 2002). However, single-process theorists argue that participants simply 
make R responses to items recognized with high confidence, and K responses to items 
recognized with lower confidence (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 1994). Donaldson 
suggests that participants have two decision thresholds which are applied to one 
underlying process. The first threshold will govern whether an item is judged as old or 
new. The second threshold, placed higher on the memory strength curve, will govern 
whether R or K responses are given. Items in between the two thresholds will be given 
K responses, whereas items above the second threshold will be given R responses. 
In Paper 3, confidence ratings were collected for each identification decision 
before a context judgment was made. Correct context judgments are more likely to be 
made for recollected items than are incorrect judgments (although the mapping 
between context accuracy and recollection is unlikely to be exact). Donaldson’s 
(1996) single-process theory would predict that inaccurate context trials should be 
associated with a range of different confidence ratings, whereas accurate context trials 
should be associated almost exclusively with very high confidence ratings.  
Figure 10 shows the percentages of accurate and inaccurate context trials 
given confidence ratings of 1 to 9. The confidence ratings are shown on the x axis, 
and the percentages are shown on the y axis. So, for example, approximately 5% of 
accurate context trials and approximately 10% of inaccurate context trials were rated 
with a confidence of 5. It is immediately obvious that the shapes of the curves are 
quite similar. For both accurate and inaccurate trials, there is a shallow increase in 
confidence ratings from 1 to 8, followed by a sharp increase in confidence ratings of 
9. Approximately 55% of accurate context trials were given confidence ratings of 9, 
as were approximately 35% of inaccurate context trials. This suggests that there are 
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situations is which a person can very confidently recognize a face without being able 
to retrieve recollective information about its previous occurrence. 
 
Figure 9: The percentages of accurate and inaccurate context recognition 
trials given confidence ratings of 1 to 9 in Experiments 5, 6, and 7. 
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There is also considerable variation in confidence ratings for both accurate and 
inaccurate context trials. Roughly 45% of accurate context trials were given 
confidence ratings between 1 and 8, and roughly 65% of inaccurate context trials were 
given confidence ratings between 1 and 8. This variation suggests that recollective 
information about a face’s previous occurrence can be retrieved even when the face 
itself is recognized with medium or low confidence. These patterns of results are 
inconsistent with Donaldson’s (1996) argument that recollection is nothing more than 
high confidence recognition.  
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Throughout this thesis, several factors were manipulated which have been 
shown to have dissociable effects on recollection and familiarity. Of all of the factors 
which were tested, the most successful one was the LOP manipulation in Experiment 
2. LOP effects are stronger for estimates of recollection than familiarity (Gardiner et 
al., 1996; Yonelinas, 2002), as deeper or more elaborate processing provides more 
cues for later recollection. In line with previous research, recollection estimates from 
the PDP increased as depth of processing increased; familiarity estimates were 
unaffected. However, the other manipulations tested in this thesis were not so 
successful at dissociating recollection and familiarity. While context reinstatement 
influenced overall accuracy, it did so at similar rates for own- and other-race faces. As 
own-race faces are more likely to be recollected than other-race faces, this 
manipulation should have influenced the size of the ORB. However, in order to detect 
such effects, greater statistical power may have been required.   
3. Practical Applications 
 When recognizing faces in an old/new recognition test, it is usually sufficient 
to decide whether faces are familiar or not. The familiarity associated with a test 
stimulus can likely be attributed to having encountered that stimulus during the 
encoding phase. However, when recognizing faces in the real world, one often wishes 
to know more than whether a face is familiar or not. Retrieving information about the 
source of a face’s familiarity will be crucial for guiding social interactions. The 
information that one is able to retrieve about a face will influence decisions about 
whether to interact with that person, and what form that interaction should take. In the 
eyewitness world, the retrieval of accurate source information by a witness regarding 
a familiar suspect will be essential in ensuring that the correct person is identified. In 
   
159 
order to illustrate this point, some real life cases from the Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org) will be discussed. 
 Timothy Cole, an African-American man, was convicted of raping a 
Caucasian woman. The witness was shown a biased photographic lineup. In this 
lineup, Cole’s photograph was the only color photograph, presented in a lineup of 
black and white mugshots. Cole was facing the camera, whereas all of the lineup 
fillers were facing to one side. The witness identified Cole as her attacker. Some time 
later, the witness was shown a live lineup, and identified Cole for the second time. On 
the basis of this evidence, Cole served thirteen years before dying in prison. He was 
posthumously exonerated on the basis of DNA evidence.  
 Gilbert Alejandro served three and a half years in prison for rape, based on an 
inaccurate identification by the victim. The witness got only a brief glimpse of her 
attacker during the crime, as her face was covered by a pillow. The witness was 
repeatedly shown photographic lineups containing Alejandro. She did not identify 
him as her attacker. She later identified Alejandro from a sketch lineup and a live 
lineup. The real perpetrator is still unknown. 
 A. B. Butler, an African-American man, was convicted of kidnapping and 
raping a Caucasian woman, for which he served 16 years in prison. The victim 
initially identified Butler during a mugshot search. Some time later, she identified 
Butler again in a live lineup. Butler was exonerated based on an analysis of DNA 
evidence from the crime scene. The real perpetrator has not yet been found. 
  Above are just three cases of mistaken eyewitness identifications which have 
resulted in miscarriages of justice. In all of the above cases, it seems likely that 
failures to identify the source of the suspect’s familiarity played at least some role in 
the eyewitness’s decision to ultimately identify the suspect. In the cases of Cole and 
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Alejandro, the witnesses were given multiple lineups including the suspect. The 
witness in Alejandro’s case did not identify him until after seeing his image in several 
photographic lineups. In Cole’s case, the original photographic lineup was biased, 
indicating very clearly to the witness which lineup member was the suspect. In 
Butler’s case, the identification was made following a mugshot search, during which 
the witness picked out Butler. 
 Laboratory studies have consistently shown that viewing an innocent suspect 
more than once, in multiple lineups or in mugshot searches, greatly increases the 
likelihood of mistaken identifications (see Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006, 
for a review). In these situations, the witness may unconsciously transfer the identity 
of the suspect onto the identity of the attacker (Loftus, 1976). The results of this thesis 
show that recollection, which is crucial for retrieving source information about 
familiar stimuli, is impaired for other-race faces. As a result of this, people struggle to 
discriminate between other-race faces from two different sources (Papers 1 and 2), 
and have difficulty in recalling specific details about contextual details associated 
with other-race faces (Papers 3 and 4). These studies therefore indicate that 
unconscious transference errors in eyewitness identifications may be more common 
when the suspect and the victim/witness are of different races. Of the three cases 
presented above, two involved cross-racial identifications. This will be discussed 
further in the following section, on limitations and future directions.  
4. Limitations and Future Directions 
 Faces form a very variable class of objects, which differ in many ways. 
Whenever a set of faces is selected for use as stimuli in an experiment, those faces are 
a small sample of a much lager population of faces. Just as when recruiting 
participants, one hopes that the stimuli are representative of the wider population of 
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faces from which they were sampled. Stimulus sampling errors occur when the 
stimulus set is not representative of the population (Wells & Windschitl, 1999). Such 
errors can lead to unjustified conclusions, which are an artefact of the particular 
stimuli used in the experiment. Stimulus sampling errors are of particular concern in 
studies of the ORB, which involve comparing recognition accuracy for two different 
stimulus sets against one another. If the two stimulus sets differ in their 
representiveness of the populations from which they are sampled, or in the amount of 
variability that they show, then the results will be unreliable and may not be replicable 
with other stimulus sets.  
 In order to increase the likelihood that the results from ORB studies are valid, 
it is ideal to recruit participants from both racial groups represented by the stimulus 
sets (Wells & Olson, 2001). If both groups of participants are more accurate with 
own-race faces than with other-race faces, then stimulus sampling explanations 
become implausible. Increasing the number of stimuli used also decreases the 
likelihood that the results will be artefacts of the idiosyncrasies of the particular faces 
sampled (Sporer, 2001a). Of the nine studies presented in this thesis, seven recruited 
participants from only one racial group, and two recruited cross-race samples. This 
could potentially limit the generalizabilty and reliability of these results. However, the 
main findings of Papers 1 to 3 were supported when a cross-race sample was recruited 
in Paper 4, indicating that the stimuli were not producing artifactual effects. The 
results were also replicated across two different stimulus sets (a different stimulus set 
was used in Paper 3). Furthermore, large numbers of stimuli were used in these 
studies (80 faces from each racial group in Papers 1, 3, and 4), reducing the impact of 
any particularly distinctive individuals on the overall results. Thus, while cross-race 
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samples could not be recruited for every study due to constraints on time and 
resources, I am confident that these results are both reliable and generalizable.  
 While considering the meaning of these studies, it is important to bear in mind 
that the dual-process theory of memory is still a topic of considerable debate. In 
particular, some of the methods used in this thesis, such as the RK procedure and the 
PDP, have themselves received some criticism. For example, some authors argue that 
participants do not understand the distinction between remembering and knowing, and 
so use R and K responses as proxies of high and low confidence judgments 
respectively (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). And within the PDP, the underlying 
assumptions of independence between the recollection and familiarity processes have 
been attacked (Curran & Hintzman, 1995; McBride, 2007). However, the consistency 
of findings presented in this thesis using a number of different methods speaks to the 
reliability of the results found.  
 A final major limitation of the studies in this thesis is that they are low in 
ecological validity. One must therefore exercise caution when considering the 
potential applications of these data to real-world situations such as eyewitness 
identifications. Old/new recognition tasks place very different demands on 
participants than a lineup places on an eyewitness. The quality of view in all of these 
studies was optimal, and ranged between 5 and 10 seconds in duration. A witness 
could view a culprit under sub-optimal conditions, and could view them from seconds 
to minutes or possibly even hours. Many other factors which could influence a 
witness’s accuracy, such as stress, alcohol intoxication, and weapon focus, were not 
taken into account in these studies. The participants in these studies were also aware 
that there were no consequences for the individuals who were identified – this would 
obviously not be true for an eyewitness making an identification.  
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 However, far from being discouraged by these limitations, one should view 
them as exciting new directions for future research. Will these results replicate to 
lineup paradigms? What would be the effect of factors such as stress, alcohol, and 
weapon focus on recollection and familiarity? How are the two processes influenced 
by changes in viewing quality? Will mugshot exposure be more detrimental to cross-
race lineup identification than same-race lineup identification? And would 
participants be more likely to misidentify innocent bystanders of a different race than 
of their own race? The results of this thesis certainly suggest that this would be the 
case, and so these questions offer promising lines of research. 
 As well as these more “applied” lines of research, future studies could also 
continue to explore the role of recollection within the ORB. An interesting idea which 
has emerged very recently is that of “graded recollection” (Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 
2009; Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & Weber, in press). Traditionally, recollection has 
been characterized as an all-or-nothing process, in which an item is either recollected 
or not recollected (Yonelinas, 2002). However, Mickes et al. suggested that 
recollection may be a continuous process, in which any number of elements of an 
encoding event could be recalled. For example, a participant could recollect a thought 
that they had upon seeing one target, but they may recall thoughts, associations, and 
contextual information about another target. While both of these targets are 
recollected, the second target elicits more detail than the first target. Mickes et al. 
argued that participants will be more confident for items which are recollected in 
greater detail than items which are recollected in less detail. Confidence and 
recollection should therefore be associated in a positive linear manner. This seems to 
be the case with the data from Paper 3 (see Figure 10, p. 160). Palmer et al. asked 
participants to report their memories of identified targets following R and K 
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responses, and found evidence consistent with this graded recollection process. Future 
research could similarly analyze the contents of self-reported memories for own- and 
other-race faces to discover whether participants report more details for recollected 
own-race faces than for recollected other-race faces.  
5. Conclusions 
 This thesis aimed to investigate the roles of recollection and familiarity in the 
own-race bias for face recognition. Based on the work of Meissner and colleagues 
(Evans et al., 2009; Marcon et al., 2009; Meissner et al., 2005), it was predicted that 
recollection would be impaired for other-race faces, but that familiarity would be 
preserved. These predictions were supported across nine studies using several 
different methods, including Jacoby’s (1991) PDP and Tulving’s (1985) RK 
procedure. Because of this deficit in recollection, participants make more errors when 
attempting to distinguish between equally familiar other-race faces from two different 
study lists. They also struggle to recall specific contextual information associated with 
other-race faces at encoding. These effects appear to be influenced by cognitive 
processing strategies at encoding and at testing, suggesting that there may be scope to 
improve recollection for other-race faces with carefully worded instructions.  
 The results of this thesis provide important advances in both our theoretical 
and our applied understanding of the ORB. The dual-process approach to the ORB 
opens up new doors for future research, allowing new questions to be asked. If this 
line of research is continued, it may well be possible to find ways of reducing the 
ORB. Future research should also focus on source monitoring errors in cross-race 
identifications, and what can be done to reduce the likelihood of such errors.  
 In conclusion, the ORB can be viewed as a specific deficit in recollection for 
own-race faces compared to other-race faces. Recollective memory plays important 
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roles in the real world, helping us to regulate our social interactions, and helping us to 
recall in which situations we have previously encountered others. Deficits in 
recollection can have far-reaching consequences, particularly within the realm of the 
legal system. This thesis provides a stepping stone to new lines of research into both 
the theoretical basis of, and the practical implications of the own-race bias in face 
recognition.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Formulae for Calculating the Effect Size Cohen’s d for Repeated 
Measures and Between Groups Designs 
 
 Repeated measures:   
  d = 
( )
( ) 2/21
21
SDSD
MM
+
−
    
 
 Between groups: 
  d = df
t
*2
 
Formulae taken from Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, and Burke (1996). 
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Appendix 2: Formulae for Calculating the Signal Detection Measures d' and C 
 
 d' = ( ) ( )FARzHRz −  
 C = ( ) ( )( )FARzHRz +*5.  
Where: 
 HR = ( ) )1/(5. +++ MissesHitsHits  
 FAR = ( ) ( )1/5. +++ CRsFAsFAs  
 
Note: HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate, FAs = False alarms, CRs = Correct 
rejections. 
 
Formulae from Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of Average Condition Source Identification Measure 
(ACSIM). 
 
Formula below is for an ACSIM calculated with three sources: 
ACSIM = 
N
YccYcbYca
Ycc
YbcYbbYba
Ybb
YacYabYaa
Yaa






++
+





++
+





++
 
Where:  
Y = old identifications 
aa = items from context a correctly assigned to context a 
ab = items from context b incorrectly assigned to context a 
N = number of sources/contexts.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
